Mid-afternoon on the 25th November, Grant’s order for Thomas to attack Bragg in the centre, against Missionary Ridge, goes ahead.

Map showing Thomas’ advance about 4pm Hardee’s plan will lead to confusion IV Corps go past the rifle pits Map of Van Derveer’s assault Hazen’s brigade breaks through Bragg’s battle report

Having made the decision to have Thomas’ divisions advance against the Ridge there followed an unfortunate period of a lack of control and coordination. Some units were told to advance to the rifle pits and then stop, others to advance to the pits and some way beyond, others to go all the way to the Ridge. The orders were not being effectively transmitted down the chain of command. 

The confused included Sheridan; “While riding from right to left, and closely examining the the first line of pits occupied by the enemy, which seemed as though they would prove untenable after being carried, the doubt rose in my mind as to whether I had properly understood the original order, and I dispatched Captain Ransom, of my staff, to ascertain from General Granger whether it was the first line that was to be carried or the ridge.”  He later returned with the message that it was the first line, but he was a little late.

To add to the confusion of the soldiers many were told to leave their line and begin an advance at 3pm, only to be held in the open for some time under the enemy guns.  It was an unsettling time.  There are many similarities with the situation of the soldiers on the Western Front in WW1. Here also communication was poor, as was coordination within and between units and although the field telephone was available in WW1 the line was frequently cut by the shells of the enemy artillery. This often left ‘runners’ as the main communication link.  Also, most soldiers were only aware of the action in their immediate vicinity, soldiers in actions in the Civil War and in WW1 saw little of what went on around them. The smoke, the noise, the shelling and the fear limited their view to their immediate surroundings while in battle. They relied on their officers having a more comprehensive view. The order for the general advance was to be the firing of six cannon on Orchard Knob; General Granger finally gave the signal at 3.40pm.

The map from the Alabama archive shows the Federals move against the rifle pits and the ridge at around 4pm.

Some 24,000 men of Thomas’ divisions were to advance, skirmishers in front then two lines of the main body some 300 yards apart, ahead of them were some fifty Confederate guns on the ridge, and they can be seen in the map above.  Sheridan described the ground in front in his report; “The ground in my front was, first, open timber, then an open, smooth plain, the distance across varying from 400 to 900 yards to the first line of the enemy’s rifle-pits; next, a steep ascent of about 500 yards to the top of the ridge, the face of which was rugged and covered with fallen timber; lastly, the rifle-pits on the ridge, about 250 yards from the first line of rifle-pits; at the base of the ridge was a second line of pits, commencing at a point about opposite my right centre, and extending to the right.”

On the Confederate heights Lt. Gen. Hardee was tasked with meeting the Federal assault, Braggs view of his position was “Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose.” Hardee had believed that an assault was likely and intended to make his main defensive stand on the crest, not in the rifle pits lower down.  Accordingly he instructed Anderson, whose men manned the rifle pits, not to make a last ditch stand in the pits. When the Federals closed to two hundred yards Anderson’s men should withdraw up the slope to the crest. This plan of Hardee’s was received badly by Anderson and his subordinate Brig. Gen. Deas commanding the men in the rifle pits. They believed the idea of fighting then withdrawing up the slope would not work, and if they were not to fight strongly in the pits, why not withdraw before the Federal attack?  The result might have been expected; some soldiers knew of the plan to retire when the Federals got close and did so, others stayed believing they were expected to hold the ground - confusion and chaos. Planned as an organized withdrawal, the reality was a rout.

When the Federal Fourth Corps advanced they were more than surprised to see the enemy get up and run back up the slope, they thought the Confederates were in retreat, they didn’t know this was the plan! Once they reached the empty rifle pits they came under fire from the guns on the crest above them, they could not stay where they were.  In the centre of the line Brig. Gen. August Willich’s 1st Brigade of Wood’s 3rd Division were in the van of the assault and quickly decided that there was no future to be had remaining in the pits, they should press on to the crest.  Similar decisions were taken by Hazen on his right and Beatty on his left and within a short time the whole of IV Corps was moving against the ridge line.

The following is from “America’s Civil War” (March 2000 edition); ‘Florida Sergeant Charles C. Hemming was among those manning the rifle pits at the base of the ridge. “We looked out on the plain, and with the precision of a dress parade, their magnificent army came in view,” he recalled. “The officers, all superbly dressed, pranced out on their high-mettled chargers; the bands played, and, to the music, came the most wonderful array of splendidly equipped soldiers I ever saw. The old flag waved beautifully at the head of each regiment and smaller flags were in their places with the brigade and division commanders. The atmosphere was perfectly still excepting just breath enough to straighten the banners. When I looked upon the old flag at the head of that wonderful army, I confess that it drew my silent admiration, as I suppose it did that of many others of our Confederate soldiers.”’

From the same publication, but the other army; At the base of the ridge, Union attackers were delighted to see some of the Rebels retreating without firing a shot.  Other sentries tried to hold their ground, but they faced impossible odds.

“Robert Watson of Florida recalled:We held our fire until they were running within about three hundred yards of us and then poured a deadly fire into them and made many of them bite the dust, but we were very few in number, merely a line of skirmishers in single rank and scattered at that.  We mowed them down until they were within thirty yards of us and then we retreated up the hill. The hill was dreadful steep, and the enemy kept up a continual fire and threw a continual shower of bullets among us and I only wonder that they did not kill all of us.”

