The move of the two armies towards Chattanooga and the Tennessee River.

Map of the area of operations Rosecrans’ plan Rosecrans’ description of the area.

William Lamers describes the importance of Chattanooga in his biography of Rosecrans; Now, with Corinth and Vicksburg taken, Richmond and Chattanooga were the two most important points held. And while as a symbol Richmond enjoyed greater importance, from a strategic standpoint Chattanooga was its equal. From it railroad lines radiated to the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Gulf and the Atlantic. Chattanooga commanded the approach to the east Tennessee coalfields, best Southern suppliers.  It guarded the only avenue by which Virginia could be reached from the southeast. Its possession by the Union would practically isolate Virginia and North Carolina, and detach Alabama and Mississippi.  It gave access to interior Georgia. When this region was penetrated, the war of movement would be pushed from the middle into the Atlantic zone.  Chattanooga was the gateway which enabled the enemy to shift troops between Virginia and the West. It enabled them to dominate the Southern Alleghenies, a territory extending into North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama, and even South Carolina.  Chattanooga had political as well as military importance. Many inhabitants, who had no slaves, were pro-Union.  Thomas observed; “Holding Chattanooga enabled us to strike at its belly where it lived.”

Following the battle at Murfreesboro Bragg withdrew his Army of Tennessee to the area around Tullahoma, about thrirty-five miles to the south east. Part of his army had been sent to Mississippi because of the worsening situation at Vicksburg, the remainder was in two Corps under Lt. Gen. Polk on the left at Shelbyville with the cavalry of Brig. Gen. Forrest covering his left flank; on the right was Lt. Gen. Hardee with his right flank covered by the cavalry of Maj. Gen. Wheeler, the whole force being some 46,000 men.  Polk and Hardee commanded some 32,000 infantry and artillery, while the cavalry of Wheeler and Forrest accounted for the other 14,000 men.

In the map below, Bragg had his HQ at Tullahoma, Hardee at Wartrace and Polk at Shelbyville. The Confederate infantry held the gaps; Hoover’s, Liberty and Bellbuckle thus covering Bragg’s front towards Murfreesboro.

Rosecrans had not only Bragg’s Army between him and Chattanooga, he also had the natural obstacles of the Duck River, the Cumberland Plateau, the wide Tennessee River and then the ridges of hills known as Sand Mountain and Lookout Mountain.  These high points commanded the town of Chattanooga.

The Union cavalry was substantially outnumbered by the squadrons of Forrest, Morgan and Wheeler and although Rosecrans persistently requested a strengthening of his units, the War Department just as persistently turned him down.  The result was that the Confederate squadrons were much more effective. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad reported that they had only been able to run trains on their complete network for seven months and twelve days in the year ending June 30th, 1863.  Every bridge had been destroyed and rebuilt at least once, and the Gallatin tunnel had been blocked for some 250 yards, and could not be used for days. These cavalry actions had their effect on the supply situation for Rosecrans’ army, and on his reluctance to move at the speed demanded of him by Washington.  And Halleck in Washington was continually trying to get him to move;

“Is it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite answer, yes or no is required.”

Rosecrans responded;

“In reply to your inquiry, if immediate means tonight or tomorrow, no. If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes.”

Washington read this as meaning that he would be on the move at least by June 21st.  True to form, he did not move, Washington were losing patience with him, but on June 24th they received what they had been waiting for;

“The army begins to move at 3 o’clock this morning.  W.S Rosecrans, Major General.”

I have included a couple of paragraphs from Pratt’s “Ordeal by Fire” where he gives a view of the inaction of Rosecrans, and the outlook of both Bragg and Rosecrans;

“In central Tennessee Bragg and Rosecrans faced each other.  They were men much alike; if war were a chess-game played with animate but somehow indestructible pieces, both of them would have been great soldiers, but battles took all the fun out of it.  While Lee marched on to his high tide and Grant slugged at Pemberton among the marshes they sat still, inventing reasons why they should not fight.

