The federals within the perimeter of Chattanooga were in a difficult position, they had no secure line of supply. This became a major concern for Rosecrans, and for Grant when Rosecrans was replaced as commander. Supplies had to be reestablished if the Federals were to go on and remove the Confederates from their positions on the heights overlooking Chattanooga.

On the 21st October, following the battle at Chickamauga, Rosecrans needed to make some decisions about the line he would hold; could he leave Thomas on the Rossville line, or did he need to withdraw him into Chattanooga as well.

View of Chattanooga from one of the cannons on Lookout Mountain. Photo J Dillon

During that day he received different and conflicting reports about the strength and disposition of the Confederates leading him to make the decision that would cause Thomas to fall back from Rossville.  Fearing that two of Longstreet’s divisions were moving towards Chattanooga (it was actually Forrest’s cavalry) he told Thomas to hold until nightfall, then withdraw into Chattanooga. A fateful decision which he tried to reverse on later information, but the move had started and Thomas was well under way.  To use a modern idiom, Rosecrans was ‘losing it.’ He was sending despairing telegrams to Stanton which were causing the Secretary of War to further question the wisdom of leaving Rosecrans in command. By the 23rd September Stanton was sending Joe Hooker with some 23,000 men from the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac (an army of which he had previously been the commander before it passed to Meade who went on to defeat Lee at Gettysburg) to assist Rosecrans, but based on the gloomy news from Rosecrans, would this be sufficient and in time? Rosecrans then makes another fateful decision, against the advice of Garfield and Granger, he ordered Brig. Gen. Spears to withdraw his force from the head of Lookout Mountain into Chattanooga so allowing the enemy to occupy this position and overlook the town of Chattanooga.  As Sword says in his book; “The enemy’s occupation of forbidding Lookout Mountain, Raccoon Mountain, and the Tennessee River’s south bank would contribute significantly to Rosecrans’ dilemma in the immediate future.”

The main concern now for Rosecrans was the resupply of Chattanooga and the security of those supply lines, he was reduced to rations for 10 days and sufficient ammunition for only 2 days.  This supply situation was brought home to him on the 2nd October when Confederate General Wheeler’s cavalry sacked an 800 wagon supply train en-route to Chattanooga.  Ideally the supply route should have run along the northern bank of the Tennessee, downstream of Brown’s Ferry, but the Confederate sharpshooters on the south bank had made this route unusable, the losses were too heavy each time it was tried.  As a result the Federals had to take a much longer route over Walden’s Ridge.  The Confederate commander in the area was Brigadier General Evander Law and he was convinced from movements he had observed on the Federal side, that at some point the Federals would try to force a crossing of the river.  He felt that his forces were inadequate to hold the expected crossing, but his requests for additional forces were turned down.

A modern map on which I have drawn the approximate alignment of the later supply route in red, ‘The Cracker Line’, and in blue the route that Hooker would take to meet Smith at Brown’s Ferry where the red and blue lines meet around Old Farm on the river.

Hooker arrived at Stevenson, 50 miles down the Tennessee from Chattanooga, on 2nd October and his initial orders from Rosecrans were to guard the rail line of communications. Having set about guarding the railroad he declined to go further up the line to Chattanooga as requested by Rosecrans, on the grounds that he needed to wait for his artillery which had been left behind in the rapid movement of his two Corps. The Federals at this point were somewhat weak; Hooker was at Bridgeport but with limited capacity to be an attacking force without his artillery, Rosecrans was in Chattanooga and desperately low on rations and ammunition, Burnside was at Knoxville some 100 miles north east of Rosecrans.  The gloomy news coming from Rosecrans, backed up by the dispatches from Charles Dana were to cause the removal of Rosecrans

Rosecrans would be removed from the command of the army on the 19th October (as outlined in the section on Rosecrans), but prior to his removal he had outlined a plan, together with his engineer officer Brigadier Smith, for the re-establishment of a supply route to Chattanooga. Thomas approved of the plan and decided to adopt it, before Grant had arrived on the 23rd. There has been a certain amount of discord over who originated the plan, and who presented it to whom.  Although Smith took the credit for it after Rosecrans had gone, Rosecrans was to later protest and in 1900 he was officially recognised as the author of the plan that would later be successful.

When Grant arrived on the evening of the 23rd October he was struck by the appearance of the men, run down through lack of supplies, and by the position of the Confederates on the heights around the town. Although the Confederates had numerical superiority in the vicinity of Chattanooga Grant had other forces on their way to him, as well as Thomas’ force in the town.  Hooker and Sherman were heading his way, and these would give the weight of numbers to Grant, but there was no point bringing them in to Chattanooga if he was unable to supply them, supply was the priority.

