Bragg was slow to appreciate that his army had won a major victory over Rosecrans, and he came in for censure for his lack of commitment to pursuing the Federals after the battle.

From Bragg’s post-battle report; “He [the enemy] had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front, and his main body was already in position within his lines at Chattanooga.

Any immediate pursuit by our infantry and artillery would have been fruitless, as it was not deemed practicable with our weak and exhausted force to assail the enemy, now more than double our numbers, behind his intrenchments. Though we had defeated him and driven him fro the field with heavy loss in men, arms and artillery, it had only been done by heavy sacrifices, in repeated, persistent, and most gallant assaults upon superior numbers strongly posted and protected.” Bragg’s appreciation of the situation was somewhat different to Longstreet’s.

After the battle it seemed to Longstreet that Bragg did not realise that the Confederates had won a major victory over the Federals. Bragg appeared to want to find reasons not to pursue the enemy aggressively, while realising that this was in fact what he should do.  Longstreet wanted to see the army cross the Tennessee above Chattanooga, destroy Burnside in Knoxville and threaten Rosecrans’ railroad communication with Nashville. Bragg pleaded lack of transportation.  While Longstreet and the Confederate army expected Bragg to order a quick pursuit, Bragg’s inclination, reinforced by a message from Forrest, was to besiege the Federals in Chattanooga. It took Bragg until the 23rd to start bringing up his infantry, by which time the Federals had strengthened their position in the town.

General Braxton Bragg

From Longstreet’s post-battle report; “Early on the 21st, the commanding general stopped at my bivouac and asked my views as to our future movements. I suggested crossing the river above Chattanooga, so as to make ourselves sufficiently felt on the enemy’s rear as to force his evacuation of Chattanooga and, indeed, force him back upon Nashville, and if we should find our transportation inadequate for a continuance of this movement, to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, destroy Burnside, and from there threaten the enemy’s railroad communication in rear of Nashville.  This I supposed to be the only practicable flank movement, owing to the scarcity of our transportation, and it seemed to keep us very nearly as close to the railroad as we were st the time.  At parting I understood the commanding general to agree that such was probably our best move, and that he was about to give the necessary orders for its execution.”

This seems to show what Longstreet thought of Bragg’s subsequent lack of movement.

Forrest’s message to Bragg while scouting on Thomas.

“Genl We are in a mile of Rossville. Have been on the point of Missionary Ridge can see Chattanooga and everything around The Enemy’s trains are leaving going around the Point of Lookout Mountain.

“The prisoners captured report two pontoons thrown across for the purpose of retreating. I think they are evacuating as hard as they can go.  They are cutting timber down to obstruct our passage. I think we ought to push forward as rapidly as possible.

Repectfully etc N.B. Forrest Brig Gen

“Lt Gen L. Polk

Please forward to Gen Bragg”

This message seems to have convinced Bragg that he could move into Chattanooga following the Federals withdrawal.

After the battle Rosecrans was removed as Commander of the Army of The Cumberland, Grant was given overall command in the West, and Grant preferred Thomas as army Commander.

Both sides had suffered terrible casualties in on of (if not the) hardest battles of the war, but Rosecrans’ defeat left the Federals with Chattanooga because of the failure of Bragg to pursue them aggressively. Although the Confederates were the victors of Chickamauga it might be said that Polk’s poor generalship and tardiness inexecuting Bragg’s orders to attack, twice on the 20th, denied them the opportunity to deal a crushing blow against Thomas.

Longstreet, rightly, gets much praise for his performance on the field, he exploited the gap created by Wood, and he eventually carried Horseshoe Ridge.  However he criticised Bragg for failing to provide him with additional troops from Polk’s wing when he saw him on the early afternoon of the 20th.

From Longstreet’s post-battle report; “About 3 o’clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some of the troops of the Right Wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to me. I had but one division that had not been engaged, and hesitated to venture to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right. I there fore concluded to hold Preston for the time, and urge on to renewed efforts our brave men, who had already been engaged many hours.”

 Longstreet said he wanted them to enable him to cut off the Federal route to Chattanooga, but at that time he still had his own reserve, Preston, unused. When he did use Preston it was not to go down the Dry Valley Road to cut off Thomas’ retreat, instead he used them on Horseshoe Ridge where other attacks had failed.  In the end Thomas got his army back to Rossville and Longstreet, using Preston, captured only the three last regiments after the rest of the Federals had gone.

As a consequence of allowing the Federals to regroup and hold Chattanooga the campaign would move to the seige of that town, and the follow-up battles at Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.  I hope to get to these in the fullness of time!