General William S. Rosecrans might have become one of Lincoln’s best generals; he had won a great victory at Stone’s River and followed that with his brilliant campaign pushing Bragg back across the Tennessee. But his Civil War record will for ever be assessed against his one big mistake at Chickamauga, when he allowed the gap in the line to result from his confused order to Wood.

Rich Mountain Iuka Corinth Army of the Cumberland After Chickamauga Missouri An assessment of his character

Rosecrans attended West Point, in the Class of 1842, where he finished as one of the top students and so was able to join the Engineer Corps.  In 1843 he took up a teaching appointment at the Academy and in 1847 he began a five year assignment as the engineer supervising the fortifications at Newport, Rhode Island. He had previously married in August 1843 and to try to earn more to support his family, he found it necessary to resign in ‘53.  He joined the Canal River Coal Company and then became president of the New Coal River-Slack Water Navigation Company.  However, when the war started Rosecrans went back into the army and was pretty quickly commissioned to Brigadier General from May 16, 1861.

General William S. Rosecrans

The book on the left is a biography of Rosecrans which is available from Amazon.

The first real action that allowed Rosecrans to show his military mettle was at Rich Mountain, July 1861. Rosecrans was under the command of General McClellan, who had 30,000 men against 10,000 Confederates who were at Beverley, West Virginia, with Colonel Pegram on Rich Mountain covering the road from Beverley to Buckhannon a few miles west of his position. Rosecrans suggested a plan to McClellan which involved Rosecrans moving behind (to the west) of Pegram and then outflanking him and coming at him up the slope from the southwest towards the Hart Farm.  The plan then called for McClellan, who would be to the east of Rich Mountain, to attack Pegram when he heard the sound of Rosecrans’ guns.  Rosecrans carried out his end of the plan but McClellan, to the disgust of some of them around him, convinced himself that what he was hearing was Rosecrans being beaten off, and he did not attack.  McClellan had a very inflated view of his abilities and worth, but this was reinforced by the way he was held in regard by many of his contemporaries.  He had been a US observer at the Crimean War, and his reports were well received by the US Army establishment. Unfortunately he had a trait of seeing everyone else as nowhere near his own ability, while if anything went wrong it was because he had been forced into acting in a particular way by his superiors; it was never his fault. Before the action at Rich Mountain he had described Rosecrans as ‘a silly fussy goose.’ (biography by Stephen Sears) An officer of the 3rd Ohio would later write that when McClellan first heard the sound of Rosecrans’ action he “sat there with indecision stamped on every line of his countenance.”

Rosecrans was left to fight it out himself, the messengers that he sent to McClellan failed to get through and when darkness came on the Confederates took the opportunity to escape.  The following morning Rosecrans found he had possession of Rich Mountain and McClellan moved his force into Beverley. Rosecrans had shown that he had the imagination to put forward a daring plan, as well as the resolution to carry it through but McClellan was keen to portray the event as a McClellan success, as he wrote in a report to his superiors; “I have the honour to inform you that the army under my command has gained a decisive victory which seems to have accomplished the objects of my march.  I turned the very strong entrenchments on Rich Mountain yesterday with general Rosecrans’ brigade of four regiments and one company of cavalry.”

Rosecrans wrote in 1865; “My brigade after a march of ten hours over pathless mountains, gained the gap two miles and a half in rear of the rebel entrenched camp, where he met and fought us with all the infantry and artillery he could spare from his camp, which General McClellan contrary to agreement and military prudence did not attack.”

This victory, and particularly McClellan’s report of it, assisted McClellan to command of the Army of The Potomac and Rosecrans to take over command of the Department of the Ohio, July 23, 1861.

In early 1862 McClellan was preparing for his Peninsular Campaign, and amassing as large a force as he could get hold of for this, in so doing, he caused his enemies in Washington to say that he was leaving insufficient forces to the defense of Washington.  Lincoln bowed to these voices and told McClellan that Blenker’s division should leave McClellan and join up with Fremont in his newly created Mountain Department, at Harper’s Ferry.  Meanwhile Rosecrans, without a command, was petitioning Stanton for a force to lead. As Blenker was not moving quickly enough to join Fremont, Stanton sent Rosecrans to hurry the division along.  As he said in a reply to Fremont; “I have sent General Rosecrans to take command until the division is brought in position for your command.”

