The Battle of Murfreesboro took place along the Stones River, and is often referred to as the Battle of Stones River. 

Rosecrans’ plan Bragg’s plan

The drawing above shows the disposition of the forces at the start of the action on 31st December, 1862.

Rosecrans felt that in order to determine what Bragg planned to do he needed to discover in which direction Hardee had gone; if to Shelbyville he would assume Bragg would abandon Murfreesboro, if he had gone to Murfreesboro then he could assume the Confederate line would be between the town and Stewart’s Creek. By noon on the 28th he heard that Hardee had gone to Murfreesboro. Crittenden’s corps advanced towards Murfreesboro and by late afternoon Palmer and Wood’s divisions were within 2 miles of the town. A brigade of Wood’s under Brig. gen. Harker had crossed Stones River and by late evening came within an ace of taking the important high points of Wayne’s Hill. As the day came to a close Rosecrans was in a less than perfect situation, as would happen later at Chickamauga his right wing was something of a mess.  McCook had not closed up on Negley, there was a good deal of cedar thicket and a creek between them. Rosecrans was exasperated and ordered McCook to make an early move next morning. That did not happen.

Most of the country over which the battle would be fought was farmland or cedar woods, fairly easy for infantry movement, but more restrictive for the movement or artillery. The area to the west of the Stones River was intersected by the Nashville, Wilkinson and Franklin turnpikes, all crossing the river close together, and then feeding into Murfreesboro, as did the Nashville and Chattanooga Rail Road.  Hardee was concerned that the river cut through the Confederate force, two-thirds of Bragg’s force was positioned west of the river; Hardee on the left, Polk in the centre, while Breckinridge covered the right, but from the east side of the river.  Also Bragg had not planned to occupy the high point of Wayne’s Hill from which artillery could enfilade Polk’s right flank. Bragg’s force moved out to take up their positions on the 28th but Rosecrans, partly to rest his troops, partly because his christianity made him reluctant to do battle on the Sabbath, did not press forward.  Facing Bragg, Rosecrans’s forces were all west of the river with McCook on the right, Thomas in the centre and Crittenden on the left. Both lines were about three miles in length and consisted of some 40,000 men each; Rosecrans had 43,400 while Bragg had 37,700.

Rosecrans had disposed of his force with the main weight on his left, and had left an over confident McCook stretched rather thinly on his right. On the evening of the 30th Rosecrans asked McCook if he could hold his ground for three hours after dawn on the morning of the 31st during Crittenden’s planned attack.  McCook said he could, but events would prove him wrong. Rosecrans instruction to McCook was “If the enemy attacks you, fall back slowly, refusing your right, contesting the ground inch by inch. If the enemy does not attack you, you will attack him, not vigorously but warmly.” To further confuse the Confederates as to the strength of the Federal right wing, McCook was told to build a string of unattended camp fires, extending his right by about a mile.

The Federal plan was to turn the Confederate right by throwing the divisions of Wood and Van Cleeve over the river against Breckinridge.  Rosecrans would then get his artillery on the high ground and so enfilade the Confederates on the west of the river. The following is an extract from the report of General Rosecrans following the battle.

McCook was to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to receive the attack of the enemy; or, if that did not come, to attack himself, sufficient to hold all the force on his front; Thomas and Palmer to open with skirmishing, and engage the enemy’s centre and left as far as the river; Crittenden to cross Van Cleeve’s division at the lower ford, covered and supported by the sappers and miners, and to advance on Breckinridge; Wood’s division to follow by brigades, crossing at the upper ford and moving on Van Cleeve’s right, to carry everything before them into Murfreesboro. This would have given us two divisions against one, and, as soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position, the batteries of Wood’s division, taking position on the heights east of Stone’s River, in advance, would see the enemy’s works in reverse, would dislodge them, and enable Palmer’s division to press them back, and drive them westward across the river or through the woods, while Thomas, sustaining the movement on the centre, would advance on the right of Palmer, crushing their right, and Crittenden’s corps, advancing, would take urfreesboro, and then, moving westward on the Franklin road, get in their flank and rear and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of cutting off their retreat and probably destroying their army.

This plan relied on McCook holding any attempted turning movement by Bragg’s left wing under Hardee.  The weakness was McCook’s position. He was extended thinly westwards, but also he was some way south of the Wilkinson Pike towards the Franklin road.  If he had positioned himself close to the Wilkinson, facing south, he would have had easy reinforcement from the centre, but also, Hardee’s forces would have had further to advance. Rosecrans wrote in his post-battle report; “When General McCook informed the general commanding that his corps was facing strongly toward the east, the general commanding told him that such a direction to his line did not appear to him a proper one, but; that it ought, with the exception of his left, to face much more nearly south, with Johnson’s division in reserve, but that this matter must be confided to him, who knew the ground over which he had fought.” Rosecrans had earlier informed McCook that he felt the facing was wrong, but he left it to McCook’s discretion whether or not it should be changed, as commander he cannot divorce himself from responsibility if the facing was wrong.

Bragg’s plan was similar, he had his main weight on his left and intended swinging it north, with Polk as the pivot for the movement. His left would then force the Federals up against the river and cut off their retreat via the Nashville Pike.  This would be a difficult wheeling attack over tricky terrain.  While the two plans were very similar, the advantage lay with Bragg. His forces had woods to shield their movement and no natural obstacles in their way. Rosecrans had to get his two attacking divisions over the river. General Sheridan’s later summation was;

“From the movements of the enemy at daylight next morning, it was plainly indicated that Bragg had planned to swing his left on our right by an exactly similar manoeuvre, get possession of the railroad and the Nashville Pike, and if possible cut us off from our base at Nashville.  The conceptions in the minds of the two generals were almost identical; but Bragg took the initiative, beginning his movement about an hour earlier than the time set by Rosecrans, which gained him an immense advantage in execution in the earlier stages of the action.”

While both commanders had a plan that required their army to pivot on their right wing, and attack with the left, Bragg had an advantage.  His left was only around 15 minutes movement time for his men to hit the Federal right, while Rosecrans would need an hour for his left to march from their position to the Confederate right wing.