This page covers the operations from June 24th up to the move from the Cumberland Plateau to the Tennessee River. This last move started on August 16th.

Spencer carbine Map Bragg falls back The terrain to be crossed

Rosecrans’ move against Bragg’s positions around Tullahoma came on June 24th with the Federal cavalry and the Reserve Corps moving towards Shelbyville, while Crittenden’s Corps went off in a wide arc around Bragg’s right flank. They would be slowed considerably by torrential rains.  Colonel Wilder’s brigade was the first to drive to and through Hoover’s Gap, helped by the fact that they were the first unit in the west to carry the seven shot Spencer carbines, bought with money raised by Wilder. This gallant action opened the way for Thomas to advance around Hardee’s flank and fall on his rear.

The Spencer carbine.  The Spencer used a tubular magazine inserted through the butt of the stock, a lever, doubling as trigger guard, expelled the spent cartridge and inserted a new one.  The hammer had to be cocked after each firing, but still a man could pour out seven shots almost as fast as he could jerk the lever. The cavalrymen loved the Spencer, as did the few infantry regiments armed with a longer rifle version. “The Rebs made three charges on us but we stood up to the rack with our 7 shooters and repilsed them each time,” wrote one Billy Yank.  “The Rebs hate our guns they call them the Yankee 7 Devils.” Well over 100,000 of them saw service in the Union Army, and with devastating effect. [extract taken from Encylopedia of The Civil War]

The map below shows the moves from Murfreesboro to the area of the Cumberland Plateau, then the subsequent moves to and across the Tennessee.  After crossing the river, the map shows the moves to the Chickamauga battlefield.

Bragg correctly saw the Crittenden and Granger moves as feints, and concentrated his attention on the danger to his front.  Hardee held the Federals at Liberty Gap, but the ill-feeling of Polk towards Bragg re-surfaced again when he failed to advance through Guy’s Gap as he was ordered by his commander.  Bragg, seeing that his right had been turned, decided to retreat on Tullahoma, and by the 27th Thomas had captured Manchester. Crittenden, however, was still being slowed down by the weather and the condition of the roads, it took him 4 days to move 21 miles.  On the Federal right the cavalry of Stanley had driven the Confederates out of Shelbyville.  The continuous fall-back on Chattanooga was now well under way.

A pair of Federal cavalry troopers at the Bridgeport re-enactment.  Photo by J.Dillon

Bragg had hoped that he would be able to bring the Federals to battle outside Tullahoma, but although the Federals’ dispositions looked as though they might do that, it was not Rosecrans’ intention to do so. Instead of continuing south, Thomas moved south-east from Manchester towards Hillsboro. This move was further threatening Bragg’s railroad supply route, as well as threatening his flank.  Also, Wilder’s mounted infantry did another of their independent raids deep towards his rear.

By the 29th Polk had pulled his force into Tullahoma where Bragg intended to make his stand, but by then the raiding party under Wilder had cut the Confederate communication lines to their rear bases by his attacks on Decherd, burning the depot and destroying tracks.  Polk strongly disagreed with Bragg, to his face, over his intention to fight at Tullahoma, he wished Bragg to pull back and secure his lines of communication. While Hardee did not fully agree with Polk, Bragg acceded to his council and the need to leave Tullahoma.

On June 30th Bragg evacuated Tullahoma and pulled back over the swelling Elk River in his rear, on the 1st July the Federals entered Tullahoma and recognized that Bragg’s army was now in full retreat towards Chattanooga, which they reached on the 3rd July and took up defensive positions. This was not a good few days for the Confederates; Bragg in retreat at the same time as the defeat at Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg.  At Tullahoma Rosecrans forced Bragg out of the town for the loss of only 83 Federal soldiers killed, but his routing of the Confederates was swamped in the news by the victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.  The prickly relationship between Stanton and Rosecrans came to the surface again in another exchange of telegrams following these victories.  Stanton to Rosecrans; “Lee’s army overthrown; Grant victorious.  You and your noble army now have a chance to give the finishing blow to the rebellion.  Will you neglect the chance?” Not a mention of Tullahoma.  Rosecrans to Stanton; “Just received your cheering telegram announcing the fall of Vicksburg and confirming the defeat of Lee.  You do not appear to observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee....I beg in behalf of this army that the War Department may not overlook so great an event because it is not written in letters of blood.” Rosecrans cannot resist rising to any slight.

