On Grant’s appointment as Lieutenant General Sherman replaced him as Commander of the Military Division of Mississippi, this was made up of the Army of the Cumberland (Thomas), Army of the Ohio (Schofield) and the Army of the Tennessee (McPherson who took it over from Sherman).

Thomas’ plan for Snake Creek Gap Positions on May 14. Positions on May 15. Photos of Resaca Confederate Cemetery

When Sherman took over in the West from Grant he had his headquarters around Nashville, but most of his force was centered around Chattanooga in April of 1864. His intention was to go after the army of Joseph E. Johnston who at that time was around Dalton, Georgia, behind Rocky Face Ridge.  On April 4 Grant had written to Sherman that; “You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply to lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave you free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.” This was giving Sherman a free hand, but also showing that Grant had confidence in Sherman, a confidence that did not exist between Davis and Johnston on the Confederate side.

Sherman responded that; “I will not let side issues draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as possible.”

The enthusiasm with which Sherman set about this task is still resented today in the South.

Map is from “The Civil War Series, The Atlanta Campaign.”

In preparation for the campaign Sherman, no less than Johnston, needed to get together supplies and a means of transport, he had to wait for troops who had served contracted time to return from furlough, and he wanted back the 10,000 men of General Smith that had been on a 1 month loan to General Banks for his Red River campaign.  Sherman believed that Bank’s expedition could “solve the most difficult part of my problem, viz., ‘provisions’”.  But if Banks did not succeed then Sherman would go ahead anyway; “Gerorgia has a million inhabitants.  If they can live, we should not starve.”  Grant, however, had seen no value in Banks’ expedition, and also told Banks to return the men to Sherman. In the event they were not sent back in time and Sherman had to adjust his intended plan of operations against Dalton.

But supplies were the first priority, as well as the maintenance of the route by which they would be delivered to his armies around Chattanooga, Sherman intended enough food, forage and ammunition to maintain 100,000 soldiers and 35,000 horses and mules for seventy days. It was estimated by Sherman’s Chief Quartermaster that to supply the intended force would require one hundred and thirty railway wagons daily to Chattanooga, each wagon carrying ten tons of supplies.  To enable this to happen all non-essential material would need to move by other means, and men would have to march.  Sherman was nothing if not single minded, the railroad would not be used to transport goods and provisions for the civil population. While appeals were made to the President, Sherman held fast to his position, and Lincoln backed him.

The photos of Sherman show a man who would appear to have little humour, it is a face that shows a fierce determination, one might say ascetic. He laid down strict rules for the march to Georgia; officers and men to carry clothing and food for 5 days, regiments were allowed only one wagon and one ambulance, “tents were forbidden for all save the wounded, and one tent only was allowed to each headquarters.” He went on to say in his memoires; “These orders were not absolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, and did not have a tent, not did any officer about me have one .... Most of the general officers except Thomas, followed my example strictly.” He believed that his strict march discipline (though not adhered to by Thomas) drastically reduced his transportation needs. “ .. I doubt if any army ever went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta ...”

While Sherman’s objective was the army of Johnston “go where it might”, he also knew the value of taking Atlanta.  This city had grown from nothing in 1840 to a thriving and vital point for the Confederacy, particularly important for its industry and as the focal point of three railways that threaded the South.  Taking the city would seriously impair transportation to Lee’s army.  On top of this, if the South were to win in 1864 by not losing, they could not afford to lose somewhere as important to them as Atlanta.

Sherman’s original plans for his move against Johnston had required the return of the 10,000 men on loan to Banks, but these were not coming back in time leaving McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee with only 24,500 men.  That original plan would have sent Schofield on a deep southward march to Rome, Georgia, to cut Johnston’s direct rail links to Alabama, but Sherman now felt that Schofield’s reduced force would need to operate closer to the rest of Sherman’s strike force.  The revised plan would be built on work done by Thomas.

