The gap in the line, created by the movement of Wood as he attempts to comply with the order from Rosecrans, allows Longstreet to exploit the position.

Longstreet’s units Johnson pushes through the gap Diagram of the breakthough Part of Sheridan’s battle report The Federal right wing collapses Rosecrans’ report of the rout on the right

While the Federal units were changing position Bragg had his own concerns; the attack had started some four hours later than he had intended, and following the setback for Adam, Stovall and Helm, the Confederates were not rolling up the Federals from north to south. Stalled, Bragg decided to issue an order to his commanders that they should all advance. Major General Stewart got right to it and threw his three brigades over the Lafayette Road.  After initial success aganist Brannan’s right flank and Van Cleeve in Brannan’s rear, Stewart’s force was thrown back again.

Longstreet, with some 23,000 men, commanding the left wing of Bragg’s army had Stewart’s division on his right, partly entangled with two of Cleburne’s brigades, in his centre front was Bushrod Johnson’s division on both sides of the Brotherton Road. and on Johnson’s left was Hindman’s division. Behind Johnson was Law’s division, then behind Law was Kershaw with two brigades of McLaw’s division. The three division column of Johnson, Law and Kershaw was commanded by Hood under Longstreet’s overall command of the wing.  At 11:10 Longstreet gave Johnson the order to begin his attack. He was some 300 yards east of the Lafayette opposite that part of the Federal line which was being vacated by Wood.

On the night of the 19th Longstreet had asked for residents of the area who were in the confederate army to come forward and help him understand the lie of the land and the local trails.  One of those who spent time with him, and acted as scout, was Tom Brotherton, whose family cabin would now be at the centre of events. The consequences of Wood’s move were now to be apparent to the Federals.  As Johnson’s troops went forward through the gap they came under artillery fire from Davis to the left of his advance, and Brannan to his right, but there was little resistance to his front.

This shows the Brotherton cabin, the Lafayette would be in the woods behind the cabin. The view is from south of the cabin.

This view is over the cannon in the photo to the left. It shows the Brotherton field, with the woods the other side. The Confederates faced little opposition as they crossed this.

As Johnson attacked, Fulton’s bigade pushed into the gap left by Wood, with McNair’s brigade on his right.  Facing them they now had the field to the west of the Brotherton House (picture above left), and Federal guns in the woods to the east of the Dyer field. Johnson’s men hesitated, then rushed, capturing fifteen of the twenty-six guns.  These guns should have been supported by the infantry of Buell’s brigade, but they were part of Wood’s division, and he was moving to the rear of Reynolds, as required by his interpretation of Rosecrans’ order.  Of Wood’s other two brigades, Barnes had reached Thomas’ units at the Kelly Field with Harker’s brigade following him, in the area of the Dyer field. Buell’s brigade, moving in column, were smashed by the Confederates. Wood, noticing what was happening behind him, stopped Harker at the Dyer field and ordered him to counter attack the Confederates in that field.  Harker’s stance caused the Federal units of McNair, Perry and Robertson to break and retreat to the woods east of the Dyer field, behind the Brotherton House.

Photo of the Kelly House, taken with a telephoto from the position of Reynolds’ line on the Battle Line Road.  The shot is taken from the woods across the Kelly Field. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

The diagram below shows Wood’s move, and Longstreet’s breakthrough

As Johnson’s men pushed through the gap Brannan’s right flank, the 17th Ohio, was exposed with Wood having left his position.  This regiment was savagely attacked in front, flank and rear, they then broke and ran. Johnson himself went forward with his mens’ advance and reached a ridge some 400 yards west of the Dyer House from which he was able to overlook the Dry Valley Road.  This road was vital to the Federals as their link from the field of battle, through the McFarland Gap and on to Chattanooga.  Having reached this point Johnson would need support to hold it as many of his men had fallen in the rush through the centre.

Hood now took hold of the situation with his three division column.  He ordered Kershaw to hold Harker’s brigade while he, Hood, rode towards Robertson, who commanded his old Texan brigade. At this point Hood was shot in the leg, evacuated to a field hospital near Alexander’s Bridge and had to have his leg amputated.

From Longstreet’s post-battle report; “Hood’s column broke the enemy’s line near the Brotherton house and made it wheel to the right.  In making this movement Major-General Hood fell severely, and it was feared mortally, wounded by a Minie ball breaking his thigh.

Having been ordered to deal with Harker, Kershaw advanced and Harker in turn was told by Wood to make a fighting withdrawal, Kershaw then pushed to the ridge near the Snodgrass House. Here Kershaw and Humphrey started to get their brigades into position for a possible assault on the ridge. Further south on the battlefield, to Longstreet’s left and about 600 - 800 yards east of the Lafayette Road was Hindman’s division. He had Deas’ brigade on the right, Manigault’s on his left and Patton Anderson in reserve.  They crossed the Lafayette to attack Davis’ division which had the two birgades commanded by Carlin and Martin.  Davis had his men positioned behind crude barricades south of the Brotherton House, but these barricades did not have the stopping power of those built by Thomas further north.

