During the night of the 23/24 November Sherman moved his force across the Tennessee.

Map of the crossing Lookout Mountain Hooker’s plan Map of north end of Missionary Ridge on 24th

For the crossing of the Tennessee River one of Sherman’s divisions (Morgan L. Smith’s) would cross on pontoons floated down from North Chickamauga Creek, about two miles above the entry of South Chickamauga Creek into the Tennessee. These units made the east bank at around 2.30 am and proceeded to secure a bridgehead to cover the crossing of the rest of Sherman’s troops, via a pontoon bridge.  Of the bridge Sherman said in his report; “I have never beheld any work done so quietly, so well, and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent (viz, 1,350 feet) laid down so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith.”

During the night and early morning the river crossing proceeded almost unopposed apart from a small piquet force on the Confederate side who were quickly taken prisoner.  Around 8 am the steamer Dunbar arrived and greatly increased the transport capacity and so increased the speed of the crossing. By a little after noon on the 24th the pontoon bridge had been completed.

From the river crossing point to the hill on the northern end of Missionary Ridge, which Sherman had designated as his first objective, was a distance of about one and a half miles. Deciding to use only his units from his Army of Tennessee for the advance he moved forward, with his units echeloned back from left to right; his left on South Chickamauga Creek was Morgan L. Smith’s division, in the centre and a little behind was the division of John E. Smith and then on the right  ‘rear’ was Ewing’s division.  By 3 pm the skirmishers of Morgan L. Smith’s division had made the hill, again with very little opposition, and began to dig in.

The map above shows Sherman’s formation after crossing the river and his movement on the hill north of Missionary Ridge. The ‘X’ shows the position of Billy Goat Hill.

What Sherman was not aware of, because his maps were not accurate, was that the hill he had moved on was Billy Goat Hill, and not the one he had intended to occupy but with dusk approaching and reports of Confederate forces moving in the area he decided to consolidate his position where he was. Because of the mistake Sherman’s forces were on a hill separate from Missionary Ridge, and Sherman himself had elected to remain in the vicinity of the river crossing bridgehead during the advance of his troops, and so he had not been in a position to take in the lie of the land and change the line of march accordingly.  Sherman, unaware of the error, had reported to Grant and Thomas that he now held the northern end of Missionary Ridge when in fact there was a steep wooded ravine between his forces on their hill and the northern end of the ridge.

But Sherman’s crossing was not the only Federal movement.  The 24th had dawned in fog, drizzle and mist, which did not help Bragg and his commanders to ascertain what was happening at the northern end of the ridge, and anyway they were preoccupied with the Federal occupation of Orchard Knob.

Just as ULTRA enabled the Allies in WW2 to be aware of the impending German airborne attack on the island of Crete in 1941, so intercepted signal traffic was to assist the Federals at Chattanooga. Maj. Gen. Stevenson held Lookout Mountain for the Confederates but on the night of the 23rd he signaled Hardee that he believed the Federals would attack Bragg’s left.  This was intercepted and read by Thomas as well as Hardee. Up to this point there had been no plan to use Hooker to attack Lookout Mountain, but Thomas could see that if they did it would confirm Stevenson’s view and further confuse Bragg as to their real intentions.  Grant instructed Hooker to make a ‘demonstration’ on Lookout Mountain on the morning of the 24th.  It should merely be a diversion so that Wood’s division could join Sherman.  Grant was skeptical of Hooker’s troops being able to take the steep point of Lookout Mountain, he did not want a failure there while he was occupied with Sherman and Missionary Ridge. Hooker should only attempt to take Lookout Mountain if the ‘demonstration’ was a success.

Hooker saw an opportunity to rebuild some of his tarnished reputation, he had not come well out of Chancellorsville, he would attack Lookout Mountain and accordingly his men were roused early on the foggy, wet morning of the 24th. I have visited Lookout Mountain and stood on the point at the top, it must have seemed daunting indeed to the soldiers at the base of the slope that morning.

Hooker’s plan was to use a pincer movement.  Geary was to take his force to Wauhatchie, cross Lookout Creek then come north, moving up the western face of Lookout Mountain, while the rest of Hooker’s force stayed below Lookout Point to divert the Confederates.  When Geary’s force, under cover of the fog, had got well forward on the western face of the mountain Hooker would launch his wing of the pincer up the slope of Lookout Mountain.

The map shows Geary moving from 8 am to 10 am along and up the face of the mountain.

The Confederate forces on the western side of Lookout Mountain were commanded by Brig. Gen. Walthall and he was aware that somewhere out in the fog the Federals were making moves that would bring them into contact with his men. When Geary’s men came upon Walthall’s defenders about 11 am they were able to take them in flank, as all the defensive positions had been built to resist an attack up the slope, not along it from the south.  Walthall’s men had to fall back towards Craven House, below Lookout Point, to join the rest of the Confederate forces.

