The final day starts later than planned, and not as well as intended.

The move of Negley’s division Rosecrans’ report of Wood’s slow move The attack starts Map of Breckinridge’s attack Adams & Stovall are checked Criticism of Polk Bragg, frustrated with Polk.

While the Confederates made their preparations for the attack, later than intended because of the mix-up with Hill’s orders, there was a need on the Federal side to redeploy some of their units. The junction of the Lafayette and McFarland’s Gap Roads was found to be unprotected, Baird did not feel that he had sufficient force available to cover up to the McDonald House.  Negley’s division was requested by Thomas and would be positioned behind Baird’s force, so giving some depth to the defence on this vital sector. Although Negley’s units were part of Thomas’ corps, they were at that time attached to McCook. Rosecrans approved the request for the move and told McCook to replace Negley, and release him to Thomas.  Delay and prevarication meant that it was sometime before Negley was relieved to join Thomas.

From Thomas’ post-battle report; “Although informed by note, from General Rosecrans’ headquarters, that Negley’s division would be sent immediately to take post on my left, it had not arrived at 7 am. on the 20th, and I sent Captain Willard, of my staff, to General Negley to urge him forward as rapidly as possible, and to point out his position to him.  General Negley, in his official report, mentions that he received this order through Captain Willard at 8 am. on the 20th, and that he immediately commenced withdrawing his division for that purpose, when the enemy was reported to be massing a heavy force in his front, sharply engaging his skirmishers, and that he was directed by General Rosecrans to hold his position until relieved by some other command.”

Rosecrans was becoming exasperated with the slowness with which his orders for the despatch of Negley, and the covering of his old position by McCook, and told Crittenden to put Wood’s division into the line to replace Negley. This he did using Buell’s and Harker’s brigades, plus Barne’s brigade from Van Cleeve’s division. Wood was also considered by Rosecrans to be taking up his newly assigned position far too slowly.  Although Wood does not himself report the conversation between himself and Rosecrans, there are other reports to say that Rosecrans gave Wood a severe “dressing down”.  One version has it that Rosecrans let out with ‘You have disobeyed my specific orders. By your damnable negligence you are endangering the safety of the entire army, and, by God, I will not tolerate it.  Move your division at once, as I have instructed, or the consequences will not be pleasant for yourself.’ This conversation would have severe repercussions at a later stage in the battle.

Wood took up a position in a fringe of woods behind the house and fields of the Brotherton Farm; Barne’s brigade on the left in contact with Brannan’s division, Harker in the centre and Buell on the right.  On the right of Wood was Davis’ division, and beyond that, Sheridan’s.  His instructions were to be prepared to repel an enemy advance, but not to initiate an engagement. It was now around 9.30am. that Negley moved north and Breckinridge in Hill’s Confederate corps began the opening movement of Bragg’s attack plan. Later than the originally requested dawn attack.

Re-enactors at Bridgeport. Photo J Dillon

From Rosecrans’ post battle report

Satisfied that the enemy's first attempt would be on our left, orders were dispatched to General Negley to join General Thomas and to General McCook to relieve Negley. Returning to the right, I found Negley had not moved, nor were McCook's troops coming in to relieve him. Negley was preparing to withdraw his two brigades from the line. He was ordered to send his reserve brigade immediately and follow it with the others only when relieved on the line of battle. General Crittenden, whose troops were nearest, was ordered to fill General Negley's place at once, and General McCook was notified of this order growing out of the necessity of promptly sending Negley to Thomas.

Proceeding to the extreme right I felt the disadvantages of its positions, mentioned them to General McCook, and when I left him enjoined on him that it was an indispensable necessity that we should keep closed to the left, and that we must do so at all hazards.

On my return to the position of General Negley, I found to my astonishment that General Crittenden had not relieved him, Wood's division having reached the position of Negley's reserve. Peremptory orders were given to repair this, and Wood's troops moved into position, but this delay subsequently proved of serious consequence. The battle began on the extreme left at 8.30 a.m., and it was 9.30 o'clock when Negley was relieved.

