When the Federals advanced into McLemore’s Cove they had no idea of the strength of the forces against them. However, the Confederates then proceeded to squander the opportunity that this gave them.

Negley advances into the Cove Lost opportunity From Rosecrans’ post battle report Polk fails to attack on 13th

When Rosecrans took Chattanooga Thomas had suggested to him that he should strengthen his communications with Nashville via Bridgeport, and then resume the offensive. However, Rosecrans believed that Bragg was retreating on Rome and wanted his army to advance through the passes on Lookout Mountain; Crittenden in the north, McCook in the south through Winston’s Gap and Thomas in the middle through Stevens Gap.

On September 8th Negley’s Division advanced into McLemore’s Cove.  He did not expect any opposition, a failing of the Federal cavalry to provide adequate information on the disposition of Bragg’s forces. As they crossed McLemore’s Cove they could see Dug Gap, their route through Pigeon Mountain towards Lafayette (see the map above). Because of the inadequate information from the cavalry, they did not expect to find any real Confederate strength in Lafayette, or on the route to it, they would soon be surprised.  Confederate skirmishers opened fire on them, and they reformed into line at Davis’ Cross Roads, between Stevens Gap and Dug Gap, after a short advance they could see that they were all but surrounded by Confederates, with no Federal force in support.  Negley now found that he had Major General Hindman’s division on his left, supported by Buckner’s Corps and the forward elements of D.H. Hill’s Corps in his front and right flank.

Negley felt it prudent to withdraw west a little to the Widow Davis’ house and called on Thomas for support.  During the night he adjusted his front to face Hindman. Thomas sent Baird’s division to support him, and late on the afternoon of September 10 they began their rapid march to relieve Negley, where he positioned himself on Negley’s left. While this did strengthen Negley’s position, the other 2 divisions under Thomas were still west of Lookout Mountain leaving Negley and Baird in a position that was far from healthy.

Seeing his opportunity, Bragg, on the evening of the 9th, ordered Hill and Hindman to move against Negley, he himself moved to Pigeon Mountain to await the development of the attack.  Bragg was let down by his subordinates, both seemed to wait on the other, neither making any decisive move.  The 10th September was a wasted opportunity for the Confederate forces, and Bragg re-ordered the attack to begin on the 11th, by now Baird had moved up to support Negley.  Again poor leadership and indecision handed the day to the federals, the attack did not happen. Realising the situation he was in, i.e. the intelligence he had been given was wrong, there was in fact a large Confederate force around Lafayette, he started back through Stevens Gap at around 8 a.m. on the 11th.  Cleburne’s men tried to cut them off, but to no avail, allowing  Negley to make a successful and skillful withdrawal that took him most of the day.

The map above is from the July 1998 edition of “America’s Civil War” magazine.

From Rosecrans’ post battle report.

On the 10th, Negley's division advanced to within a mile of Dug Gap, which he found heavily obstructed, and Baird's division came up to his support on the morning of the 11th. Negley became satisfied that the enemy was  advancing upon him, in heavy force, and perceiving that if he accepted battle in that position he would probably be cut off, he fell back after a sharp skirmish, in which General Baird's division participated, skillfully covering and securing their trains, to a strong position in front of Stevens' Gap. On the 12th, Reynolds and Brannan, under orders to move promptly, closed up to  the support of these two advanced divisions.

Although two divisions had almost been lost, and it was obvious that they had been opposed by a much larger force, Rosecrans still believed that Bragg was retreating, he still believed he would find little resistance at Lafayette. Thomas was warning Rosecrans that Bragg had a large force opposing Negley, but Rosecrans ignored this, feeling that Thomas was over cautious; “Your desperate dispatches of 10:30 last night and of 4 this morning have been received. After maturely weighing the notes, the General commanding is induced to think that General Negley withdrew more through prudence than compulsion.  He trusts his loss is not serious.” Assistant Secretary of War, Charles Dana was on a visit to Rosecrans, his view was “It seemed as if at last the Army of the Cumberland had practically gained a position from which it could effectively advance on Rome and Atlanta, and deliver there the finishing blow of the war”.  Thomas’s view was very different “Nothing but stupendous blunders on the part of Bragg can save our army from total defeat”.  Thomas could see what Rosecrans had chosen to ignore, if Thomas lost his force, then Crittenden and McCook, some fifty miles apart, could be destroyed individually by Bragg.

After the battle of Chickamauga Bragg placed Hindman under arrest for not prosecuting an attack as ordered, but there would later be continuing controversy over the failure to grasp the situation on the 10th September. On the night of the 12th Bragg ordered Polk to attack Crittenden at dawn on the 13th, in the north, near Lee & Gordon’s Mill.  Again Bragg’s orders would not be folllowed as he intended them.

Polk (the Bishop) protested that Crittenden had now positioned his whole Corps for defence, behind the Chickamauga Creek. Bragg was not accepting this excuse and told him to attack on schedule with his four divisions against Crittenden’s three.  Bragg, arriving at 9 a.m. and expecting the attack to be under way, was furious to find that Polk had ignored his order to attack. Crittenden, like Negley a few days previously, had taken advantage of Confederate indecision and withdrawn his force beyond Missionary Ridge. Bragg, furious at the way two opportunities had been lost, pulled all his army back to Lafayette.

By now Rosecrans realised his poor position with his force split in three, and he could see that he needed to withdraw them to concentrate his force.  By the 17th all three of his corps were within supporting distance of one another, but he was now getting worrying reports that Bragg was to be reinforced by three divisions under Longstreet. Bragg had failed to take advantage of the way Rosecrans had split his three corps and blamed “The resistance of the enemy’s cavalry and bad and narrow country roads (which) caused unexpected delay in the execution of my orders.” His superiority in numbers would not last long, soon the opposing forces would come together and meet in battle at Chickamauga, one of the bloodiest battles of the war.