The plan for regaining a supply route (whether it’s Rosecrans’ or Smith’s) called for the linking up of Kelley’s Ford (‘X’ on the map above where the blue line crosses the river on the west of the map) with Brown’s Ferry via Cummings Gap, held by the Rebels, so a plan calling for some dash and flair would be needed to establish this line. Hooker would need to move from Bridgeport, across the river, and move along the railway south of Raccoon Mountain, turn north up through Wauhatchie and so on to Brown’s Ferry; Thomas would move via the pontoon bridge to the north of Chattanooga and across the neck of Moccasin Point to Brown’s Ferry. Meanwhile another force would float on pontoon boats, at night, from Chattanooga under Lookout Mountain to Brown’s Ferry to form a pontoon there for Hooker’s force to cross over. A lot would depend on the pontoon boats floating to Brown’s Ferry without being detected by the Confederates on Lookout Mountain, but also on Hooker pushing on and meeting up with these boats.  When Hooker heard of his intended part in the plan he was against it, and telegraphed his views to Thomas; he was wary of the Confederates on Lookout Mountain and the fact that they would be able to oversee his movements. When it was all over Grant would report to Stanton that he would like to see Hooker removed.  Hooker got off on the wrong foot with Grant on the 23rd, on that day Grant had arrived at Stevenson on his way to Chattanooga but Hooker did not come out to meet him, he sent a Staff Officer.  Grant considered this a breach of military etiquette, and was not likely to forget it quickly.

While Grant and his commanders were considering and approving the plan to reopen the supply route, later called the ‘Cracker Line’, the Confederates were also making some changes in their dispositions and some of their internal wranglings would come to influence the outcome of the events of the next few days.  Longstreet was still at loggerheads with Bragg, not that surprising as he had been a prime mover in the attempts to remove Bragg from command. Longstreet would later be criticized for a lack of ‘grip’ on events, and he certainly had a different view of the possible aims of the Federals from his commander, Bragg. An extract from Wert’s biography of Longstreet; “Apparently, Longstreet did not appreciate the strategic importance of Lookout Valley or the vulnerability of Law’s handful of troops.  He seems not  to have demonstrated serious interest in the region until it was too late. McLaws argued afterward that Longstreet “neglected to provide in any manner against such a disaster.”  It is a fair judgment.

Longstreet was convinced in his own mind that the Federals would move from Bridgeport against the southern end of Lookout Mountain, he would believe that the action at Browns Ferry was only a diversionary tactic to distract the Confederates from this intended southerly strike.  On Oct. 26th Longstreet wrote to Bragg’s Chief of Staff; “I have no doubt but the enemy will cross below and move against our rear.  It is his easiest and safest move.” This view of Longstreet’s of the Federal intentions would influence his later orders, and the pull back of a large part of Brig. Gen. Evander Law’s force onto Lookout Mountain.

Law had been in Hood’s division at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, and in both battles Hood had been wounded and the command of the division had fallen to Law.  However, at Chattanooga Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins arrived and took command of the division from Law on the grounds of his seniority in rank over Law, of just 2 months. This did not sit well with Law, the two disliked each other, and the situation was made worse because Jenkins was a protégé of Longstreet. When Law went on two days leave to visit the convalescing Hood, Jenkins moved all but two of Law’s regiments back up on to Lookout Mountain on the 24th. Law only discovered the move on his return on the 26th.  Different books ‘credit’ Longstreet and Jenkins for the decision behind the move, but it must have at least been done with Longstreet’s approval, and it fitted in with Longstreet’s view that the Federal advance would be against the south of Lookout Mountain, so it needed reinforcing.  This movement made the subsequent Federal move across Brown’s Ferry easier than it might have been if Law’s views had been listened to.

Having approved of the plan it was now time to put it into place.  Hooker was to cross over at Bridgeport with three of his divisions, some 11,000 effectives, leaving one division to hold Bridgeport, and on the 26th he was to march to Brown’s Ferry via Wauhatchie. Also on the 26th some 3,500 men of Thomas’ units, under Smith who had been given command of this movement by Grant, were to move the following morning across the neck of Moccasin Point.   Early on the 27th another 1,500 men from Brig. Gen. Hazen’s and Brig. Gen. Turchin’s brigades would move down river in the 60 pontoon boats. This would be a journey of some 9 miles, and 7 of them would be along enemy occupied shoreline. The Confederate force left to defend the south bank consisted of some 250 men of the 15th Alabama Regiment under Colonel William Oates, a veteran of Little Round Top.  At around 05.00 the pontoon boats caught the rebel defenders of Brown’s Ferry unawares, and captured the river crossing in about 20 minutes, so allowing the Federals to start ferrying Smith’s men across. Raccoon Mountain and Cummings Gap were soon in the control of the Federals.