As part of his assignment on April 14th Rosecrans met with Banks.  He felt that as Banks was facing only some 8 - 13,000 Confederates under Ewell and Jackson, that better dispositions could be made of the 75,000 Union men.  His proposal for a unification of the armies in the area of the Shenandoah met with disapproval from Stanton, and was to lead to Stanton holding a grudge against Rosecrans, he also felt that Rosecrans had not brought up Blenker’s division quickly enough.  That force however was in a fairly sorry state. Soon after moving out as directed by Lincoln, Blenker’s division were caught unprepared in terrible weather; poor clothing, lack of footwear as well as insufficient blankets and tents led to very poor morale and a slowly moving force.  He telegraphed Rosecrans on the 17th; “...I deeply regret that you did not follow my instructions.  I hope you will now see that the division is placed in its proper command, as I directed in the first instance.” Things were not good between them. Similarly on the 18th; “When you have obeyed your instructions by placing Blenker’s division under General Fremont’s orders you will return immediately to Washington and await orders.” A command did not seem to be immediately in the offing!

Things started to improve for Rosecrans in May when he was sent off to report to General Halleck in his Department of the West. He reported to Halleck on the 24th of May, where he was then put under Pope who assigned him to command his right wing. At this time they were in the area of Corinth after the battle of Shiloh which had taken place on the 6th & 7th of April.  In front of them at Corinth was Beauregard who managed to fool Pope into believing that he was about to attack, in fact he carried out a clever withdrawal from Corinth, and was moving down the Mobile and Ohio railroad towards Tuscumbia. Rosecrans was given the job of leading the pursuit of Beauregard, but Halleck was reluctant to take his advantage and give battle. So, as at Corinth, another opportunity to follow-up a Confederate withdrawal with a Federal attack was missed, or rather, avoided. Halleck did however claim a victory for himself and Pope over Beauregard, a victory which was later ridiculed as a ‘newspaper victory’.

Following this ‘victory’ Halleck decided to split up his force; Pope was sent to command the combined armies of Banks, Fremont and McDowell (just the sort of combination suggested earlier by Rosecrans but put down by Stanton) and Rosecrans took command of the Army of the Mississippi.  Halleck took over as General-in-Chief and Grant took over from Halleck the command of the District of West Tennessee, as well as Rosecrans and his Army of the Mississippi. Rosecrans now reported to Grant and their early relations were friendly and cordial, but this would change later.

In mid September of 1862, operating under Grant, Rosecrans was instrumental in drawing up the Federal plan for a pincer attack on Price in Iuka, hoping to defeat him before Van Dorn could come up from the south. Such a pincer attack required a great deal of coordination and communication for it to be effective. As with McClellan at Rich Mountain, plans do go awry and your other force may not be with you.

Rosecrans was to make his way south of Iuka, then attack northwards, but on his way his force had been delayed and he had informed Grant that he would leave early on the 19th, arriving at Iuka in mid-afternoon. It was expected that Grant’s force under Ord would have started attacking from the west before the arrival of Rosecrans, so allowing Rosecrans to fall on Price’s rear.  Therein lay the future confusion, who was waiting for whom. Rosecrans’ understanding was that “the main attack should begin on the Railroad to attract the enemy’s attention and enable me to surprise his [Price] left flank and get the roads in his rear.”

Rosecrans had told Grant that he would be up by 2pm (he was actually delayed until about 4pm) so would have expected by 2pm to hear sounds of Ord advancing on the Confederates.  He heard no such thing. Price, hearing of a Federal advance from the south towards his rear, moved some of his units to meet it.  There was fierce fighting in the brush for a couple of hours till darkness fell.  As at Rich Mountain Rosecrans felt unsupported; “Profoundly disappointed at hearing nothing from the forces on the Burnsville Road, and not knowing what to expect, it became my duty to make dispositions for the battle next morning as if we were alone.”