In late July Buckner’s Department of East Tennessee was merged into Bragg’s Department of Tennessee, so adding Maj. Gen. Buckner’s 17,800 men to Bragg’s available forces and Buckner would later be ordered to Chattanooga after Burnside advanced on Knoxville.  There were also command changes, Hardee had no respect for Bragg and left for another command in mid-July, being replaced by Lt. Gen. Daniel Hill.

Geer, in his ‘Campaigns of The Civil War’ said; “In a period of nine days of continuous rain, by brilliant strategy, with the loss of only 583 men, Rosecrans had manoeuvred the Confederate army out of its natural and artificial strongholds, and forced it across the Tennessee. Up to this time there had been no strategic campaign so brilliant in plan and execution, and General Rosecrans was warmly congratulated by all his corps-commanders, under the lead of General Thomas.”

Bragg settled his infantry in and around Chattanooga, relying on his cavalry forces; Forrest on the right, Wheeler on the left, to protect his flanks and supply information on the movements of the Federals. Rosecrans similarly sat out the next few weeks, he needed to restore his line of supply, especially via the Nashville and Chattanooga railway, particularly the section from Murfreesboro to Stevenson, then onward to Bridgeport. The retreating Confederates had destroyed the bridge spanning the Elk River as well as that at Bridgeport over the Tennessee.  Because of the size of his army Rosecrans needed the restoration of the railroad for supplies, but even then he still had to rely on local foraging for supplies for his animals and this meant he needed to await the ripening of the local corn crop.

As so often before, Rosecrans’ caution and wish to protect his supply line and communications was the subject of criticism in Washington. On July 24 he was wired by Halleck “.........There is great dissatisfaction felt here at the slowness of your advance.  Unless you can move more rapidly, your whole campaign will prove a failure.” He was warned how close he had come to losing his command and, in an attempt to spur him on he was required to “....daily report the movement of each corps till you reach the Tennessee River.”  The lack of movement against Bragg was allowing that commander to transfer troops to Johnston for the relief of Vicksburg. This was not a situation that Washington could tolerate. On August 5th Halleck had issued an order to Rosecrans telling him to advance, Washington was all out of patience, Rosecrans called his commanders together to read to them his reply to Halleck; “To obey your order literally would be to push our troops into the mountains, on narrow and difficult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, where they would not be able to maneuvre as exigencies may demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and probable disaster.  If, therefore, the movement which I propose can not be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the command.”  His corps commanders approved, with Thomas declaring “Stand by that and we will stand by you.”  The cautious Thomas again.

The army commanded by Rosecrans was much larger than that available to Bragg and his intention was to split it to force Bragg from his position.  Crittenden would threaten Chattanooga from the west, Thomas would go south east from Bridgeport over Lookout Mountain to threaten from the south while McCook and Stanley’s cavalry would go south of Thomas towards the rail line between Chattanooga and Atlanta. Bragg would either be forced to retreat, cut off if he stayed, or defeated by a larger force if he decided to fight. That was the plan. Rosecrans began his move over the Cumberland Plateau on August 16th, 1863. The country he would have to cross is well described in Geer;

“After crossing the Cumberland range west of the Tennessee, and the river itself, there is a series of mountain ridges, valleys and streams, generally parallel to the river, on the eastern side.  First, there is Raccoon Mountain, which ends in a mass of rough ridges and gorges, enclosed in a deep bend of the Tennessee, about four miles west of Chattanooga.  Next comes Lookout Valley, beyond which is Lookout Mountain, which ends abruptly four miles south of Chattanooga in a commanding point of rock, rising from the edge of the river.

From the summit of its steep palisades, 1400 clear feet above the swift current of the Tennessee, on a clear day parts of seven states can be seen, spread out in a magnificent panorama.  Below, on the easterly side, is the valley of Chattanooga, through which flows Chattanooga Creek. Near the mouth of the creek stands the city, superbly situated in the midst of a great amphitheatre of hills.

View from Lookout towards Chattanooga. Photo by J Dillon

On the further side the valley is enclosed by Missionary Ridge, which also extends up to the river. Four miles south of the town this ridge is traversed by Rossville and McFarland’s gaps, beyond which lies Chickamauga Valley, the scene of the battle.

At their upper or southern ends the valleys of Chattanooga and Chickamauga unite in a single valley known as McClemore’s Cove. Beyond Pigeon Mountain and Taylor’s Ridge, to the east, are the towns of Ringgold and Dalton, stations on the railroad from Chattanooga to Atlanta, where Bragg had his base of supplies.”