View from the Lafayette Road at the south of the battlefield, crossed by Manigault, but repulsed by Wilder coming from the far left of the shot. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

On the evening of the 19th Thomas had warned Rosecrans about the poor state of the right wing of the army, he had recommended that it be brought up closer to Snodgrass. A pity Rosecrans did not act on the advice.  As Hindman overran the units of Davis, Sheridan was crossing Davis’ rear, having been ordered by Rosecrans to go to the assistance of Thomas.  Davis’ headlong retreat was taken up by Sheridan’s men.  The Confederate push reached the Widow Glenn’s house, but the exposed flank of Manigault was attacked by the arrival of Wilder’s brigade with his Spencer repeaters and he was driven back three-quarters of a mile, over the Lafayette Road. Hindman’s other two brigades were now opposed by Lytle’s brigade who had not retreated like the rest of Sheridan’s division.

Jim’s cannon crew fire at Bridgeport re-enactment.  Photo J Dillon

In his after battle report Sheridan wrote; “I here learned positively what I had before partially seen, that the divisions still farther on my left had been driven, and that I was completely cut off.  I then determined to connect myself with the troops of General Thomas by moving on the arc of a circle until I struck the Dry Creek Valleyroad, by which I hoped to form the junction ... On reaching the Dry Creek Valley road I found that the enemy had moved parallel to me and had also arrived at the road, thus preventing my joining General Thomas by that route.” He then felt that he needed to go via Rossville to be able to get round onto Thomas’ left; “I then determined to move quickly on Rossville and form a junction with him on his left flank via the Lafayette road. This was successfully accomplished about 5.30 pm.”

After the battle there was criticism of Sheridan, had he just left the field leaving Thomas in a difficult position?  One of those there was Confederate Brigadier General Archibald Gracie who had assaulted up the slope of Snodgrass Hill, he said afterwards; “General Sheridan owes no apology for his conduct or for any order that he delivered that day. On the other hand, when we consider the extraordinary movement made by his division , from the extreme right wing of the army to the extreme left, after receiving the terrible punishment in the morning, we cannot but consider the performance a remarkable one, which, so far as I can learn, has not its counterpart in any other great battle.  General Sheridan marched his troops into the battle, as he supposed, at the most important point where his men might render the most service and have the opportunity of redeeming their noontime discomfiture.”

Lytle’s brigade was in column as part of Sheridan’s division going to support Thomas, when the Confederates overran Davis.  He had to reform his brigade into line of battle and was now on Rosecrans’ far right flank, both of his own flanks overlapped by Hindman and with Sheridan’s other two brigades, and Davis’ division, departing the field. Not a good position, so he decided to charge! Almost as soon as they began the counter attack Lytle himself was wounded, and then hit by three more bullets and dropped from his horse.  he died where his men put him, under a tree. His brigade had put up a good fight, but had also been forced to retire.

Longstreet now had his headquarters in the Dyer House, which had been in the centre of the Federal position when he began his attack, and he was now facing north rather than west, to assault Thomas on his Snodgrass position.  Longstreet wanted to cut the Dry Valley Road, take McFarland’s Gap and so cut off Thomas’ retreat to Chattanooga.

General James Longstreet

Bragg sent word that he wanted Longstreet to come back to see him, to discuss the situation. Although Longstreet had pulled off a brilliant move against the Federals, meeting little that delayed him, except Wilder, Bragg seemed to be missing something in the situation. Now, as Longstreet had indicated, was the right time to continue turning the Federal right and cut him off from McFarland’s Gap.  Bragg, however, said he would be at Reed’s Bridge later, way off at the other end of the line.

At this point in the battle Sheridan’s and Davis’ units were fleeing westward.  Not only that but McCook and Crittenden, who had tried to rally retreating units, had also escaped westward, as had Rosecrans himself.  The right wing had not foght as a cohesive whole, they had found themselves with units caught in column on their way to support Thomas, and they fled the field when they might have tried to reform some way from the battle. The situation of the whole right wing was not made easier by the way they were spread out to the south, and were used by Rosecrans almost as a reserve, to be depleted unit by unit as he sent them north to support Thomas.  In the end Crittenden, who left the field, had no units to command, Rosecrans had sent them all individually to Thomas. They were constantly presenting themselves as targets in column to the Confederates.

From Rosecrans’ post battle report

While the enemy poured in through this breach, a long line stretching beyond Sheridan's right was advancing. Laiboldt's brigade shared in the rout of Davis. Sheridan's other two brigades, in movement toward the left, under  orders to support Thomas, made a gallant charge against the enemy's advancing column, but were thrown into disorder by the enemy's line advancing on their flank, and were likewise compelled to fall back, rallying on the Dry Valley road, and repulsing the enemy, but they were again compelled to yield to superior numbers and retired westward of the Dry Valley road, and by a circuitous route reached Rossville, from which they advanced by the La Fayette road to support our left.

Thus Davis' two brigades, one of Van Cleve's, and Sheridan's entire division were driven from the field, and the remainder, consisting of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, and Wood, two of Negley's brigades and one of Van Cleve s, were left to sustain the conflict against the whole power of the rebel army, which, desisting from pursuit on the right, concentrated their whole efforts to destroy them.