During the night of the 19th Price evacuated Iuka, and in the morning Rosecrans learned from Ord, when he asked him why he had failed to support, that Grant had ordered him to delay. This was based on Grant’s understanding of Rosecrans’ expected arrival late on the afternoon of the 19th, but Grant’s directive to Rosecrans to delay did not get to Rosecrans. This of failure Grant to continue with the attack from the west, or to ensure that his change of orders were both received and understood by Rosecrans caused the latter to feel let down by Grant, and allowed the escape of Price and his army.  It would also be a cause of bad blood between Grant and Rosecrans from then on. Rosecrans had now managed to get both Grant and Stanton against him

In our modern age we tend to forget how poor and slow communications were in the US of the 1860’s.  One reason for Grant’s apparent lack of real interest in the progress of Rosecrans was to do with events further afield.  On the 18th he had heard of the result at Antietam, however, the story he received was of a massive defeat for Lee, not a ‘draw’ as had actually happened. Grant allowed a number of hours to be wasted while the ‘result’ of Antietam was conveyed to Price, with a suggestion that Price should surrender. Price used the diversion to prepare his withdrawal.

Lamers. in his biography of Rosecrans makes many interesting points to highlight the difference between actual events in the battle at Iuka and Grant’s official reports. Although Grant had earlier agreed with Rosecrans that the ground south of Iuka made it difficult for Rosecrans to use both southern approaches to the town, and would only be able to use the west-most, he later blamed Rosecrans for leaving the east-most road open, so allowing Price to use it for his escape.  Lamers also spends some time on an issue that was live in the newspapers after the battle; Grant was accused of being drunk on whisky in Burnsville while Rosecrans was attending to the battle.

The next stage in Rosecrans’ career is Corinth, September 1862, where he is garrisoned along with 18,000 men at his disposal and expecting the arrival of the Confederates under Van Dorn, with around 22,000 men.  By the 1st of October Rosecrans was sufficiently convinced of Van Dorn’s intent on Corinth that he withdrew his outlying forces into the cover of Corinth’s fortifications. Grant, however, also by now believing Corinth to be Van Dorn’s objective, failed to move reinforcements quickly to Rosecrans.  Van Dorn for his part had a lot of respect for Rosecrans’ capabilities, describing him as “one of the ablest generals of the Unites States Army,” and so was preparing to meet strong opposition.

On the night of the 2nd/3rd October Rosecrans gave his plans to his subordinates and on the 3rd moved some of his force out to meet the oncoming Confederates and to allow him to assess Van Dorn’s line of attack on Corinth.  The initial contact between them caused the withdrawal of some of the Federal groups, but by now Rosecrans could see that Van Dorn’s plan was to attack against Rosecrans’ left and centre.  Van Dorn hoped that this would cause Rosecrans to move forces from his right to strengthen the left and centre, he would then attack Rosecrans’ right flank.  Both were wily, both were keeping their reserves well hidden.

By about 3pm on the 3rd the weight of attack on Davies was such that he felt compelled to fall back.  Rosecrans sent orders for Hamilton, on the right, to manoeuvre against the Confederates but Hamilton professed not to understand the orders and refused to move.  There was then a period of to-ing and fro-ing between Rosecrans and Hamilton to explain the orders.  When Hamilton finally moved, not long before sunset, the moment had passed and the movement did not have the desired effect, but as the day closed both commanders felt they were in a position to be victorious on the next day.

During the night Rosecrans, furious with Hamilton’s failure or refusal to understand the orders given in the late afternoon, rode over to Hamilton and ‘savagely’ berated him, much as he would later berate Wood at Chickamauga.