In both camps the technique was similar. general Bragg rose for morning prayers and, being of a morose temperament, spent an hour or two brooding on his wrongs before calling in one of his generals for a quarrel - “Be pleased to inform me to what extent you have encouraged General Polk in his acknowledged disobedience” - then dispatched a wire to President Davis, setting forth his inability to accomplish anything while surrounded by such scandal-mongering villains.  general Rosecrans did his squabbling by telegraph, a less wearing method.  He was out for early mass and, being of a poetic temperament, rode around for an hour or two with Father Tracey, discussing the influence of God and the beauties of nature, then returned to headquarters and dashed off a bad-tempered telegram to Halleck, demanding more cavalry; he could accomplish nothing without it.  Halleck, a good nagger, retorted in kind - “Your actions with regard to Governor Johnson are disapproved”; “I must protest against the expense to which you put the government for telegrams”; “You have already more cavalry than any other general in the field.”  Being legally minded, the Chief of Staff had the general always in the wrong. But, right or wrong, nothing could make Rosecrans move from Murfreesboro till he had the horsemen he wanted, and six months drifted by from the day when Bragg withdrew from the banks of Stones River.”

For Rosecrans to succeed he would have to drive Bragg from his present position to beyond the Tennessee River and possibly get behind him and destroy his army.  To do this he had some 97,000 men in four Corps, although the number of effectives available for offensive operations was reduced to around 65,000 because of his need to leave garrison forces in his rear. His four Corps were; The Fourteenth under Maj. Gen Thomas, the Twentieth under Maj. Gen. McCook, the Twenty-first under Maj. Gen. Crittenden and the reserves under Maj. Gen. Granger. The Cavalry Corps was commanded by Maj. Gen Stanley. Foote in his history describes Rosecrans’ plan as follows;

“He had no intention of advancing due south, through Bellbuckle or Liberty Gap, for a frontal assault on the Confederate intrenchments, which presumably was just what Bragg was hoping he would do.  Nor was it any part of his design to launch an isolated attack on either of the rebel corps alone, since their positions were mutually supporting.  His plan was, rather, to outflank them, thereby obliging the graybacks to come out into the open for a fight against the odds - or, better yet, to throw them into headlong retreat by threatening their rear, either at Tullahoma, where their supplies were stored, or somewhere else along the sixty brittle miles of railroad, leading down past the Alabama line.”

The plan to catch Bragg involved some deception. Rosecrans would send Granger’s Corps to the west through Guy’s Gap and down the pike towards Shelbyville, hoping that Bragg would assume that this would be the direction of his attack.  Meanwhile the two corps of Thomas and McCook would swing south east through Hoover’s Gap to Manchester, where he would then strike for Tullahoma. At the same time he would also send out Crittenden with two of his divisions (the 3rd remained at Murfreesboro) to feint through Bradyville towards McMinnville.  The intention was that this feint should look like a feint to Bragg, further convincing him that the move by Granger on Shelbyville really was the main thrust. Bluff and double-bluff.

Rosecrans describes the country he will operate over, in his post battle report.

The Cumberland range is a lofty mass of rocks, separating the waters which flow into the Cumberland from those which flow into the Tennessee, and extending from beyond the Kentucky line, in a southwesterly direction, nearly to Athens, Ala. Its northwestern slopes are steep and rocky, and scalloped into coves, in which are the heads of numerous streams that water Middle Tennessee. Its top is undulating or rough, covered with timber, soil comparatively barren, and in dry seasons scantily supplied with water. Its southeastern slope, above Chattanooga, for many miles, is precipitous, rough, and difficult all the way up to Kingston. The valley between the foot of this slope and the river seldom exceeds 4 or 5 miles in width, and with the exception of a narrow border along the banks is undulating or hilly.

The Sequatchie Valley is along the river of that name, and is a cañon or deep cut, splitting the Cumberland range parallel to its length. It is only 3 or 4 miles in breadth and 50 miles in length. The sides of this valley are even more precipitous than the great eastern and western slopes of the Cumberland which have just been described. To reach Chattanooga from McMinnville or north of the Tennessee it is necessary to turn the head of this valley by Pikeville and pass down the Valley of the Tennessee, or to cross it by Dunlap or Therman.

That part of the Cumberland range between Sequatchie and the Tennessee, called Walden's Ridge, abuts on the Tennessee in high, rocky bluffs, leaving no practicable space sufficient for a good wagon road along the river. The Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad crosses that branch of the Cumberland range west of the Sequatchie, through a low gap, by a tunnel, 2 miles east of Cowan, down the gorge of Big Crow Creek to Stevenson at the foot of the mountain, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, 3 miles from the Tennessee and 10 miles from Bridgeport. Between Stevenson and Chattanooga, on the south of the Tennessee, are two ranges of mountains, the Tennessee River separating them from the Cumberland, its channel a great chasm cut through the mountain masses, which in those places abut directly on the river. These two ranges are separated by a narrow valley, through which runs Lookout Creek.

The Sand Mountain is next the Tennessee and its northern extremity is called Raccoon Mountain. Its sides are precipitous and its top barren oak ridges, nearly destitute of water. There are but few, and these very difficult, wagon roads, by which to ascend and descend the slopes of this mountain.