As Rosecrans repositioned his forces to strengthen Thomas he issued a string of orders, and many of these would be to units below his immediate subordinates, as he had at Stone River leading Crittenden to comment later; “I regard Rosecrans as of the first order of military mind. He was both brave and generous, impulsively so; in fact, in his impulsiveness lay a military defect, which was to issue too many orders while his men were fighting.” This would occur again at Chickamauga and showed either a problem with delegation, or a lack of faith in the abilities of his Corps commanders.

Breckinridge

The Confederate attack began at around 9.30am. with the advance of Breckinridge; the brigades in a line advancing roughly south, Helm’s brigade on his left flank, Stovall the centre and Adams his right.  Helm was one of President Lincoln’s several brothers-in-law fighting on the Confederate side, and he would be later mortally wounded in the action that morning, as it was his brigade met strong resistance as they came up against the Federal defensive positions that Thomas had had built during the night. 

The brigade fought hard to break down the Federals to their front, but the loss of men was terrible.  Of the 1,400 who went into action, 471 were left on the field of battle, including the Colonels of the 4th, 2nd and 9th Kentucky regiments. Stovall and Adams, however, further to the west, met little resistance, Beatty and Stanley were forced to withdraw in front of them, and the Confederates were able to advance south down either side of the Lafayette Road.  Their advance south, however, would be limited because of Helm’s inablity to come with them, their flanks were now well exposed.

The following is an extract from an article in the March 2000 edition of “America’s Civil War”, the article was related to the 35th Ohio Infantry regiment at Chickamauga and was written by Greg Fugitt; “The frost-covered morning of September 20 began with the 35th in reserve, gradually shifting to the left through dense woods.  At 11 a.m., Maj. Gen. John Breckinridge’s Confederate division attacked the Union left, and the 35th moved to support Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird’s division.  The regiment was on the right of the second line moving into Kelly’s farm when Brig. Gen. Marcellus Stovall’s Confederate brigade appeared with no warning. The 35th received a galling fire from short range and immediately changed front to meet the threat.  Lying down in two ranks, the regiment waited until the Rebels were less than 100 yards away.  After rising to fire two volleys, the 35th and the 9th Ohio charged the stunned Rebels, drove them back 500 yards, and took positions in the woods north of Kelly’s farm. For another hour, the Persimmons maintained determined combat.”

The map above shows the advance of Adams and Stovall down the Lafayette road towards Beatty, Stanley and Van Derveer.

This photo is at the northern end of the field covered by Reynolds on the 20th.  It approximates to Adams moving south on the Lafayette Road, behind Reynolds’ divisons on the left of the photo. The Kelly House is further down the road, hidden by the trees on the right.  Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

From Breckinridge’s post-battle report; “When Helm’s brigade was checked, and I had given Colonel Lewis orders in reference to his new position, I rode to the commands of Adams and Stovall, on the right. It was now evident, from the comparatively slight resistance they had encountered and the fact that they were not threatened in front, that our line had extended beyond the enemy’s left.  I at once ordered these brigades to change front perpendicular to the original line of battle, and with the left of Adams and the right of Stovall resting on the Chattanooga road to advance upon the flank of the enemy. Slocomb’s battery, which had previously done good service, was posted on favorable ground on the west of the road to support the movement. The brigades advanced in fine order over a field and entered the woods beyond.  Stovall soon encountered the extreme left of the enemy’s works, which, retiring from the general north and south direction of his intrenchments, extended westwardly nearly to the Chattanooga road.  After a severe and well contested conflict, he was checked and forced to retire. Adams, on the west of the road, met two lines of the enemy, who had improved the short time to bring up re-enforcements and reform nearly at a right angle to the troops in his main line of works. The first line was routed, but it was found impossible to break the second, aided as it was by artillery, and after a sanguinary contest which reflected high honor on the brigade, it was forced back in some confusion. Here General Adams, who is as remarkable for his judgement on the field as for his courage, was severely wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy.”

The map below shows the action to the north, in Thomas’ area.