The battle began again on the 4th; at 04.30 Confederate artillery began to bombard the Federals’ left wing. From around 7 till 9 there was a lull, then the Confederates attacked Rosecrans’ centre-right. Soon Price, who had escaped Rosecrans’ attacks at Iuka, had taken Davies’ line in the centre.  Rosecrans rallied his men by personal example and the correspondent Whitelaw Reid later wrote; “It lives in the memory of every soldier who fought that day, how his General plunged into the thickest of the conflict, fought like a private soldier, dealt sturdy blows with the flat of his sword on the runaways, and fairly drove them to stand. Then came a quick rally which his magnificent bearing inspired, a storm of grape from the batteries tore its way through the Rebel ranks, reinforcements which Rosecrans sent flying gave impetus to the National advance, and the charging column was speedily swept back outside the entrenchments.” Rosecrans was certainly not short of personal bravery.

There was fierce fighting in the centre with charge and counter-charge and all the while fierce fire from the Federal artillery pieces on the attacking Confederates. By 2pm Van Dorn wrote to Price to tell him to withdraw. Van Dorn later said; “I don’t see how the devil Rosecrans held the place, and I don’t believe any other man in the service but Rosecrans could have done it.” Rosecrans rode to Davies’ lines where he had seen the men in full retreat earlier in the day and again his temper got the better of him, he told Davies the men were cowards.  Davies’ later recollection was that Rosecrans “...said upon the battlefield, among the piles of the dead and groans of the wounded, slain by the Second Division...that they were a set of cowards; that they never should have any military standing in your army till they had won it on the field of battle; that they had disgraced themselves, and no wonder the rebel army had thrown its whole force upon it during the two days’ engagement.” There were times when Rosecrans just could not control his ill-tempered tongue.

Grant, in his reports of the battle to Halleck, and of his own part in it, was less than totally accurate, while not participating he did have forces he could have dispatched to assist Rosecrans. Such forces as he did send were given notice to move too late to play any constructive part in the action. Having given Roscrans less than fulsome support for the battle, Grant was to criticize him for failing to pursue Van Dorn’s force “the moment they were repulsed.”  In his memoirs Grant wrote that Rosecrans “failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repulsed; he did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle.”  The gulf between Grant and Rosecrans was widening.

On the 5th Rosecrans began to pursue Van Dorn, but as had happened before and would happen again, orders to his subordinates on the pursuit and its timing were either followed tardily or at worst ignored. This would not best suit his temper. McKean had been told specifically by Rosecrans not to take his wagons with him on the pursuit.  McKean ignored the order twice and early on the morning of the 6th was sent back with his wagons to command Corinth. Rosecrans in his communications with Grant, while pursuing Van Dorn, was pleading strongly for assistance, insisting that now was the chance for the Federals to win a decisive victory over the Confederates.  Grant, in his only response to Rosecrans, ordered him to stop the pursuit. Rosecrans dissented with Grant’s view, appealed to him to reconsider, but said he would obey if told to; “I most deeply dissent from your views as to the manner of pursuing.  We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army which holds the lower Mississippi Valley.......The effect of our return to old position will be to pen them up in the only corn country they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and occupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications, and rolling stock will again render them superior to us.....If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient, I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of victory, but I beseech you   to bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill-supplied.”

Grant said that he called Rosecrans back because of his extended supply line, the Confederates could not understand why the pursuit was called off, they felt Vicksburg was at risk if the pursuit was continued.  The Cincinnati Commercial was just one of many newspapers that felt the honours for the victory at Corinth were due to Rosecrans, although Grant was claiming them for himself and others. The gulf was now there for all to see. Sherman, a friend of Grant’s later wrote “General Grant was very much offended with General Rosecrans,”  this because of the views of many that Grant failed to support Rosecrans at Iuka. Things had reached such a pass that Rosecrans effectively offered his resignation to Grant, “...if you do not meet me frankly with a declaration that you are satisfied I shall consider my power to be useful in this department ended.”  Rosecrans was promoted Major General and sent to command the Army of the Cumberland, leaving Grant on October 26th. Grant’s comment showed the rift between them; “I still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves.  As a subordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day.”