Grant, from his position on Orchard Knob was worried and incensed, who had ordered the divisions to assault the crest?  He had ordered only a ‘demonstration’ by troops in whom he had little confidence, they had been ordered to stop at the rifle pits.  Having previously witnessed Sherman’s men retreating from Missionary Ridge, Grant did not want to witness another that day. He sent Staff Officers to Wood and Sheridan to find out who had ordered the advance beyond the pits, and to recall them (“It was General Granger’s order not to go beyond the works at the foot of the ridge”) but the men were doing what they felt necessary in the face of the fire from the ridge, a circumstance Grant had not fully considered when he ordered the ‘demonstration.’ These orders to pull back caused more confusion when they reached Sheridan’s units and Wagner and Harker’s brigades withdrew to the pits while they could see Wood’s Division still advancing. This can be seen on the right of the map below.  However a follow-up order to Sheridan “...informed me that the original order was to carry the first line of pits, but that if, in my judgment, the ridge could be taken, to do so. My judgment was that it could be carried, and orders were given accordingly, obeyed with a cheer, and the ridge was carried.”

Thomas wrote in his report; “...the original plan of operations was somewhat modified to meet and take the best advantage of emergencies, which necessitated material modifications of that plan.  It is believed, however, that the original plan, had it been carried out, could not possibly have led to more successful results.”

Grant in his report does not indicate that he was concerned that the troops had apparently marched to their own orders and could cause a repulse such as Sherman had experienced on the left; “Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, ........ with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive - stopped but for a moment until the whole were in line - and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy, without further orders.” Nothing here about questioning why they were disobeying the order to stop at the first line, or the sending out of Staff Officers to order them back to the first line.  The report is written a month after events and by then it had gone successfully, so no point in reporting that this was not the original plan.

But confusion was not confined to the Federal ranks. A critical position in front of Wood’s Division was Sharp’s Spur (see top centre of map above) held by Colonel William Tucker, but prior to the Federal attack there was a lot of repositioning of the Confederate units in that area, so that when Willich’s men made the crest Tucker had lost support on his flanks. This was the break through point. Having reached the crest the Federals took one of the retreating twelve-pounder Napoleon guns and gun team which they then repositioned to fire on the Confederate units to the north of them, Manigault’s men. At a point in the action when quick and decisive action was needed, Manigault hesitated and sent to Anderson for support.  Too late, the gun was used on Manigault’s men who broke and ran, the breach was widening.  The collapse became total as Van Derveer and Turchin’s brigades broke through Deas’ and Manigault’s positions while Hazen’s brigade routed Reynolds in the centre. Against all odds Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland, not held in high esteem by Grant, had taken the ridge and routed Bragg’s Confederates.

Van Derveer and Turchin hit Deas and Manigault

Reynold’s is forced back as Hazen breaks through.

Bragg’s report after the battle does read as though he abdicates himself from any responsibility for the events after the Federals start their move on the rifle pits.  The following are some quotes from that report.

“In a short time the roar of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent that the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front. While riding along the crest congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on  my right and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point, under Brigadier-General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back.  General Bate found the disaster so great that his small force could not repair it.” Bragg seems not to have been aware that Hardee had called for the men in the rifle pits at the foot of the ridge to fall back rather than hold a determined stand there. This was always going to have the appearance of a rout, and indeed would become one.

“About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded.  Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where, by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally. Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved toward the left when he heard the heavy firing in that direction.  He reached the right of Anderson’s division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left, where the enemy had first crowned the ridge.  By a prompt and judicious movement he threw of portion of Cheatham’s division directly across the ridge facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact.” By now the whole thing was falling apart and Bragg’s earlier comment about the strength of his position seems to have been somewhat optimistic. However, had the men not been told to fall back it may well have all been different.

“All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate’s division, was entirely routed and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff and by many other mounted officers availed but little. A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character. In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, general Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breckinridge’s command, and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breckinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga.” Again I feel that what he is describing would have been the natural result of Hardee planning for the men to retire from the rifle pits. It would have made the men themselves feel that they were retreating, they would have been shot at from behind and the Federals would have been encouraged to charge on because the Confederates appeared to be routed.  Not a good plan.

Bragg in his report then moved into ‘not my fault’ mode, he seems to have forgotten that as the Commander it is his responsibility to make his dispositions and then control events through his senior commanders, was he aware of Hardee’s instruction to Anderson?

“No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left in allowing their line to be penetrated.  The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them. Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and, turning our guns upon us, enfiladed the lines, both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable.

Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence no enemy could ever have dislodged us, and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops who had never before failed in any duty assigned to them, however difficult and hazardous. They had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak-minded and untried soldiers; but our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind. As yet I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms.  Investigation will bring out the truth, however, and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad.” Given the position that the Confederates held on the heights, and the work the Federals would have to do to storm those heights Bragg could not surely believe that blaming the courage of his men was the answer. They were badly led in this action.

But while Bragg was blaming his troops, Grant praised his after the battle; “In a short time, you have recovered from the enemy the control of the Tennessee River from Bridgeport to Knoxville. You dislodged him from Chattanooga Valley, wrested from his determined grasp the possession of Mission[ary] Ridge, repelled with heavy loss to him his repeated assaults upon Knoxville, forcing him to raise the siege there, driving him at all points, utterly routed and discomfited, beyond the limits of the state. By your noble heroism and determined courage, you have most effectually defeated the plans of the enemy for regaining possession of the states of kentucky and Tennessee. You have secured positions from which no rebellious power can drive or dislodge you.”