With the ‘Cracker’ line open, supplies arriving in Chattanooga and Grant in charge the Union forces could again think about taking the fight to the Confederates.

Thomas says ‘no’ to Grant’s first plan. Sherman moving up Map for 23-25 November Map for 23rd November The attack on Orchard Knob Bragg repositions

On October 30 the supply line from Bridgeport to Brown’s Ferry, via the Tennessee, was opened when the steamer ‘Paint Rock’ and a converted scow ‘Chattanooga’ moved up river laden with supplies.  It would take some time to get the supply situation back to normal, but the siege was now broken.  On the other side Bragg had not put sufficient effort into repairing the railroad from Atlanta and now the Confederates had lost control of a vital section of the Tennessee River. The result was a supply shortage of the Confederates at the time that the Federals restored theirs.  Bragg however was still blaming others and when he reported to Jefferson Davis on October 30 the loss of Lookout Valley and the opening of the Federal supply line he took the opportunity to portray Longstreet’s indecisive actions against Hooker as the main cause of the reverse. Bragg was determined to rid himself of Longstreet, and took this as his opportunity to send him off elsewhere - towards Burnside at Knoxville in East Tennessee.

Grant was fairly pleased with the situation; Hooker was in a strong position in Lookout Valley, the supply line to Chattanooga was open and his army was again in good heart.  At the same time he was coming under considerable pressure by early November, from Washington, to take action that would relieve what Washington saw as a dangerous position for Burnside. Washington was concerned that the Confederates would force Burnside from Knoxville. Grant expressed his view in his memoirs; “There was no relief possible for him [Burnside] except by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and about Chattanooga.”  On November 6 Grant received intelligence of the movement of Longstreet’s division from Lookout Mountain to move against Burnside in East Tennessee. He believed it imperative to make a move against Bragg and cause the Confederates to change their focus from Burnside and back to the Chattanooga area.  Accordingly he ordered Thomas to attack the northern end of Missionary Ridge, the attack to go in no later than the morning of the 7th November.

Thomas did not believe that the proposed attack was sensible, he had reconnoitered the planned point of attack and believed that it was not practicable to attack until Sherman had arrived.  Thomas proposed an attack on the point of Lookout Mountain under the cover of heavy artillery barrage. Grant was disappointed with Thomas’ suggestion and his annoyance comes through in his memoirs; “he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order.”  Thomas was hailed as the “Rock of Chickamauga”, he had held his position while others had left the field, and he had carried out a skillful withdrawal of his force, at night, from under the noses of the Confederates.  He was Rosecrans’ best defensive general, but Grant wanted offensive flair.  The rejection by Thomas of Grant’s suggested attack and its replacement by something less aggressive confirmed Grant’s view that Thomas was too cautious. he preferred the style of Sherman, and while he waited for the latter’s arrival his frustration grew, he wasn’t making the bold move against Bragg at Missionary Ridge and neither was he doing anything to relieve Burnside in East Tennessee. But Sherman was on his way, commanding Grant’s old army, the Army of the Tennessee.

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Sherman had been some weeks in coming up, he had started back in September when Halleck wanted troops moved to come to the support of Rosecrans. By the time they were set moving it was too late to assist in the battle at Chickamauga and although they were to continue towards Chattanooga, Halleck had them repairing the railway en-route to improve supply lines.  En-route Sherman and his troops were living off the land in the way that would later make him infamous in the Confederacy, “...I don’t think there will be much left after my army passes.”  Eventually Sherman reached Bridgeport on the 13th November, Grant had decided to hold off action against Bragg until he arrived.  Sherman, ahead of his troops, joined Grant in Chattanooga on the 15th.  Grant was now impatient to move against Bragg, he had originally intended the move against the north of Missionary Ridge, which Thomas had believed impracticable, to have happened on the 7th. On the 16th the senior generals rode out for another reconnaissance at which Sherman declared that he could what Thomas had previously declined to do.  From Sherman’ post-battle report; “I then learned the part assigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessary maps and information, and rode during the 16th in company with Generals Grant, Thomas, William F. Smith, Brannan and others to a position on the west bank of the Tennessee, from which could be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chattanooga and the line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on Chickamauga Creek, the point that I was expected to take, hold and fortify.”

