After the Battle of Perryville, October the 8th, 1862, General Buell had pursued the Confederates, but at a rate so slow as to exasperate the War Department.  As a result he was replaced as commander by Major General William S. Rosecrans, and the army was redesignated from Army of the Ohio to Army of the Cumberland.  He joined the army at Bowling Green on October 30th. Although Rosecrans had commanded the Army of the Mississippi, and had won the Battle of Corinth in October ‘62, Grant had a low opinion of him for failing to pursue and destroy the enemy.

Rosecrans

“The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the army in Middle Tennessee.  I was delighted at the promotion of General Rosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day.”  General U.S. Grant ‘Personal Memoirs’.

But Rosecrans was not first choice for the position. On 29 September Buell had received a message from Washington telling him to yield command to General Thomas, but Thomas declined.  Where other Generals burned to take command of armies, Thomas seemed strangely reluctant and gives one the impression that he prefers being s solid support to a chief, rather than wishing to assume the mantle of Chief.  Thomas declined, “General Buell’s preparations have been completed to move against the enemy and I respectfully ask that he may be retained in command. My position is very embarrassing, not being as well informed as I should be as the commander of this army and in the assumption of such responsibility. ..... his removal and my assignment were alike unjust to him and to me.  It was unjust to him to relieve him on the eve of battle, and unjust to myself to impose on me the command of the army at such a time.”

In the November of ‘62 Rosecrans had concentrated his Federal Army in the vicinity of Nashville and he did not wish to move until he had collected two million rations for his force. There were some 60,000 men; about half of them in the centre under Thomas, 16,000 on the right and 14,000 on the left.  He was concerned about the vulnerability of his communication lines from Louisville, and these were in fact broken by Morgan’s cavalry on the 26th December.  Entreaties for him to get moving went unheeded. The following is from Foote’s book, ‘The Civil War’.

When Halleck at last lost patience altogether, informing the General in early December that he had twice been asked to designate a successor for him - “If you remain one more week in Nashville,” he warned, “I cannot prevent your removal” - Rosecrans set his heels in hard and bristled back at the General-in-Chief: “I need no other stimulus to make me do my duty than the knowledge of what it is.  To threats of removal or the like I must be permitted to say that I am insensible.”

Bragg had moved his Confederate force from Chattanooga to Murfreesboro, where he had effectively gone into winter quarters and did not expect a Federal move against him until the Spring.  Bragg had disappointed he generals, especially Polk and Hardee, by his unwillingness to take advantage of his position at Munfordsville and later at Perryville. He had occupied the former in mid September, putting his army between Buell and Luisville, but while his subordinates expected a battle and a victory, Bragg withdrew to Bardstown. Buell caught some of the rebels at Perryville while Bragg was away, this caused Bragg to return and he forced the Federals to withdraw.  But again, rather than follow up the action Bragg pulled back to Murfreesboro. Polk petitioned Jefferson Davis for the removal of Bragg, but to no avail. Bragg would have to suffer the dissension of his subordinates right through to Chickamauga.

Bragg

Foote: “Completing his two-day circuit of Rosecrans - in the course of which he captured more than a thousand men, destroyed all or parts of four wagon trains, brought off enough rifles and carbines to arm a brigade, remounted all of his troopers who needed fresh horses, and left a train of destruction along both flanks and around the rear of the entire Union army - Wheeler made contact with Bragg’s left at 2 a.m. on the last day of the year, in time for a share in the battle which was now about to open.”

As Christmas approached, and under a lot of pressure from Washington to ‘do something’, Rosecrans prepared to move on Bragg in his winter quarters.  The move started at 04.40 on the 26th December in inclement weather.  The Federal advance, while meeting some pockets of resistance, continued well but Rosecrans had trouble organising his cavalry, they were on the road after rather than before the infantry. At the end of the first days advance Crittenden, on the Federal left, was closer to Bragg (16 miles) than was Hardee out on the left flank 24 miles away. Unsure of the objective Rosecrans was making for Bragg was reluctant to concentrate on Murfreesboro.  However, following a later update from Hardee he decided just such a move was needed and shortly before dawn on the 27th orders were issued for the army to gather at Murfreesboro. By the end of the 27th the Federals were in an arc to the west and north-west of Murfreesboro; from Triune in the west some 15 miles away, to part of Crittenden’s force at Stewart Creek about 10 miles from the town.