Lincoln and Halleck wanted Rosecrans, a proven winning commander, appointed to the command of the Army of the Cumberland (formerly the Army of the Ohio) as successor to Buell and so he enabled the ante-dating of Rosecrans commission to give him seniority over his subordinates who felt that they had seniority over him.  Stanton had wanted Thomas. This was not a good way to start if those subordinates resented the appointment of one they felt to be their junior in seniority. Thomas, McCook and Crittenden were all senior to Rosecrans, except for the ante-dating and Thomas expressed his view; “... today I am officially informed that he [Buell] is relieved by General Rosecrans, my junior. .... I feel deeply mortified and aggrieved at the action taken in this matter .... I do not desire the command of the Department of the Tennessee but that an officer senior in rank sgould be sent here if I am retained on duty in it.” This was before he had heard of the change in the date of Rosecrans’ seniority.  Rosecrans, in reply to Thomas’ complaint replied “the best interests of the country demand your service with this army.” In making the appointment Lincoln also urged action on Rosecrans, “I need not urge upon you the necessity of giving active employment to your forces.  Neither the country nor the government will much longer put up with the inactivity of some of our armies and generals.”  Inactivity would later be a charge laid at Rosecrans’ door.  On November 1 1862 he entrained for Bowling Green to take up his command of an army of almost 99,000 men (75,000 present for duty) with Crittenden as commander of the left, Thomas the centre and McCook the right wing.

Rosecrans’ initial aims were to get his army to Nashville and to improve the discipline, organization and absenteeism, after that he would move against Bragg, but he was concerned that the Confederates had a cavalry force considerably superior to his own.  This would give them a significant scouting and raiding capability over the Federals.  Bragg was also keen to do battle with Rosecrans and moved his army back over the Tennesee towards Nashville, by December 3 Bragg was between Tullahoma and Murfreesboro.

The two sides were ready to do battle for Murfreesboro in late December, and one incident is worth mentioning here because of its relevance during the battle at Chickamauga.  On the 29th December Crittenden’s Corps had moved down the Nashville pike towards Murfreesboro and had crossed Stewart’s Creek at 10.00 am, the Confederates falling back, and at about 3 pm reached Stone’s River. Colonel Garasche, Rosecrans’ Chief of Staff, passed an order to Crittenden, who was in sight of Murfreesboro, to “occupy Murfreesboro if you can with one division.  Encamp main body of troops on this side, as before directed.”

The timing of the message was such that when it was delivered to Crittenden the situation had changed. Bragg was positioned to dispute the crossing of Stone’s River, and while Crittenden ordered Wood to cross and occupy Murfreesboro Wood, given that the light was fading, urged Crittenden to ignore the order.  Crittenden however felt that he was obliged to obey, so Wood advanced. While he drove the enemy back he then found himself up against Breckinridge’s whole division, not a regiment as had been supposed.  Wood returned to persuade Crittenden that they should not continue, but should disregard Garasche’s order and this time Crittenden agreed that he would delay further advance until Rosecrans could be consulted.  Rosecrans later agreed that Wood had been right to question an order that was based on an incorrect understanding of the situation on the ground.

The incident is important, it told Wood that Rosecrans did not expect an officer to blindly obey an order that was based on incorrect facts. It is a pity that Wood did not remember this when he moved out of the line at Chickamauga, knowing there was no gap on his left, the incorrect assumption on which the order he received from Rosecrans was based.

After his success at Murfreesboro Rosecrans went on to win a later action against Bragg, forcing him out of Tullahoma and back towards Chattanooga, this action was won with little loss of life but was overshadowed by the victories of Vicksburg and Gettysburg.  Rosecrans, prickly as ever, resented the fact that Tullahoma received little attention.  Washington was still keen to have movement and success, and Rosecrans came now under a lot of pressure to move again against Bragg, but again he wanted time to secure his lines of supply and to build up the necessary stocks he would need for a campaign. To quote, or paraphrase, Professor Richard Holmes, “amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.”  Rosecrans would always try to ensure his logistical supply was in order before undertaking military action. He would move in mid-August after being pushed constantly by Washington, he would say of this;  “We were ordered forward alone, regardless alike of the councels of the commanders, the clamours of the press, the principles of military art and science, and the interests of the country.”  Halleck’s view was expressed as “You seem to be laboring under the impression that the authorities here were making war on you. There was never a greater mistake......Nevertheless, many of your dispatches have been exceedingly annoying to the War Department ....... It is said that you do not draw straight in the traces, but are constantly kicking out or getting one leg over.”  True to form, Rosecrans was building up resentment against himself, although he was recognised as one of the successful commanders.

