BuiltWithNOF
Thomas

When the right wing of the army folded, Thomas remained, held off the Confederates and effected a controlled withdrawal of his units. He earned his sobriquet, “Rock of Chickamauga”.  As a native of Virginia Thomas was considered as a traitor by his own family for fighting on the Union side against the Confederacy. When he had been put forward for promotion from Colonel to Brigadier it had been opposed because of his Virginia roots, Lincoln had had to intervene for the promotion to go through.

Map of Thomas’ position

Thomas’ lines

Steedman arrives

Map showing Thomas’ position on Snodgrass

Preston’s attack on Horseshoe Ridge

Map showing assault on Snodgrass

The withdrawal begins

Bragg’s late attack on Thomas’ left

 

 

Rosecrans; “To Major-General Thomas, the true soldier, the prudent and undaunted commander, the modest and incorruptible patriot, the thanks and gratitude of the country are due for his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga.” Taken from his post-battle report.

The biography of Thomas can be purchased through Amazon by clicking on the cover photo.

While the right wing of the army had pretty well folded and retired from the battle (some to later rejoin with Thomas), and the Commanding General had also left, the position in the north still held. Thomas commanded the northern, left, wing of the army, and his dispositions centred on two of the homesteads; the Kelly Field, a little to the east of the Lafayette Road, and the Snodgrass House, about a mile west of the Kelly House. While these two wings of the army were themselves strong, there was a gap in the middle between them (see map below) that was never really strengthened, and never really a focus for the Confederates as Bragg and Longstreet both concentrated on the Federal flanks.

 

 

Map showing Thomas’ position, the entry of Steedman, and the later exit of Federal units.

 

 

The Federal units on the east of the Kelly Field were those who had held their positions in the morning against attacks by Polk’s divisions. Those around the Snodgrass House had formed there during the course of the battle. The Federal line was now somewhat of the shape Thomas would have liked Rosecrans to adopt, following the meeting on the previous evening.  However, if it had been adopted then it would have included many of those units who had now left the field of battle, and consequently would have made Bragg’s job harder. This line, south of the Snodgrass House, facing south-east and south was formed by units who had been in the battle, but had decided to retire no further, units such as Brannan’s, Stanley’s, Harker’s and others.  This line became the new focus of the Confederate attacks, and the first ones to try against Brannan were the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys, who went up against the eastern end of the line defended by Wood.  At the other, western, end at around 2pm. Bushrod Johnson began his assault with the brigades of Sugg and Fulton, but as they crested the ridge they saw two brigades of Steedman’s division, from Granger’s reserve corps, coming at them on the opposite side of the ridge.

 

 

Above left is the Snodgrass House, the photo to the right is taken from a position to the right of the house, looking due north. Steedman would probably have crossed the northern edge of this Snodgrass field on the way to the left to support the right of Horseshoe Ridge. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

 

 

Granger and Steedman had heard the sounds of battle from their reserve position and decided to move to support Thomas.  On the previous evening Thomas had checked with Granger that he was within supporting distance, the reply was ‘yes’, and they were at McAfee’s Church. At 8pm. that night Rosecrans had issued orders to Granger, via his chief of staff, Garfield, “You must help us in the fight tomorrow by supporting Thomas”.  While the order was not time specific, it was an order, allowing Granger discretion over the timing, as Commander of the reserve.

Steedman moved at 11am., with five miles to go to the battle.  The lead elements arrived at 1pm., the complete division was there by 1.30pm. En-route they were harassed by Forrest’s cavalry, but did not allow this to distract them from their aim to assist Thomas. As they marched south they left McCook’s brigade north of the McDonald House to cover their rear, while Steedman’s division, with Whitaker’s brigade on the left and Mitchell’s brigade on the right headed behind Brannan’s  men (to get away from Forrest) to extend the right of that line at Horseshoe Ridge. 

From Rosecrans’ post-battle report; “Fortunately, Major-General Granger, whose troops had been posted to cover our left and rear, with the instinct of a true soldier and a general, hearing the roar of battle on our left, and being beyond the reach of orders from the general commanding, determined to move to its assistance.”