Hooker did not move as intended on the 26th, but got underway eventually on the 27th, to take part in an operation he was not comfortable with, and on which he had made his views known to Thomas. On the 28th Hooker’s force was seen moving up Lookout Valley by the Confederates on Lookout Mountain, among them were Longstreet and Bragg, the latter was mightily unpleased at the loss of Brown’s Ferry, a held Longstreet in no small way responsible.  Longstreet believed that this movement by Hooker was further confirmation of his own view that the Federals would move against the south of Lookout Mountain, but this was still not Bragg’s view.  Bragg authorized Longstreet to use the divisions of Jenkins, McLaws and Walker to stop Hooker, but he elected only to use four brigades of Micah Jenkins’ division, including Evander Law, and he would send them against Geary’s division at Wauhatchie, not against the main Federal force at Brown’s Ferry as Bragg had intended. The ill feeling between the commander and his subordinate was affecting their ability to communicate effectively, and the bad blood between Law and Jenkins was not working much better.

While four brigades of Jenkins’ division were assigned by Longstreet to this action, they were not going down to the valley together, Law was to go down first towards the end of the 28th and basically scout for action against the enemy.  Jenkins had gone down with Law, but then went back to bring down the remaining three brigades and when he met up again with Law, the latter was appalled that they were supposed to take action against what Law now knew to be a force much larger than their own.  It was almost midnight before Jenkins had all his units in place in the valley and by now he did not wish to do much more than probe a little with part of Bratton’s brigade.  Bratton’s force came upon Geary’s units from the north, Geary had not thrown up defensive works as his men were exhausted, and he had expected that if any attack did come, it would be from the south. The ensuing fight would last for some two hours and one of those to fall would be Geary’s own son, a Lieutenant in the artillery.  At around 3 a.m. Micah Jenkins ordered Bratton, who at that point believed he was winning, to withdraw. 

Hooker had arrived in the vicinity of Brown’s Ferry late on the 28th and the sound of the firing on the Wauhatchie position was heard by him and his men. Hooker chose Maj. Gen. Schurz to “push forward” rapidly to Wauhatchie  to relieve Geary, and he moved off at around 01:10am. En-route from Brown’s Ferry to Wauhatchie, about half way along the road, were two hills; the northern one was subsequently known as ‘Smith’s Hill’ while the southern one, about a quarter of a mile closer to Wauhatchie was later called ‘Tyndale Hill’.  In the dark there was confusion as Shurz’s troops went towards and around Smith’s Hill, held by Law and Robertson’s Confederate brigades.  Schurz ordered three of his regiments to take Tyndale Hill, held by Benning’s brigade, which they did, but they then became aware of firing in their rear from Smith’s Hill.

Micah Jenkins, in the action around Wauhatchie, had ordered Bratton to withdraw, just as he felt about to succeed against Geary, he also gave a similar order to Benning on Tyndale Hill.  Both Bratton and Benning would now withdraw towards the bridge over Lookout Creek while Law on Smith’s Hill had been ordered by Jenkins to hold his position to cover Bratton’s withdrawal.  Throughout all this Hooker was getting concerned and at about 02:30 he believed two divisions or even a complete corps of Longstreet’s troops were just across Lookout Creek, and so around 03:00 he was requesting reinforcements from Chattanooga.  Because of the fighting around Smith’s Hill the focus for Schurz had been Smith’s and Tyndale’s Hills, the column had not pushed on to relieve Geary as was Hooker’s original intention. Hooker exploded demanding “what were your orders General Schurz!” and ordering him again to resume his march to relieve Geary.  Hecker’s brigade, the lead brigade in Schurz’s force moved off at about 04:30, but it was 07:00 before they reached Geary’s position and by then Law, Robertson and Bratton had withdrawn over Lookout Creek.

By the 29th all was secured and on the 30th a steamer was able to deliver some 40,000 rations upriver to Kelley’s Ferry to go across the Cracker Line to Chattanooga.  Grant could now be confident of his supply line and of being able to take the fight to the Confederates on the heights.

Longstreet at Chickamauga had been able to deliver the decisive blow against the Federals when he took advantage of the gap in the line caused by Wood’s move to his left. At Brown’s Ferry the movement of most of Law’s force back up on to Lookout Mountain by Longstreet was a major factor in allowing the Federals to make a relatively easy crossing of the Tennessee in the early hours of the morning of the 27th October.

Following events at Brown’s Ferry Bragg wanted rid of Longstreet, whom he held largely responsible for the way events had turned. Longstreet was sent with his two divisions into East Tennessee and Bragg felt well rid of him, he had written to President Davis at the end of the month that detaching him from his army was “a great relief to me.”