The actions and movements that led to the battle at Chickamauga are explained on other pages on the site but it is worth mentioning comment by General John C Gordon who believed that Rosecrans’ feinting movements north of Chattanooga showed “a strategic ability perhaps not surpassed by any officer during the war.”  However, as the forces of Rosecrans and Bragg manoeuvred themselves towards the coming battle it was becoming obvious that Bragg was being reinforced to the point where his forces would be considerably larger than those available to Rosecrans. Grant, who could have given some assistance was prevented from doing so.  Halleck wrote to Rosecrans that “Grant’s movements at present have no connection with yours.” It is difficult not to believe that the ill feeling that Rosecrans had by now engendered towards himself in Washington was not to some extent responsible for this lack of enthusiasm for reinforcing him against Bragg.  By this lack of reinforcement Halleck and Stanton should bear some of the responsibility for the later events at Chickamauga, although it would all fall largely on Rosecrans.

The actions that took place before and during Chickamauga are detailed elsewhere, but we should note here that some of the characteristics which Rosecrans had shown up to this point would also show themselves during the battle, and to disastrous effect.  He often involved himself in the giving of direct orders to units, rather than going through his Corps commanders, it was as though he had either lost faith in those commanders, or had problems delegating in crisis situations.  This tendency would show itself strongly in the repositioning of his forces from the right to the left wing at Chickamauga, to support Thomas.  As he had at Corinth, he would allow his temper to run away with his tongue.  He gave Wood a dressing down on the battlefield at Chickamauga in such a way that Wood allowed himself to take his division out of the line, causing a fatal gap, and knowing that this would be the consequence of following an ambiguous order. He did it because of the way he had been berated earlier by Rosecrans.  When the battle went against him then those whom he had upset over the last year; Stanton, Halleck and Grant, were able to work to have him removed from the army of the Cumberland.

While the Confederates won the ground at Chickamauga, the Federals won the strategic transport hub of Chattanooga and as the Richmond Whig newspaper recorded, “If he is permitted to hold Chattanooga, then our victory will be without profit.  If he holds it, he holds a point from which he may at any moment strike at the vitals of the Confederacy.”  Following the battle Rosecrans set about his supply line again, as he was short of all necessaries in Chattanooga, after that it was his intention to move towards Lookout Valley.  Unfortunately for him Stanton was now determined to be rid of him, and he still had Charles Dana in Rosecrans’ camp sending back notes and telegrams, many were not to the advantage of Rosecrans.  While his soldiers still greatly respected him, Rosecrans was being undermined by the messages from Dana; “...our dazed and mazy commander cannot perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us, nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it. I never saw anything which seemed so lamentable and hopeless.”

The photo on the left is of Charles A. Dana, from the March 2000 edition of “America’s Civil War. Secretary of War Stanton had used him to report back on Grant at Vicksburg. Those reports were favourable to Grant. Unfortunately when he was sent on a similar mission to keep a watch on Rosecrans, the latter did not fare so well.  Following Chickamauga Dana telegraphed Washington that: “Chickamauga is as fatal a name in our history as Bull Run.”