It was these brigades that were now to cause Johnson’s men to recoil back down the ridge.  Thomas’ first order to Steedman had been to position himself on the left of Wood to fill the gap between the right wing on Snodgrass Hill, and the left on Kelly Field. He changed his mind with Bushrod Johnson’s and Hindman’s attack on Brannan’s right which could turn his whole flank and cut the route to Rossville.

 

 

This map from the Alabama archive shows the position around Snodgrass Hill from mid afternoon onwards. The gap between Thomas on Snodgrass and those east of the Lafayette road is obvious. Steadman can be seen arriving, and at the bottom are Gracie, Kershaw and co. attacking up the slope of Snodgrass.

 

 

From Thomas’s post-battle report; “Steedman, moving his division into position with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan’s right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on hima a most terrible loss in killed and wounded. This opportune arrival of fresh troops revived the flagging spirits of our men on the right, and inspired them with new ardor for the contest.  Every assault of the enemy from that time until nightfall was repulsed in the most gallant style by the whole line.”

 

 

Johnson called for support in his continuous assaults on the ridge, and when Hindman’s division arrived, it went in on the left of Fulton. However, these were the brigades of Deas and Manigault who had seen severe fighting earlier in the day (Manigault having been previously routed by Wilder) and were exhausted after just one assault.

 

 

The following is an extract from an article in the March 2000 edition of “America’s Civil War”, the article was related to the 35th Ohio Infantry regiment at Chickamauga and was written by Greg Fugitt; ”At 2 p.m. heavy fire was heard in the direction of the high ground to the right, and Colonel Van Derveer moved his brigade towards the sound of the firing. The 35th arrived on Horseshoe Ridge as Brannan was desperately trying to hold his line against relentless Confederate assaults, and the units was immediately placed on the western end of the ridge behind a line of logs.  From then until sunset, the 35th was hotly engaged in fighting of “inconceivable fury and persistence,” twice fending off determined attacks by several Confederate brigades.

With its ammunition supply nearly exhausted, the 35th fixed bayonets and waited for the next assault while officers scrambled for extra bullets among the dead and wounded. Old friends in the 2nd Minnesota supplied handfuls from their own meager supply, and it was enough for every man to get three rounds. Sensing that something was not right, Van Derveer ordered the Persimmons to wheel and guard the brigade’s flank. No sooner had the move been made than a Florida brigade appeared at the base of the hill.  A volley from the 35th, possibly the last shots fired at Chickamauga, was enough to scatter the tired Rebels.  The regiment remained in position on the ridge until ordered to withdraw about 7 p.m.” Van Derveer’s position can be seen in the middle of the map a little lower down the page.

 

 

Johnson and Hindman were finding that they could make no headway against the Federals on Horseshoe Ridge, their men were too exhausted. Also, Longstreet seemed not to have given this area of the battlefield much attention, and it was not until after he had had lunch, and his meeting with Bragg (who then went off to Reed’s Bridge) that he turned serious attention to this part of the Federal line.  Longstreet decided to deploy his last division, Preston’s, against the ridge and at 3.30 they were ordered forward, to pass through Law’s division.  The three brigades were Gracie’s on the right, Kelly’s in the middle and Trigg’s on the left.

At around 4.30pm. Gracie reached the foot of Horseshoe Ridge, came under fire and found the assault heavy going, as did Kelly coming up on Gracie’s left.  Kelly would become the youngest Brigadier General in the COnfederate army at only twenty-three; he commanded a battalion at Shiloh, a regiment at Stone’s River and a brigade at Chickamauga, but he would fall at the battle of Franklin. As the evening dusk came on Preston sent Trigg up a ravine in a flanking movement against the units facing Kelly.  They gained the ridge, turned east and together with Kelly’s brigade, encircled what turned out to be the remnants of the Federals on Horseshoe Ridge.

From Longstreet’s post-battle report; “Preston’s assault, though not a complete success at the onset, taken in connection with the other operations, crippled the enemy so badly that his ranks were badly broken, and by a flank movement and another advance the heights were gained.”

 

 

The climb that faced Gracie’s Brigade. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

 

 

The assault on Snodgrass in more detail.

