This page is intended as a quick aide memoire for those familiar with the battle, or as a quick intro for those for whom this is a new topic.  It is not a comprehensive potted history.

I have started the ‘story’ with the action at Murfreesboro where the two armies faced each other in late December 1862, and early January 1863. The action was something of a draw, and led to a fall back by both armies on Chattanooga, the vital communications hub.

On the way the armies moved through the Cumberland Plateau to the crossing of the Tennessee River. While Bragg got his army in to Chattanooga, Rosecrans carried out a very skilful river crossing, while feinting north of Chattanooga to fool Bragg. Bragg withdrew from the town towards the town of La Fayette in the hills southwest of Chattanooga, not far from Chickamauga Creek. Rosecrans meanwhile, with his army split into three wings, was attempting to cross the hills behind the Tennessee River to try to cut off Bragg.

The three wings of Rosecrans army were exposed, as there was a distance of some fifty miles between the points of his north and south wing, and he did not have a good idea of where the Confederates were in the hills, nor in what strength.  They clashed initially at McLemore’s Cove on the evening of September 9th. There was rumour of them being reinforced by Longstreet, but Rosecrans was disposed to discount that. He brought the three wings together to then go over Lookout Mountain towards Bragg.

The map below gives an overview of the moves from Murfreesboro through to the battle.

The two armies were to come together around the homesteads of the Brotherton, Dyer, Poe Kelly and Glenn families, west of the Chickamauga creek.

As with many battles of that time, before radios, satellites and modern communications, the two armies had imperfect information of the position and condition of their own forces, let alone those of the enemy.  On the days of the 18th, 19th & 20th September, 1863, the situation was no different.  Bragg would be constantly trying to get his right wing to overlap the Federal left wing, with a view to cutting off the Federal route to Chattanooga, he then intended his army to turn south and roll up the Federals from north to south.  Rosecrans was also to find himself in the position of moving units north.  He seemed to be constantly feeding units in at the south, then moving them north, largely to support Thomas.

By the evening of the 19th the Federals had held ground, and Thomas had thrown up strong defences against Polk’s force, but Thomas was concerned about the condition of the Federal right wing, and made his views known to Rosecrans. Rosecrans, unfortunately, took a more relaxed view of the condition of that wing.  Bragg had instructed his commanders to start a dawn attack, beginning with Polk’s right wing, on Thomas.  Command problems caused that attack to start some four hours late, and it would stall against Thomas’ strong defences.

In the centre came the mistake, most battles have one. An ambiguous written order was sent to Brigadier General Wood, it contained two mutually exclusive commands, Woods put his best interpretation on the order and moved his division out of the line to go behind Reynold’s division.  This caused a gap in the line which Longstreet’s divisions were quick to exploit. The right wing, confirming Thomas’ concerns of the previous night, was quick to collapse, and many units and commanders left the field. Among them, Rosecrans, a decision he would no doubt later regret.

Following the withdrawal of Rosecrans and the Federals into Chattanooga after the battle a siege set in with the Federals suffering from lack of supplies.  At the same time Rosecrans was removed from control and Grant was sent in, fresh from his victory at Vicksburg. The priority was to open a supply routs and this was done with the opening of the Cracker Line. This then allowed the Federals to get themselves into a position to attack the Confederates on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. Unfortunately Bragg had not used his time on these strategic points to put himself in a position where he could be sure of beating off a Federal attack, and so the Confederates lost these strong positions in late November of 1863.