On October 19 Rosecrans received notice that he was relieved of command, and replaced by Thomas, who would then carry out the move to Lookout Valley that had been planned by Rosecrans.  Whitelaw Reid wrote later “The enemies whom he made by his sturdy honesty dealt him their fatal blow at the unkindest moment.  Rosecrans had never been more active, more enterprising, more skillful, than after Chickamauga. His plans for an advance were matured, the preliminary steps were all taken, the troops for which he for so long begged had nearly reached him.  In a few days more the glory of Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge might have been his. But the fields he had sown it was left for others to reap; from the coign of vantage he had won, it was left for others, with larger armies, and the unquestioning support of the government, to swoop down on Georgia and march to the sea.”  Or, as Colonel Sanderson wrote; “He is gone.  In him this army has lost its idol and the country the best of its commanders.  May he soon again be restored to a command for which he is so eminently fitted.”  But he had upset Grant as well as Stanton.  Logic said that there should be a combination of the western commands under one commander, that would be Grant, but Grant declined the chance to have Rosecrans as one of his commanders.

Following his removal from command there were many different views, and rumours on why and how it had happened, some, like those of William Shanks of the New York Herald, were quite extreme; “Politics nor war ever thrust upon the nation a more incompetent leader than Rosecrans.  He was neither a strategist nor a tactician, and all he knew of the art of war were its tricks.”  Given his success up to Chickamauga, this was hardly a balanced view.  It needed Lincoln’s consent for Rosecrans to be removed, and Lincoln was swayed by Grant, Stanton and the messages from Charles Dana, Lincoln later described his reasoning for the move; “I couldn’t do anything but remove him.  The army had lost confidence in him.  We could not have held Chattanooga three days longer if he had not been removed.  His own dispatches after the battle confirmed that.  I think Stanton had got a pique against him, but Chickamauga showed that Rosecrans was not equal to the occasion. I think Rosecrans a true man, and a very able man, and when the War department merged the departments, I fully expected Rosecrans would remain in command. But you wouldn’t have me put him in active service against Grant’s express request, while Grant is commander-in-chief?  I try to do my best.  I have tried to do justice by Rosecrans.  I did the most I could.” So Grant is a prime mover in Rosecrans’ removal, and this is backed up by the comments of Colonel Rawlins, Grant’s aide; “While General Grant is no enemy of General Rosecrans, he could not in justice to himself and the cause of his country think again of commanding General Rosecrans, after his experience with him in the summer and fall of 1862. Of this the authorities at Washington were fully advised in General Grant’s reports of the battles of Iuka and Corinth, in the former of which, in consequence of his deviation from the entire plan and order of battle the enemy was enabled to escape with much less loss than he should. To this might also be added the general spirit of insubordination toward General Grant, although to his face he professed to him the highest regard both as a man and officer.”  Rosecrans had a very different view of the causes and outcomes at Iuka.  Amongst those who were making negative comments was Rosecrans’ own chief of staff, Garfield, who had urged Rosecrans to make for Chattanooga on the 20th September. He wrote quite disparagingly to Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, that at Chickamauga “after the breaking of our line, the general was totally unfitted to command.” These comments worked against him in Washington and would cause ill feeling when Rosecrans finally heard of them late in life.

The deed done, it was necessary to find Rosecrans another command, he was a good general, and he needed a command, but there was little for him except the somewhat moribund command of the Department of Missouri.  He took up his command in January 1864 in St Louis.  Having got another command Rosecrans was eager to use it, and asked for additional troops but instead his force was gradually depleted to support others, and while this was going on Grant was in action in the Wilderness and at Cold Harbour, but losing thousands of men. The chance for more action against the Confederates came in September/October as Price began to move against Missouri and Rosecrans’ reduced force, and although Rosecrans requested reinforcement, he was continually briefed against by Grant and Stanton, who still wished to see him removed.  He was under pressure to release men to Sherman whom he had previously had moved to St Louis because he felt unable to meet Price with the men he had.  The release of these men to Sherman and the exchange of letters between Halleck and Grant gives a picture of the feeling against him; Halleck to Grant “I have telegraphed him to forward them on immediately, but I presume he will, as usual, disobey orders....General Canby telegraphs that the forces under Steele and Rosecrans are greatly superior to those of the enemy.”   Grant replies; “If Rosecrans does not send forward the regiments belonging to Sherman as ordered, arrest him, by my order, unless the President will authorize his being relieved from command altogether.” No love lost there.