East of Lookout Valley is Lookout Mountain a vast palisade of rocks rising 2,400 feet above the level of the sea, in abrupt, rocky cliffs, from a steep wooded base. Its eastern sides are no less precipitous. Its top varies from 1 to 6 or 7 miles in breadth, is heavily timbered, sparsely settled, and poorly watered. It terminates abruptly upon the Tennessee, 2 miles below Chattanooga, and the only practicable wagon roads across it are one over the nose of the mountain, at this point, one at Johnson's Crook. 26 miles distant, and one at Winston's Gap, 42 miles distant from Chattanooga.

Between the eastern base of this range and the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta or Georgia State Railroad are a series of narrow valleys separated by smaller ranges of hills or low mountains, over which there are quite a number of practicable wagon roads running eastward toward the railroad.

The first of these ranges is Missionary Ridge, separating the waters of Chickamauga from Chattanooga Creek.

A higher range with fewer gaps, on the southeast side of the Chickamauga, is Pigeon Mountain, branching from Lookout, near Dougherty's Gap, some 40 miles south from Chattanooga. It extends in a northerly direction, bearing eastward until it is lost in the general level of the country, near the line of the Chattanooga and La Fayette road.

East of these two ranges and of the Chickamauga, starting from Ooltewah and passing by Ringgold to the west of Dalton, is Taylor's Ridge, a rough, rocky range, traversable by wagon roads only through gaps, generally several miles apart.

Missionary Ridge passes about 3 miles east of Chattanooga, ending near the Tennessee at the mouth of the Chickamauga. Taylor's Ridge separates the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.

The junction of these roads is at Dalton, in a valley east of Taylor's Ridge and west of the rough mountain region, in which are the sources of the Coosa River. This valley, only about 9 or 10 miles wide, is the natural southern gateway into East Tennessee, while the other valleys just mentioned terminate northwardly on the Tennessee to the west of it, and extend in a southwesterly direction toward the line of the Coosa, the general direction of which, from the crossing of the Atlanta road to Rome and thence to Gadsden, is southwest.

From the position of our army at McMinnville, Tullahoma, Decherd, and Winchester, to reach Chattanooga, crossing the Tennessee above it, it was necessary either to pass north of the Sequatchie Valley, by Pikeville or Kingston, or to cross the main Cumberland and the Sequatchie Valley, by Dunlap or Therman and Walden's Ridge, by the routes passing through these places, a distance from 65 to 70 miles, over a country destitute of forage, poorly supplied with water, by narrow and difficult wagon roads.

The main Cumberland range could also have been passed, on an inferior road, by Pelham and Tracy City to Therman.

The most southerly route on which to move troops and transportation to the Tennessee, above Chattanooga, was by Cowan, University, Battle Creek, and Jasper or by Tantallon, Anderson, Stevenson, Bridgeport, and the mouth of Battle Creek, to same point, and thence by Therman or Dunlap and Poe's Tavern, across Walden's Ridge. The University road, though difficult, was the best of these two, that by Cowan, Tantalon, and Stevenson being very rough between Cowan and Anderson and much longer.

There were also three roads across the mountains to the Tennessee River below Stevenson, the best but much the longest by Fayetteville and Athens, a distance of 70 miles.

The next, a very rough wagon road from Winchester, by Salem, to Larkinsville, and an exceedingly rough road by the way of Mount Top, one branch leading thence to Bellefonte and the other to Stevenson.

On these latter routes little or no forage was to be found except at the extremities of the lines, and they were also scarce of water. The one by Athens has both forage and water in abundance.

It is evident from this description of the topography that to reach Chattanooga, or penetrate the country south of it, on the railroad, by crossing the Tennessee below Chattanooga was a difficult task. It was necessary to cross the Cumberland Mountains, with subsistence, ammunition, at least a limited supply of forage, and a bridge train; to cross Sand or Raccoon Mountains into Lookout Valley, then Lookout Mountain, and finally the lesser ranges, Missionary Ridge, if we went directly to Chattanooga, or Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, and Taylor s Ridge, if we struck the railroad at  Dalton or south of it. The Valley of the Tennessee River, though several miles in breadth between the bases of the mountains, below Bridgeport, is not a broad, alluvial farming country, but full of barren oak ridges, sparsely settled, and but a small part of it under cultivation.

This was the plan then as Rosecrans moved out on June 23rd, and would take them to their next stopping point by the Cumberland Plateau.