What followed for the next couple of hours was a confused fire fight in the area of the Craven House, a white clapboard house, visible to the Federal units at the foot of the mountain.  The weather conditions that day on the mountain meant that many of the units had no idea where the enemy was, or where other units of their force were positioned.  Hooker had directed his commanders to halt on the plateau at the Craven House, below the crest of Lookout Mountain.  In command of the Confederate forces on the mountain was Carter L. Stevenson and as the day wore on and the fog hung around he requested reinforcement to allow him to drive off the Federals, Bragg had said that he could call on Breckinridge for such assistance, but by late afternoon it was not forthcoming.  Bragg’s concern that day was not with the holding of Lookout Mountain, it was for his flank on Missionary Ridge.  He was more concerned that Stevenson should not get cut off from the main force on Missionary Ridge than that they should continue to hold Lookout Mountain.  When one of Stevenson’s messengers reached Bragg he sent word back to Stevenson that he should abandon the Mountain and get back to the Missionary Ridge side of Chattanooga Creek.  The battle for Lookout Mountain was over. Bragg commented on this in his report; “.....Why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field (Major-General Stevenson) had six brigades at his disposal.  Upon his urgent appeal another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support, though it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action and I proceeded to the scene. Arriving just before sunset, I found we had lost all the advantages of the position.”

While the action had been taking place on Missionary Ridge Bragg was concerned by reports of Federal movements, especially those of Sherman, and was concerned that he would find his forces caught in a pincer movement.  Because of this concern he had Maj. Gen. Pat Cleburne take a brigade to the north of Missionary Ridge, the position there had become increasingly precarious as Sherman established his position on Billy Goat Hill (not the hill he had intended to be on).  By the evening Cleburne could see that he did not have sufficient force to prevent Sherman from turning the right flank of the army and he believed that he would receive orders to withdraw from this position.  He was later surprised to hear around midnight on the 24th that rather than withdrawing, Bragg intended to fight.

The map above shows the positions at the north of Missionary Ridge later on the 24th and during the 25th.  Sherman’s advancing line on the 25th is outlined in green, Cheatham and Stevenson who arrive during the 25th are shown in yellow. Cleburne is in the middle of the Confederate line.

Stevenson now had to withdraw his units by night to the east side of Chattanooga Creek, and as the skies had cleared it was now a cold November night on the mountain. Stevenson was unknowingly aided by an over-cautious Joe Hooker; Hooker had told his men to stop at the Craven House plateau rather than go all the way to the summit, and he had also been over-cautious in sending some of Wood’s brigade round the north face of the mountain into Chattanooga Valley.  Hooker had gone from a ‘gung-ho’ attitude prior to the movements against Lookout Mountain to a cautious “I await orders” frame of mind on the morning of the 25th.

Just as Thomas had succeeded in extricating his divisions from Snodgrass Hill during the battle at Chickamauga under the noses of the Confederates, so by 3 am on the 25th Stevenson had executed a skillful withdrawal of the Confederates from Lookout Mountain under the guns of the Federals.  As dawn broke the Federals realized the mountain was theirs and the Rebels had gone, they had burned the bridges over the Chattanooga Creek and were now on their way to join Bragg on Missionary Ridge.

Brigadier General Montgomery Meigs in his battle report gave to the battle a romantic name that stuck; “The day had been one of driving mists and rains and much of Hooker’s battle was fought above the clouds.”

As the 25th dawned Grant’s view was that Bragg would retreat and he wanted to avoid him getting away, it would be a ‘pursuit’ day. His early plan for the day was for Sherman to attack southwards down Missionary Ridge from his position on the northern edge, Hooker would attack Bragg’s left flank on the southern end of Missionary Ridge and Thomas would move against the centre, the rifle pits that the Confederates had along the base of the Ridge.  The plan would later be changed to have Thomas take up a threatening position against Bragg’s centre. On the night of 24/25 November Bragg conferred with his senior commanders, Breckinridge and Hardee.  Breckinridge argued adamantly that they should fight, as they surely held the ground advantage; Hardee, aware of the critical situation on the right against Sherman proposed an immediate withdrawal.  Bragg sided with Breckinridge but recognised Hardee’s concern for the right wing and sent Stevenson (fresh from the Lookout Mountain action) along with Cheatham’s division to the right. See map above.