Having determined that he could assault Missionary Ridge, Sherman had to return to his troops and bring them up from Bridgeport, through Lookout Valley, to join Grant at Chattanooga. Because of problems with the rain and the crossing at Bridgeport it took longer than anticipated to get his Fifteenth Corps across the river, (from Sherman’s report; “It was simply impossible for me to fill my part in time. .....No troops ever were or could be in better condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill their part.”). Grant was now hoping he would have Sherman’s force at Chattanooga by the 22nd, but this date was slipping as well. Sherman had ordered that as his divisions moved through Lookout Valley each division should be trailed by its own wagons and artillery, so slowing each following division. Grant was losing his patience and was blaming the divisional commanders rather than Sherman, who had decreed the march formation.  Sherman himself, being at Chattanooga rather than with his troops, was somewhat out of the picture.

Waiting patiently was not one of Grant’s virtues, and it had started to show.  He was losing patience with General Thomas, he felt he was slow to carry out some of his orders and lacked the drive and incisiveness of Sherman. Some of Grant’s ill feeling towards Thomas goes back to command changes after the Battle of Shiloh.  At that time General Hallecktook over the command of the army from Buell and because he felt that Grant had “resumed his former bad habits” (drinking) he gave him the titular position of ‘second in command’, a position with little or no authority. At the same time Halleck put Thomas in command of the right wing of the army and “while Sherman was placed under Thomas in the right wing, the incident would not be forgotten by Grant after he became commander-in-chief....” (Cleaves biography of Thomas).  With Thomas’ army still not fully supplied, and with many of his transport and pack animals either dead or underfed, he could not march to relieve Burnside at Knoxville. Burnside was making noises about his need to withdraw if he did not receive support, and these messages were then translated by Halleck into requests for Grant to assist Burnside.  Each delay in Sherman’s advance caused Grant to make excuses to Halleck for his own failure to act. All of this did not sit well with Grant, and now the Confederates were floating rafts down the swollen river, and smashing the pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown’s Ferry.

On the Confederate side supplies were running low, by mid November the beef and bread ration per man had been severely cut back, Sgt. Washington Ives was writing home that they hadn’t drawn “a pound of meat in five days”, and now the winter was setting in. As well as food the men were short of warm clothing, adequate footwear, blankets and tents.  It was a hard time and Bragg seemed to be concentrating much of his effort into reorganizing his army so as to split up cliques and opposition to his leadership. Bragg was not at all confident that he had the respect of the subordinates in his army. On November 15 Bragg ordered a reduction in rations to three-quarters of a pound of meat per man per day. Desertions from the Confederates to the Yankees were now running high, “some nights 150 come in” reported one Federal soldier below Lookout Mountain.

Bragg had received a number of warnings that Sherman was on the march to reinforce Grant at Chattanooga, but since the arrival of Grant he had done little to change his situation opposite the town, other than to send Longstreet into East Tennessee. Now with Sherman’s arrival, and his feint against Trenton on Lookout Ridge, Bragg was concerned for his left flank and was asking for more men.  Bragg now began to react to what he believed were Grant’s intentions. He had convinced himself that Grant intended Sherman to move on Longstreet’s rear, so raising any siege on Knoxville and cutting off Longstreet from Bragg’s forces. Accordingly, with Longstreet requesting extra men to allow him to do an effective job on Burnside, Bragg on November 22nd decided to send 11,000 men to Longstreet by rail; these were Cleburne and Buckner’s divisions, but no sooner had they left than the units received counter orders to return.  Grant decided to move

The diagram below is from the March 2000 edition of the magazine “America’s Civil War”.  It shows the movements from 23-25 November.

Grant’s pontoon bridges were still being damaged by timber sent down by the Confederates, and repairs were taking longer than hoped for, also Wood’s division at the tail of Sherman’s force was still not over Brown’s Ferry.  And now he was being told that the enemy was retreating.  Deserters told the Federals that they had seen Bragg’s forces retreating from Missionary Ridge to Chickamauga station, these were Cleburne and Buckner’s units en-route to Longstreet. So now Grant was building up a picture of a withdrawal by Bragg, just what he did not want if he was to bring events to some sort of decisive conclusion.