There followed a series of actions in which Price was forced to retreat and there were, later, many different views on the need for the pursuit of Price and whether or not it had been effective.  Many felt that Price’s men would have deserted had they not been pursued, while pursuing them caused them to stay more or less together.  Grant, again, was particularly critical of Rosecrans’ efforts against Price, as he had been at Iuka. After the pursuit Rosecrans was again required to send units back to General Thomas and yet again the personal antipathy of Grant and Halleck to Rosecrans came through, to the extent that Grant sent his aide, Colonel Rawlins, to see that Rosecrans was complying with the order. If he were not then Rawlins was told to issue the necessary orders over Rosecrans’ head, but Rawlins saw that there was no problem, Rosecrans was complying as requested but by now Grant wanted him removed. Grant to Stanton in December; “Rosecrans will do less harm doing nothing than on duty. I know no department or army commander deserving such punishment as the infliction of Rosecrans on them.” On the 9th December 1864 he received his order removing him from command, although he still professed not to understand why this had come about. He either could not see, or did not want to see, how some people felt about him, right ot wrong.

After the war Rosecrans followed a number of business opportunities, not all were successful, and at the same time a number of his family members died, including his beloved wife Annie.  In 1880 he became a Democratic Congressman while in the same year his ex chief-of-staff Garfield was elected Republican President, Garfield later died from an assassin’s bullet. Rosecrans, after holding a number of political appointments, retired to live with his son in California where he died on March 11th, 1898.

Rosecrans was a religious man, he did not brook fools lightly, and he allowed his temper to get the better of him. Having bawled out a man in public as he did with Wood at Chickamauga, or criticised superiors as he did McClellan at Rich Mountain or Grant at Iuka, he assumed a blindness to their reaction, feigning a complete lack of understanding of their position towards him.  Yet, he could take umbrage himself as when he felt his seniority was not backdated sufficiently to give him credit for battles won. He was good general, and he gave the Federals a number of victories when they needed them, but leaving the field at Chickamauga whether because he was too fatigued to see the way it would be interpretted, or because of poor advice from Garfield, or a lack of understanding of the situation of Thomas, was a mistake that would allow his enemies to pursue him. At the end of the day, though he lost the ground at Chickamauga he held Chattanooga and prepared the supply line and the position for the later move on Lookout Valley.

A rather good summary of Rosecrans is given in T. Harry Williams’ book “Lincoln and his Generals”.

“Old Rosy, as the troops called Rosecrans, was a fascinating personality.  He was tall and stongly built. His hair and whiskers were blond, and his complexion florid.  He had what one observer called “an intensified Roman nose.” In his speech, he was rapid, excited, and dogmatic.  He could get quickly and terribly angry at his generals and staff officers, and just as quickly he would become all smiles and stroke the recipients of his irritation with caressing gestures.  He had enough quirks in his character to make him interesting.  He was a hard worker and wanted officers on his staff who would work. He preferred “sandy fellows” because they were “quick and sharp” and more industrious than brunettes.  He could not judge between what was important and what was not. He would spend as much time discussing a small matter with a sergeant as a big one with a major general.  He was a convert to Catholicism, and an ardent one. He carried a cross on his watch seal and a rosary in his watch pocket.  He loved to discuss religion, and frequently kept his staff up until four in the morning for as long as ten nights running to talk about spiritual matters. After a night of such conversation, the commanding general would often sleep until noon. Rosecrans liked to swear but squared this with his religion by saying he never used the name of God. He had a distinction, which he delighted to expound on, between profanity and blasphemy. He was a heavy consumer of whiskey, but he never produced a rationalization for his drinking.  As a general, Rosecrans had a good strategic sense and aggressive instincts.  But he lacked the balance and poise that a great commander should possess. At a critical moment, he was likely to be overcome by excitement and lose control of himself and the situation.  This weakness would destroy him at the crisis of his career.”