Rosecrans, Commanding General of the Federal Army of The Cumberland, together with others of his commanders, voluntarily left the field.

Discussion between Rosecrans & Garfield Wilder & Charles Dana Rosecrans’ comment in his report Why did Rosecrans leave?

Rosecrans and some of his commanders rode up the Dry Valley Road before Bushrod Johnson had his troops or artillery in place around Vittetoe.  Retreat by the Commanding General may well be preferable to capture, as such a prisoner would be a great coup for the other side.  Hitler depended on this when he promoted General Paulus, commanding the 6th Army in front of Stalingrad, to Field Marshal. he hoped this would prevent Paulus from surrendering to the Russians, as no previous Field Marshal had surrendered. The ploy did not work.

Rosecrans, Commanding General

While Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, Sheridan and Davis had all tried to rally the troops, they had failed, and they had then left the field with these troops. However, it was not impossible to get through to Thomas, whose troops were still on the field of battle in the north around Snodgrass Hill. Major Thruston, a member of McCook’s staff, with an escort and some 200 prisoners from Manigault’s brigade did get through to Thomas, where he explained what had happened on the right wing. Thomas asked him to go back, find Davis and Sheridan, and get them to bring up troops to reinforce Thomas’ right wing, facing an expected assault by Longstreet.  By the time Thruston found them they had gone up the Dry Valley Road as far as McFarland’s Gap, and while Davis turned his troops as requested, Sheridan continued on to Rossville.  [From Negley’s post-battle report; “I rode forward and respectfully suggested to General Sheridan to move to the support of General Thomas, stating that I would join him with all the troops I had collected. He stated his object was to march to Rossville”.] It was getting dark by the time Davis arrived on the battlefield.

Ahead of Davis on the Dry Valley Road were Rosecrans, his Major Bond (who wrote the fateful order to Wood) and Brigadier General Garfield. When they came to the fork in the road that led one way to Rossville, the other to Thomas, there was a discussion that has been variously reported. The upshot was that Garfield urged Rosecrans to continue to Chattanooga where he, as Commanding General, may need to select a new line of defence. Garfield should ride to Thomas where, according to Bond, he should tell Thomas “.....after dark withdraw his troops to Rossville Gap”.  At this critical point Rosecrans should have ridden himself to see Thomas, to assess the situation and then, together with Thomas, decide the action to be taken.

From McCook’s post-battle report; “After ascertaining that the center of our line had been broken, my first object was to endeavor to find the general commanding to ascertain to what point he wished the rallied troops marched. Failing to find the general and believing that an efficient stand could not be made by the army until it reached Chattanooga, the firing on the left retiring toward Rossville, from the statements of General Rosecrans’ guides, and from observations by General Morton, I was satisfied that the enemy was endeavoring to cut our army off from Rossville. At this juncture, Lieut. Col. Lyne Starling, of General Crittenden’s staff, rode up and reported to me that his chief had gone to Chattanooga to report to General Rosecrans.  I then decided to report to General Rosecrans at once for instructions as my last order from his headquarters required.”

All this time there was still one coherent unit in the right wing who had not left the field, Wilder’s brigade.  Following his action earlier, where he had rounted Manigault’s brigade, Wilder was positioning himself to attack the rear and flank of Hindman’s brigade and so break through to assist Thomas.  Wilder’s men had the Spencer repeater rifles which would have allowed them to wreak havoc.  Unfortunately Assistant Secretary of War, Charles Dana, came across Wilder, and in an agitated state, ordered the Colonel to escort him to Chattanooga, telling him that the rest of the army had collapsed.  Eventually Wilder got Dana away in the company of some of his scouts.  At around 4.30pm. Major Thruston, sent by Thomas, ordered Wilder to establish a line from the Vittetoe House to Lookout Mountain to prevent the Confederate cavalry getting round Thomas’ right wing. He remained there, holding the position, through the night.

Wilder’s Tower, 85ft high, on a high point of the field where his mounted infantry faced the Confederate breakthrough.  On a hot September day in Georgia, the climb to the top for the view was a little more than we had expected!  Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

View from the tower, looking due east. The Lafayette should be at the east edge of the field over the first line of trees.  Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

From Rosecrans’ post battle report

The crowd of returning troops rolled back, and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down it accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, Major Bond, and Captain Young, of my staff, and a few of the escort, under a shower of grape, canister, and musketry, for 200 or 300 yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent to his support, by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our lines, but found the routed troops far toward the left, and hearing the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville. On consultation and further reflection, however, I determined to send General Garfield there, while I went to Chattanooga, to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to   make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies,  should we hold our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position.

Why did Rosecrans leave, a decision for which he was later much criticised. It is difficult to see a good reason, even though there were a number of influences on him. He was not a coward, although he had been under a great deal of pressure since he had brough the army over the Tennessee River.  The army had been in three wings where they were at risk of being destroyed individually, he had then brought them back together as one unit to strike at what he thought was a retreating Confederate army.  On the first and second days of the battle his army had held its ground, but he had failed to deploy it sufficiently well for the third day. He was dependent on Thomas, his most able commander, and had complied with Thomas’ requests for additional units when they were needed, but he had not shown the required belief in Thomas’ judgement when it came to the deployment of the right wing. The units here were spread out, they were not in depth, and they became a sort of pool of reserves, to be sent piecemeal, in column, when needed by Thomas.

Rosecrans saw the Confederates of Longstreet pour through the gap in his line, and he saw his right wing break.  He would seem to have allowed the views of these retreating units to convince him the whole army was in rout. That was not the case, Thomas, his able commander, to whom he had constantly sent reinforcements, was still in a strong position around the Snodgrass House and in front of Polk’s wing.  Rosecrans should have attempted to communicate with Thomas to assess that position.  Instead he allowed Garfield to persuade him to go to Chattanooga, and also to order Thomas to withdraw that evening on Rossville, without going to see Thomas.

It is difficult to excuse Rosecrans’ decision.