Thomas had previously noted that there was an undefended gap south of Rocky Face Ridge, that gap was Snake Creek Gap and Thomas proposed that he should take his Army of the Cumberland through the gap to Resaca and so cut Johnston’s supply line and line of retreat. While Sherman liked the shape of the plan, he wanted to modify it, he wanted his old Army of the Tennessee to be the ones through the gap.  Once through the gap and having severed the Western & Atlantic railroad, McPherson should withdraw again into the gap and wait to attack Johnston’s flank as that commander retreated from Dalton. His orders to McPherson were; “Should the enemy’s policy be to fall back along the railroad, you will hit him in flank. Do not fail in that event to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible, as it may save us what we have most reason to apprehend - a slow pursuit - in which he gains strength as we lose it.”

A feature of the Atlanta campaign was that it was made up of a series of flanking moves; both sides had armies made up of seasoned veterans who knew that frontal attacks rarely succeeded, the idea was to get at the flank or the rear of the enemy.

On May 5, the day on which Grant was also due to start his moves on Virginia, Thomas and Schofield began their maneuvers against Dalton and McPherson began his march towards Snake Creek Gap, which he reached on May 9.  This move of McPherson was being covered by attacks against the strong defences on Rocky Face Ridge by Thomas. Unfortunately McPherson would prove not to be aggressive, he managed to convince himself that although he was supposed to have a numbers advantage of 3:1, he felt that he could be the subject of a strong attack from the direction of Dalton and so he failed to damage the railroad. Learning on the 10th May that McPherson had failed to achieve his objective, Sherman changed his plan again, and again it was after discussion with Thomas; he would move Hooker’s XX Corps, Palmer’s XIV Corps and Schofield’s XXIII Corps to join McPherson at Snake Creek Gap. Howard’s IV Corps would remain in place above Dalton to occupy Johnston while the move took place.

Sherman, in his memoires, wrote PcPerson could have “placed his whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there have easily withstood the attack of all of Johnston’s army, with the knowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels.”  “Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but at the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious.”

Johnston, however, became aware of the Federal move and moved his own forces south to the west and north of Resaca, consequently on May 14 the opposing forces were as shown on the map below. [Map from the Civil War Series, The Atlanta Campaign.]

Sherman did not believe that Johnston would put up a serious resistance at Resaca, based on his experience from going against him as Vicksburg, he believed Johnston would fight a delaying action and resume his retreat.  That is not what happened. 

Johnston used two of Hood’s divisions to try to turn the Federal left flank and so threaten the Federal route to Snake Creek Gap.  The Confederate attack on the Federal flank had initial success against Stanley’s division, but a reinforcement of the position by William’s division [see map above] restored the flank.  On the Federal right two brigades of the XV Corps stormed and held a hill overlooking Resaca and the railway bridge.

On May 14, seeing that Johnston had obviously decided to defend vigorously, Sherman changed his attack plan. On the morning of the 15th Sherman moved all of Hooker’s XX Corps to his left flank where, together with Howard’s IV Corps, they could attack the Confederate right. The assault was held and this then encouraged Johnston to try once again, as he had the previous day, to turn the Federal left flank.  [Map from the Civil War Series, The Atlanta Campaign.]

Again the attack did not succeed, but also Johnston heard that a Federal force (Sweeny’s division of XVI Corps had crossed to Oostanaula below Resaca, at Lay’s Ferry.  This now made the holding of Resaca highly unlikely and during the night of the 15th May Johnston withdrew his army over the Oostanaula unnoticed by the Federals.  Scaife’s book quotes Colonel Henry Stone of Thomas’ staff on the withdrawal; “It is hardly possible to imagine a more successfully managed movement than that of Johnston. ... The completeness with which Johnston had made his escape profoundly impressed everybody.”

So, at the end of Resaca; Johnston had escaped, McPherson (commanding Sherman’s old Army) was blamed by Sherman for allowing Johnston to escape and while Sherman had relied on a lot of advice from Thomas, he did not take it all. Had he not modified Thomas’ plan for Snake Creek Gap, or at least added to McPherson’s force with units from the Army of the Cumberland, he might well have had a force through that gap capable of forcing Johnston to battle.

Historians have been left to mull over three questions;

Why didn’t Johnston’s cavalry find Snake Creek Gap before the Federals?

Why did McPherson fail to exploit the opportunity?

Why didn’t Sherman send the bulk of the army through the gap in the first instance, as Thomas had suggested?

The result would be another of the legs of the march towards Atlanta.

These three photos of Resaca Confederate Cemetery were taken by myself in April 2005.