As mentioned earlier, Sherman in the north was not where he expected to be, instead of occupying the northern point of Missionary Ridge he held Billy Goat Hill, a point separated from the Ridge by a ravine. In his battle report Sherman acknowledged his wrong position; “From studying all the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deep depression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point.” By the morning of the 25th Sherman had grown cautious, he felt his position to be such that he expected to be attacked by the Confederates. The general whom Grant relied on to bring him a successful victory was not acting with the panache expected of him. When Cleburne heard that Bragg intended to fight, and so he would not be given orders to withdraw, he positioned such forces as he had available to try to prevent Sherman overrunning the right wing.  He was, however, badly outnumbered.

Sherman however would attack as required by Grant, he detailed a single brigade under Brig. Gen. M. Corse to attack up the northern slope towards Cleburne’s men on the crest, (see map above).  Sherman described the ground; “Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of the series, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest.  The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The farther point of the hill was held by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which he had a fair plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, through which several roads and the railway tunnel pass, could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural place d’armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist our contemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangering his communications with his depot at Chickamauga.” It was an assault with dreadful loss, made worse by a battery of guns firing directly into the attacking Federals.  By 1pm this assault was beaten off and Cleburne realized that he needed to reposition to meet the attacks that would inevitably follow that first one.

Grant was relying on Sherman to win the day in the north, but Sherman’s force was not having an easy time.  The attack by Corse had been repulsed with heavy loss and his left wing was having a hard time from batteries in support of Govan and Lowrey on the extreme right of the Confederate line.  Sherman decided that he would make the main thrust of his attack against Tunnel Hill with Ewing and John E Smith’s divisions. There followed a bitter fight for the hill with the crest held by Cleburne’s Confederates and with the Federals trying desperately to climb the hill whilst being raked by musket and cannon-fire. Holding the hill, Cleburne agreed to a suggestion from Lt. Col. Warfield - a bayonet charge against the Federals. The charge hit the front and flank of the Federal line which, being exhausted and low on ammunition, broke and retreated in haste.  The repulse was described in Sherman’s report a little differently; “The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, and, exposed as they were in the open field, they fell back in some disorder to the lower edge of the field and reformed. These two brigades were in the nature of supporters and did not constitute a part of the real attack. The movement, seen from Chattanooga, 5 miles off, gave rise to the report, which even General Meigs has repeated, that we were repulsed on the left.  Not so: the real attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, and General Smith were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggle all day, persistently, stubbornly, and well.  When the two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of one brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought his cover behind the hill.  Thus matters stood about 3 p.m.” However, Sherman had not delivered for Grant.

Sherman, based on a dispatch from Grant that he had received before midnight on the 24th had expected support from Thomas during his attacks on the Confederate right at Tunnel Hill, but on the morning of the 25th Grant had revised his plan. Sherman had failed and knew it, but there was a tendency to blame others rather than himself, at 12.45 he would send a despairing message to Grant, “Where is Thomas?”.  And at 3 pm. he sent a message by Staff Officer; “Go signal Grant.  The orders were that I should get as many as possible in front of me and God knows there are now enough.  They’ve been reinforcing all day.”  Sherman wanted Thomas moving as he felt he had now drawn enough of the Confederates to his front.  However, earlier that morning at 11.00 he had declined the support of Baird’s division, obviously believing that the attack which had just started with Corse’s assault, would succeed. Grant in his report wrote that; “This movement of his (the Confederates against Sherman’s right) being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird’s division, of the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to Sherman’s support, but receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas’ left.” Grant spent the morning and the early afternoon doing not a lot, he expected Sherman to succeed in the north and he believed Hooker would be providing the other arm of a pincer to roll up the Confederate left flank. In fact by 9.30 that morning Hooker had still not moved, he was ‘awaiting orders’.  By 2.30pm Grant, from his position could see the rout of Sherman’s men on Tunnel Hill, when Hooker did finally move it was only slowly and he found he needed to rebuild bridges across Chattanooga Creek. Grant and Thomas could see that Hooker was not providing the expected pincer movement.

Grant’s options were running out.  He had doubts about the ability of Thomas’ force and he had earlier said that storming the rifle pits at the base of the ridge and then attacking the ridge, was not feasible.  Now he had little option but to use Thomas to do just that, with the divisions of Wood and Sheridan in the van. Grant’s decision was not sound when looked at coldly.  He wanted this action as a means to draw off Confederate forces from the north so relieving pressure on Sherman and allowing Sherman to attack again.  He didn’t know that Sherman was not in a position to attack again. Grant also believed that Bragg had moved men from the centre of his line, opposite Thomas, against Sherman; in fact it was Stevenson’s men from the south who had been moved north. Also, if Thomas’ men took the rifle pits they would be directly exposed to the batteries on the crest of the ridge.  All in all it looked like a decision made in haste and based on incorrect information regarding Sherman’s situation.