I have decided to expand the scope of the site to include the Federal advance on Atlanta and eventually include Sherman’s march to the sea.  This will be a large project and will take a fair bit of time.  Bear with me!

Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman

1863 drew to a close with the Federal armies having had conclusive victories at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga, but the war was not yet won.  The Army of The Potomac had seen a number of different commanders, none of them excelling in the role and by the spring of 1864 Lincoln knew that he needed to have an overall commander for the Federal Armies. Grant was elevated to the rank of Lieutenant General on the 2nd March following a bill in Congress to re-establish the rank which had previously only been held by George Washington and Winfield Scott. In this position he would be Commander in Chief of all the Federal armies.

Following his promotion Grant moved east to be with the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General Meade, but leaving Meade with that command; this left the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi vacant, it was filled by Major General William Tecumseh Sherman.

The choice of Sherman looks obvious with hindsight, and with the knowledge of the outcome of that choice, but on the basis of track-record and talent, it was not so obvious. Thomas had redeemed the day for the Federals at Chickamauga, where he earned the sobriquet of “Rock of Chickamauga”.  It was Thomas who recovered the situation at Missionary Ridge when Sherman’s attack had failed, and in the coming months some of Sherman’s moves would be in response to suggestions from Thomas. Sherman had not shown himself so far to be a great general, but Grant considered Thomas to be something of a plodder, and he trusted Sherman.  At the end Grant put his trust in the personal relationship he had with Sherman; had he appointed Thomas then Grant’s antipathy to him would have caused Thomas to fail. It was critical that the two commanders should trust each other and be able to work together.

Grant’s strategy to make use of the Federal’s superiority in manpower and resources was to hammer the Confederates from two directions. Meade’s Army of the Potomac would move against Lee near Richmond, while Sherman would attack Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee.  This would stop the Confederates being able to reinforce one or the other army, and then when one of them was defeated the Federals would concentrate against the other.  His instruction in April to Sherman was that “....You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to be done, and leave you free to execute it in your way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations......” In his memoirs Sherman stated his objective as “Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah was the objective, but the Army of Joseph Johnston, go where it might.”

Realising that the North had an overwhelming advantage in manpower and industrial resources the South believed that for them to win their independence they needed to inflict casualties on the Federals while denying them any victories in 1864. There were many in the north who wanted Lincoln replaced and the war bringing to an end, the South wanted the Democrats to win the coming election and so replace Lincoln. The Democrats would offer the Confederates peace on the basis of “the Union as it was and the Constitution as it is”.  However the Army of Tennessee had experienced a “score draw” at Murfreesboro, a “barren” win at Chickamauga and failure at Missionary Ridge.  The Federals had won at Missionary Ridge, Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

Joseph E. Johnston

Following the defeat at Missionary Ridge Bragg resigned on November 29, 1863 and temporary command passed to Hardee, who had declined permanent command which was assigned to Johnston by President Davis. The two men did not like each other and this was to dog their relationship.  On the 28th December Johnston took command of an army which he deemed was in poor logistical shape and not in the necessary shape to undertake the offensive operations that Davis wanted to see; Davis wanted Johnston to move on the Federals at Chattanooga.

Davis believed that Johnston lacked the drive and offensive spirit that he was looking for in a senior commander, and his view was confirmed in the reports that others gave him regarding the state of Johnston’s army.  Hardee, who declined command did not help Johnston with the reports he submitted, he claimed that the army that he was handing over was stronger than it had been prior to Missionary Ridge and that he had ‘great pleasure’ in turning over to Johnston an army in ‘fine condition.’  As Connelly says in his history of the Army of Tennessee it is as if Hardee takes “..one final stab at Bragg, by giving the appearance that he had rebuilt an army ruined by his predecessor.”

President Davis believed that the force in front of Johnston was much smaller than Johnston made it out to be, he wanted Johnston to move against Chattanooga and then on into Tennessee to link up with Longstreet.  He and Lee believed that this would draw off Federal troops from Lee in Virginia, where Lee was convinced that the main Federal attack would fall. Johnston, however, did not feel he could do this, he put in requests for additional manpower and he did not believe that the army was in as good a condition as Hardee had made it out to be, when he had handed it over to Johnston. All of this, added to the bad feeling that existed between Johnston and Davis before he assumed command of the army, meant that Johnston would find himself constantly sniped at by the powers that be in Richmond.

Johnston had two Corps Commanders, Hardee [who had given an overly optimistic appreciation of the state of the army] and Hood [who took issues head on and would also give an appreciation that went against Johnston’s view] with Wheeler in command of his cavalry. Johnston was glad to have Hood, he was a fighter and a leader, he had exploited the gap at Chickamauga while he was under Longstreet’s command, and it was this exploitation that enabled Bragg to drive the Federals from the field.  Hood also bore the scars of a warrior; he had a maimed arm after being shot at Gettysburg and as a result of another wound at Chickamauga he had had a leg amputated and had to be strapped into the saddle.  Unfortunately for Johnston he made a report in early March that further undermined Johnston’s position with Davis, he wrote that the army was in fine condition with excellent transportation and could unite with Longstreet without any additional reinforcement.  In mid April he wrote Bragg to say that Johnston could not be induced to take the offensive and he ‘could not comprehend’ when the army would be in better condition for an offensive.

The plan that Davis and Bragg had for Johnston required him to march to join Longstreet south of Knoxville, cross the Tennessee River and the Cumberland Mountains and then seize Nashville before the Federals at Chattanooga had time to withdraw and stop them.  To help Johnston achieve this there were ‘promises’ of additional troops, but with no definite schedule, “just as soon as you may be able to use them.”  Johnston’s protestations that he was not able to do this, that he had insufficient men and inadequate transport were all seen as the excuses of a man who would not fight.

The mistrust with which Richmond [Davis] viewed Johnston’s protestations caused them to send agents to report back on the state of his force. One such was General Pendleton, Lee’s chief of artillery. Johnston had prepared his case and convinced Pendleton the enemy had some 77,000 infantry to Johnston’s 34,500, and he reported back accordingly and agreed with Johnston that the plan of Davis was not feasible.  Johnston was not against action, but he was against an attack at that time. He believed that the Confederates should remain where they were and cause the Federals to attack them, then, having beaten off the Federals, they could go on to the offensive. The Confederate position at Dalton was a good one, for the Federals to attack they would have to go against strong positions at Rocky Face Ridge.

Perhaps the difference in the trust levels between Prsidents and senior commanders is best exemplified by quoting from a letter written by Lincoln to Grant on April 30, just prior to the start of operations; “..I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, ...The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know.”  Very different to Davis and his relationship with Johnston.

The lack of confidence in Johnston as a strategic and offensive leader in the West continued through the month of May.  Even when he was being forced back from Dalton to Resaca, Davis and Bragg were still berating him for not taking the offensive to the force in his front, which they still refused to believe was as large as it was in reality.  They blamed him for allowing Federal forces to move East to join Grant and so threaten Lee.

1864 was an election year and with the Democrats prepared to negotiate peace and let the South continue as they were, the Republicans needed to bring the southern armies to decisive battle, they needed victories over Lee and/or Johnston before the election.  The south on the other hand just needed to inflict heavy casualties and avoid defeats, but Johnston would have to move sometime.

Before moving on Johnston at Dalton Sherman wanted to hurt the Confederate transportation and production facilities at Meridian and Selma, and I will open with the Meridian expedition before moving on to Atlanta and the coast.