|
|
The day had not been conclusive for either side. There had been many individual actions, but no serious commitment of one army against another
|
|
|
|
|
|
As the day had worn on the battle had moved from north to south, while both armies had been feeding units in at the south and moving them north. To quote Tucker:
“As the battle had developed there had been little form or general objective in the movements of either side except to meet the desperate needs immediately at hand. The fighting had been a series of disconnected attacks in the heavy timber and vine-covered thickets, with visibility rendered still more difficult by great clouds of heavy powder smoke. In both armies the combat had been waged mainly by brigades, the largest units that could be seen and directed by the officers under such unfavourable battle conditions.”.
|
|
The day had opened with the most northerly units of Rosecrans’ army, under Thomas, going forward against what they believed was a single Confederate brigade to the west of Reed’s Bridge. As units had been moved north during successive encounters between Federals and Confederates, the focus of the action had moved down to Viniard Field and the action by Sheridan to move Law’s units back over the Lafayette Road.
|
|
As night approached the action suddenly moved back to the northern end of the battlefield. Earlier in the day Bragg had ordered Hill to send Maj. Gen. Cleburne’s division to join Polk in the north, on his army’s right wing. By 6pm. Cleburne was in position behind Walker’s corps, facing the Winfrey Field, his front was about a mile in length when he attacked. On the right of his line was Lucius Polk at Jay’s Sawmill, in the centre was Wood, with Deshler on the left. The attack then took place in the early gathering dark.
|
|
The various units in the north had had some time to reposition, rest and reform after the mornings activities, and Thomas had brought his defensive position back to some 500 yards east of the Lafayette Road, and had had Johnson’s division to cover the moves. He would be supported as necessary by Baird.
|
|
|
Re-enactors at Bridgeport. Photo J Dillon.
|
|
In the gathering dark, surrounded by forest and with difficult communications between units, there was confusion. After attack and counter-attack Johnson and Baird withdrew to Thomas’ new defensive line and Cleburne’s men occupied the Winfrey Field. One consequence of the attack taking place in the dark was the inability to see your own units around you, let alone the enemy. Many of the attackers found themselves fired on by their own side from their rear, not a pleasant experience. By about 7pm. the fighting ceased, not because either side had won, but because they could not see to continue the action. It is very likely that it was in this action that John Dillon Lynch lost his leg, fighting with the 17th Tennessee Infantry.
|
|
|
|
From Rosecrans’ post battle report
|
|
The roar of battle hushed in the darkness of night, and our troops, weary with a night of marching and a day of fighting, rested on their arms, having everywhere maintained their positions, developed the enemy, and gained thorough command of the Rossville and Dry Valley roads to Chattanooga, the great object of the battle of the 19th of September.
The battle had secured us these objects. Our flanks covered the Dry Valley and Rossville roads, while our cavalry covered the Missionary Ridge and the Valley of Chattanooga Creek, into which latter place our spare trains had been sent on Friday, the 18th.
We also had indubitable evidence of the presence of Longstreet's corps and Johnston's forces, by the capture of prisoners from each, and the fact that at the close of the day we had present but two brigades which had not been opportunely and squarely in action, opposed to superior numbers of the enemy, assured us that we were greatly outnumbered, and that the battle the next day must be for the safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga.
|
|
|
|
|
|
After the battle came thirst. Water was in short supply on the battlefield, and there were now some 130,000 many, many of them wounded, needing drinking water. The problem was more accute for the Federals than the Confederates, who had their backs to the Chickamauga. As well as raging thirst after the action in the forest and scrub, they were made still more uncomfortable that night by the unseasonable cold, frosty even, and they were told they could not light fires because of the nearness of the enemy. They spent a miserable night with thin clothing and an inadequate supply of blankets. While trying to sleep, not easy under these circumstances, the Confederates were further distracted by the sounds of the Federals cutting trees and preparing their defences for the morning.
|
|
Re-enactors at Bridgeport. Photo J Dillon
|
|
|
|
This photo is taken with the Glenn-Kelly Road to my back, looking west. The site of the Dyer House is i the trees to the right. Rosecrans HQ was on the rise, straight ahead in the centre. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.
|
|
|
|
|
About 11pm. Rosecrans called a council of war at the Widow Glenn’s, they were a feature of his command style. A summary of their position at the end of that Saturday was that they still held the Lafayette Road, they had been on the defensive but had not been dislodged, and their army was now concentrated behind a much shorter front than the previous day. Rosecrans liked to have these councils during a battle, and would listen to the expressed views of his commanders, but would not necessarily take account of them. Thomas felt that the right of the army was not fundamentally strong in its position some little was south of the Brotherton Cabin, as a result of the attacks earlier by Hood and Bushrod Johnson it was left facing south-east. Thomas would prefer to see the right and centre pulled back to the spur on which stood the Snodgrass House, and also to those spurs of Missionary Ridge overlooking the Dry Valley Road. Rosecrans was relatively happy with the current positions and did not act on Thomas’ concerns. Thomas himself would pull his line back closer to the Lafayette, he would retain Johnson’s division from McCook’s corps and Palmer’s division from Crittenden. McCook would close up on Thomas’ left, and Crittenden’s other two divisions of Wood and Van Cleeve were held in reserve near the junction of McCook and Thomas.
From Rosecrans’ post battle report
During the evening of the 19th the corps commanders were assembled at headquarters at Widow Glenn's house, the reports of the positions and condition of their commands heard, and orders given for the disposition of the troops for the following day.
Thomas' corps, with the troops which had re-enforced him, was to maintain substantially his present line, with Brannan in reserve.
McCook, maintaining his picket line till it was driven in, was to close on Thomas, his right refused, and covering the position at Widow Glenn's, and Crittenden to have two divisions in reserve near the junction of McCook's and Thomas' lines to be able to succor either.
Plans having been explained, written orders given to each and read in the presence of all, the wearied corps commanders returned about midnight to their commands.
No firing took place during the night. The troops had assumed position when day dawned. The sky was red and sultry, the atmosphere and all the woods enveloped in fog and smoke. As soon as it was sufficiently light I proceeded, accompanied by General Garfield and some aides, to inspect the lines.
The battle now moves on to its conclusion on Sunday, 20th September.
|
|
|
|
|