This photo is taken from what is now called Battle Line Road.  The shot is taken from the line of Reynolds divisions, with the Confederate line marked by the regimental stones in front. Out of shot to the left are the monuments marking where Colquitt and Helm fell. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

The brigades of Beatty and Stanley had been forced to withdraw back down the Lafayette to the vicinity of the Kelly House, and Adam’s and Stovall’s advance was putting them behind the Federal forces facing Breckinridge and Cleburne. Thomas wanted to strengthen his position and requested Rosecrans to release Brannan’s division back to him.  This had been sent the previous afternoon to strengthen the centre against Stewart’s attack. However, Brannan was already in the Poe woods between Reynolds and Wood, so Van Derveer’s brigade was despatched at around 10.30am. to support Thomas’ left against Breckinridge.  They arrived in time to halt the advance of Adams and Stovall.

This photo is from the area of the Poe Field, Brannan’s men would have been in the tree line by the regimental monuments. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

In miniature, Adams and Stovall were executing Bragg’s plan of rolling up the Federals from the north, unfortunately the advance needed support, and it was not getting any. Adams himself had been severely wounded in the action and was captured by Stanley. Cleburne, who could and should have provided support was also held up by Thomas’ defences formed by the semi-circular sweep of the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer and Reynolds east of the Lafayette Road.  Cleburne’s difficulties were further compounded by the entanglement of two of his leftmost brigades with Stewart’s division.  The situation for the Confederate right wing continued to go badly. Cheatham’s division was stalled behind Cleburne and there was now a gap in Hill’s corps. Gist, commanding Walker’s division, to the rear of Breckinridge was to assist.  Colquitt had taken over the command of Gist’s brigade and, believing that his front was covered by the Confederates, advanced without skirmishers. The brigade was destroyed by the Federals and Colquitt himself was killed. When Hill put forward Govan’s brigade to give support they were met by the retreating units of Adams and Stovall, and retreated with them.  By noon, on the Confederate right, Cheatham’s men had not been used, while the other units were all played out.

Bragg’s plan for the day relied on events on his right wing starting on time, and being pursued aggressively, the battle would roll south, but Polk on the day was not the man to make the plan happen. The attack started late because he had not ensured that his orders of the previous night were distributed to, and understood by, his subordinate commanders. Then, he did not aggressively pursue the opportunity afforded to him when Adams and Stovall started down the Lafayette.  As mentioned on a number of occasions, Bragg’s plan was for the Federal left to be rolled up, and the attack moved south.  This would cut the Federals off rom an opportunity to retreat on Chattanooga.  If the Confederate victory came against the Federal right or centre then it would tend to drive them back on Chattanooga.  Still a victory, but not the one wanted.

The following is from Bragg’s post battle report

Before the dawn of day myself and staff were ready for the saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of and accessible to all parts of the Free. With increasing anxiety and disappointment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun, and at length dispatched a staff officer to Lieutenant-General Polk to ascertain the cause of the delay and urge him to a prompt and speedy movement. This officer, not finding the general with his troops, and learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga and there delivered my message.

Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were immediately dispatched for Lieutenant-General Polk, and he shortly after joined me. My orders were renewed, and the general was urged to their prompt execution, the more  important as the ear was saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the   ax and falling timber as the enemy industriously labored to strengthen his  position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A reconnaissance   made in the front of our extreme right during this delay crossed the main road  to Chattanooga and proved the important fact that this greatly desired  position was open to our possession.

The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by the wing commander appear in part in the reports of his subordinates. It is sufficient to say they are entirely unsatisfactory. It also appears from these reports that when the action was opened on the right about 10 a.m. the troops were moved to the  assault in detail and by detachments, unsupported, until nearly all parts of   the right wing were in turn repulsed with heavy losses.

Our troops were led with the greatest gallantry and exhibited great coolness, bravery, and heroic devotion. In no instance did they fail when called on to rally and return to the charge. But though invariably driving the enemy with slaughter at the points assailed, -they were compelled in turn to yield to the greatly superior numbers constantly brought against them. The attack on the left, promptly made as ordered, met with less resistance, much of the enemy's strength having been transferred to our right, and was successfully and vigorously followed up.

The missed opportunity was the failure to be in a position to exploit the advance made by Adams an Stovall of Breckinridge’s division. They had got past the Federal flank, were advancing down the Lafayette as intended, and would be behind the Federal defences.  Polk had Gist’s, Liddell’s and Cheatham’s divisions, but failed to get them to support the advance.