The map above shows Fort Wood as a blue cross a little below the river, and Orchard Knob can be seen in the middle of the map, just to the right of Wood’s division.  This map and other similar ones are courtesy of http://alabamamaps.ua.edu/historicalmaps/

To discover whether or not Bragg was in fact retreating he ordered Thomas to make a reconnaissance towards Orchard Knob which lay between Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge.  This was done as a ‘reconnaissance in force’ with four divisions under Major General Granger.  The main force would be Wood’s division supported on their right by Sheridan, the left and right flanks would be covered by Howard and Baird. Wood understood his orders as meaning that he would attack whatever was on Orchard Knob, if indeed there were any enemy there as they were supposed to be withdrawing, he would then withdraw back into Chattanooga.

At 1 pm the men formed up in front of Fort Wood where Grant and some of his generals were watching proceedings, at 1.50 pm they began to go forward. Opposing the Federals were only two regiments, the 24th and 28th Alabama of Brigadier General Manigault’s Brigade, some 630 or so men against thousands, and these two regiments were some twelve hundred yards in front of their comrades in the fortified line at the base of Missionary Ridge.  As the Federals came on the 24th Alabama under Colonel Davis withdrew, but the 28th under Lt. Col. Butler were unaware of this.  They held their position to face Hazen’s Brigade, 300 against over 2,000. After a stout resistance Butler’s men were overwhelmed.  By about 2.20 pm this action was over, Orchard Knob and the adjacent position earlier held by the 24th and 28th Alabama were occupied by Wood’s men.  Thomas now told Wood to entrench, not retire, and ordered up Howard and Sheridan’s divisions to extend and strengthen the line.

The question facing Grant and Thomas was what to do next.  It was still not determined whether or not Bragg was withdrawing and at 3 pm Granger had decided the Confederate positions at the base of Missionary Ridge were too strong to be carried “without heavy loss”. During the night, concerned that there could be a Confederate counter attack, the Knob was strengthened with artillery.

Up on Missionary Ridge one the Confederates watching the advance on Orchard Knob was Brigadier General Manigault who was then called to his divisional commander, Anderson. Anderson told him to retake the position with his one brigade against all those Federals, all Manigault’s protestations fell on deaf ears until Anderson was persuaded of the futility of such an attack by one of his staff officers, to Manigault’s immense relief!

The movement of the Federals against Missionary Ridge caused Bragg to reassess his position; where he had held a large force on Lookout Mountain, Hardee’s men, he now believed this should be moved and only a brigade should be left on the Mountain, Hardee was to take the rest of his men to the right flank on Missionary Ridge.  At the same time Bragg was recalling Cleburne from Chickamauga Station where he had been sent by Bragg on the night of the 22nd to protect Longstreet’s communications. Bragg had been criticized following the battle of Chickamauga for failing to aggressively follow up the retreat of the Union forces into Chattanooga.  This apparent lack of drive and resolution was carried over to the time he had spent overlooking Chattanooga.  believing the natural features of Missionary Ridge would be sufficient to deter the Union forces from a direct assault he had ordered very little preparation of defensive positions on the heights.  Now that he could see that Grant intended a direct attack he needed to redeploy and dig in on the expected eve of battle, but Bragg expected Grant to the attack the centre of the Confederate position, not the flank on the northern edge of Missionary Ridge.  This move of Grant’s would also cut off Longstreet from the Army of Tennessee.

It was Grant’s plan to move Sherman, screened by the hills of Moccasin Point, to a position near the mouth of South Chickamauga Creek (i.e. north of Chattanooga at the red ‘X’ on the map below) where they would cross the river to hit Bragg’s right flank.  Thomas would remain threatening Bragg’s centre, so preventing him moving it against Sherman. Grant still held the view that Thomas was too much of a defensive general and believed that Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland was too demoralized after Chickamauga.

Once Sherman was over the river then the cavalry would go off to tear up the railway between Chickamauga Station and Longstreet, so cutting that general’s communications with Bragg. The key to the start of Grant’s plan was the movement into position of Sherman’s four divisions opposite South Chickamauga Creek, but just as he had been slow getting all his units into Chattanooga from Bridgeport, so he had problems moving his four divisions into position on the 23rd.  In the event he was up with only three of his divisions, Osterhaus was held up at Brown’s Ferry and joined Hooker at Grant’s instruction.  He would later take part in the action against Lookout Mountain.

The action now moves to South Chickamauga Creek and Sherman’s river crossing on the night of the 23/24 November.