 

 

While Preston’s division was assaulting the ridge, Thomas was complying with the earlier directive from Rosecrans to withdraw at dusk on Rossville, an order Rosecrans had confirmed by telegraph to Thomas at 4.15pm.  Garfield, having left Rosecrans on the Dry Valley Road, reached Thomas at 4pm. with the verbal order to withdraw.  Thomas believe this order to withdraw was a mistake, “It will ruin the army to withdraw it now”.  It was around this time that he earned the sobriquet “Rock of Chickamauga” as a result of a telegraph from Garfield to Rosecrans which said “Thomas standing like a rock”.  The first units to be withdrawn were from the Kelly Field, Reynolds division left at 5.30, then Palmer’s, but their withdrawl caused the Confederates to increase their efforts against the remaining divisions of Johnson and Baird.  As these last two divisions pulled back Johnson got out in reasonable order but Baird’s brigades were badly mauled.  While Thomas earned a reputation for his dogged defense at Chickamauga, he also pulled off a military feat in withdrawing his army successfully, while under attack by superior forces.

From Thomas’ post-battle report; “The order for the withdrawal being received about 6 pm. the movement commenced at 9 pm., in the following order: Strong skirmish lines, under the direction of judicious officers, were thrown out to the front of each division to cover this movement, with directions to retire at daylight, deployed and in supporting distance, the whole to be supported by the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, under the superintendence of Major-General Rousseau, assisted by Minty’s brigade of cavalry, which was to follow after the skirmishers. Crittenden’s corps was to move from the hill to the left of the road at 9 pm., followed by Steedman’s division.  Next Negley’s division was to withdraw at 10 pm.; then Reynolds, McCook’s corps, by divisions from left to right, moving within supporting distance one after the other; Brannan’s division was posted at 6 pm. on the road about half was between Rossville and Chattanooga to cover the movement.  The troops were withdrawn in a quiet, orderly manner, without the loss of a single man, and by 7 am. on the 22nd were in their positions in front of Chattanooga, which had been assigned to them previous to their arrival, and which they now occupy, covered by strong intrenchments thrown up on the day of our arrival, and strengthened from day to day until they were considered sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes.”

 

 

Bragg had earlier, at 2pm., issued orders for Polk to resume the attack on Thomas’ left, the orders reached Polk’s commanders by 3pm., but as that morning, the attack began late, around 5pm. At this time Reynolds had begun his withdrawal and in response to an order from Thomas, he ordered Turchin’s brigade to face north to protect the withdrawal of the divisions east of the Lafayette from Bragg’s renewed attack. Steedman, Brannan and Wood disengaged and withdrew with harassment, so now the only remaining units were the three regiments surrounded by Preston’s assault on the ridge; the Twenty-second Michigan, the Eighty-ninth Ohio and the Twenty-first Ohio.  One of Granger’s last orders before he left the area, while he was the ranking officer on Snodgrass (Thomas away supervising the withdrawal of the eastern four divisions from the Kelly Field) was to these regiments in response to a request for orders from the commender of the 22nd Michingan. He told them to “use the bayonet and hold fast”. This they did.

 

 

In todays world it seems almost unbelievable that an army could withdraw from the field with the other army almost unaware, but they did not have modern communications and surveillance tools.  The Confederates expected to have to renew the battle the next day, while Thomas had regrouped his units around Rossville.  The Federals pausing at Rossville only for breath, withdrew into Chattanooga, which they built into a strong defensive position.

 

Re-enactors, Bridgeport. Photo J Dillon

It is perhaps worth noting that Minty and his cavalry who were involved at Reed’s Bridge at the beginning of the battle on the 18th, was still on the field at McAfee’s Church after the rest of the army had pulled back to Rossville. He found himself and his 3,000 men “three miles in front of our army, and directly between it and the army we have been fighting for three days”.  When he asked Thomas for orders he was told “Well, as you are there, delay the enemy as you can. Give me as much time as possible to get ready for them”.  Minty finally pulled back to Rossville, arriving there at 1pm. on the 21st.

 

 

 

 

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