It is now the afternoon of the 19th and Bragg has brought forward Cheatham’s division to support the Confederate action west of Reed’s Bridge.

Thomas advances around Poe’s Farm The Confederates push back.

The map shows the changing position between noon and mid-afternoon on the 19th September.

Once Cheatham had his force in battle order, he advanced and pushed Croxton westward.  Meanwhile Brig. Gen. Richard Johnson’s division had been ordered north by Rosecrans from McCook’s Corps to join Thomas, who then ordered him eastward where he arrived as Croxton was being driven back by Cheatham. Johnson fell on the Confederate force of Jackson, and halted their pursuit of Croxton. Johnson’s division was too big a force for Jackson’s brigade to hold, and as they were now low on ammunition they were replaced by Maney’s brigade.  Again, this was too small a force to hold the two leading Federal brigades of Johnson’s force, his flanks began to collapse, and he also had to withdraw. The Federals were beginning to have the upper hand at the northern end of the field of battle, and there were more forces on their way to join Thomas.  Major General Palmer (promoted to Maj. General at Stone’s River) had been ordered to take his division north along the Lafayette road, following Johnson’s division, and he also arrived on the battlefield around 1pm., where Thomas put him on Johnson’s right to the east of Poe Farm.  Palmer put the brigades of Hazen, Cruft and Grose in a single line and ordered them forward into the forest to their front, where Cruft’s brigade struck the Confederates at around 1:30 pm. near the Brock House, south of the Brotherton road which leads from the Lafayette Road to Reed’s Bridge.

The map above shows the position around Palmer’s Division early afternoon on the 19th.

It was a feature of the day that there was to be a constant change between Federals and Confederates as to who was pushing forward, and the focal point of the battle would gradually slip from north to south.

The following is Bragg’s comments on these moves from his post battle report.

The enemy, whose left was at Lee and Gordon's Mills when our movement  commenced, had rapidly transferred forces from his extreme right, changing his entire line, and seemed disposed to dispute with all his ability our effort to gain the main road to Chattanooga, in his rear.

Palmer’s line caused havoc as they advanced into the forest, where they came first upon the Confederates under Brigadier Generals Smith & Wright. Smith, in the Brock Field, took the brunt of Palmer’s attack, he called for relief, was replaced by Strahl’s brigade who themselves fared no better and also withdrew.  On the left of Smith was Wright’s brigade, but their left flank was hit by two birgades of Brig. Gen. Van Cleeve’s division who had followed Palmer up the Lafayette Road. Smith & Wright’s brigades were now in retreat, with the Federals in a strong position on the Lafayette Road south of the Brotherton Cabin.  To the right of Beatty, who had just routed Wright, were the brigades of Dick and King, both also facing east towards the Confederates.

Although Cheatham’s division had been worsted in these actions, Bragg still had opportunities available to him, he had by no means employed all his forces.  At 1.30pm. he ordered Maj. Gen. Stewart to move north from Thedford Ford through the forest to the Brock Farm (where Smith’s brigade had been hit by Palmer), en-route he met Wright’s retreating brigade who informed him of the situation with the Federals of Van Cleeve on his left.  Van Cleeve was fifty-four, and the eldest of the divisional commanders of the Army of the Cumberland. He was severley wounded at Stone’s River, but returned in time for the Tullahoma campaign and resumed command of his division. Stewart decided to attack Van Cleeve. 

From Stewart’s division, Brig.Gen. Clayton’s brigade held the advance of the units of Beatty, Dick and Grose until they had no more ammunition, and their position was taken over by the brigade of John Brown. In that action Clayton’s force lost 604 men, killed and wounded, in an action that had lasted 45 minutes.  Beatty’s brigade of Van Cleeve’s division had marched up at 1pm. and formed up on Palmer’s right, their Corps Commander Crittenden had ridden up with them.  The fighting at this point was at very close range, “muzzle to muzzle”, and during this action they captured four Confederate guns of Lt. Carne’s battery, which were double-shotted with cannister, but they had had to shoot fourty-eight of the battery horses to get the guns.    At around 3.15pm. Brown arrived to take over from Clayton, and his brigade attacked Beatty’s exhausted troops, as well as the flanks of Dick’s brigade, which he was threatening to turn.  Beatty and Dick were forced back and the Confederates retook their four guns of Carne’s battery, lost earlier in the action.  To use a short quote from Tucker’s book on Chickamauga; “In the fury of this fighting the dry woods, parched from the long drought, caught fire, and to the clouds and fumes of powder smoke were added the heavy white billows from the dry leaves and flaming underbrush.”

True to the run of play on the day, it was now the turn of the Confederates to rout some Federal units.  Stewart’s last brigade was commanded by Brig. gen. William Bate, who had enlisted as a private, and at 3.30pm. he came out of the forest against Van Cleeve’s division, who were now in the Brotherton Field, and routed them, as well as Hazen’s brigade who had tried to assist Van Cleeve. At about the same time part of Hood’s division under Colonel John Sheffield drove back Croft and Grose on Bate’s right. The impetus of the rush by Stewart and Bate took them through the Brotherton Field to the Dyer Field (see map at top of page) scattering Van Cleeve before them.  En-route they also captured twelve Federal guns.  This was a critical point in the battle for Rosecrans.  From his HQ at Widow Glenn’s he watched as King’s three regiments were thrown back towards his HQ. Crossing the Lafayette Road the Confederates had cut his vital link from Lee & Gordon’s Mill in the south to Thomas in the north.  He could see that the Confederates had pierced his centre, and now also posed a threat to the rising ground overlooking the Dry Valley Road to the west, his only other link to Chattanooga.  As so often happens in battles a breakthrough requires supporting forces to be close behind if it is to hold the newly won ground.  With Federals approaching both flanks, and no close supporting forces, Stewart and Bate had to withdraw east of the Lafayette Road.

The photo above shows the open field south of the Dyer House.  The site of the old house is in the tree line at the left of the picture.  The road on the right is the old Glenn-Kelly Road.  The Brotherton House is out of picture on the right.  Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.

Part of the threat to Stewart came from Thomas, who, hearing the increasing sounds of battle on his right, and now aware of the advance of Stewart over the Lafayette to the Glenn-Kelly Road, despatched Brannan’s division from his left flank (somewhat rested after their actions that morning).  Negley’s division, also of Thomas’ Corps, which had been at Crawfish Springs during the morning, was moving up from the south. These two divisions were converging on Stewart’s flanks and caused him to withdraw east of the Lafayette, so re-establishing Rosecran’s essential north-south link.

When Stewart had moved forward earlier in the day he had passed behind Bushrod Johnson’s division (see map below) who had been contacted by the Federals of Brig. gen. Davis at around 2pm., Davis had been ordered north from Crawfish Springs by Rosecrans and was drawn up east of the Lafayette Road in front of the Viniard House, forming the Federal right.  They would later be joined by Sheridan’s division.  At the same time as Davis arrived, Colonel Barnes’ brigade from Van Cleeve’s division arrived in the same area so that the line up of Davis’ force on the Federal right was now; Heg’s brigade on the left, Carlin’s brigade in the centre with Barnes on the right, Wilder’s brigade was in support west of the Viniard House. The piecemeal way in which individual commands had been fed into the battle was exemplified by the make-up of this force defending the right wing; Heg and Carlin’s brigades were from McCook’s Corps, Barnes was from Crittenden’s Corps and Wilder was from Thomas’ Corps.

The map above shows the position south of the Brotherton farm at about 3pm on the 19th.

Unfortunately for the Federals, Davis had positioned his division on the field in such a way as to leave his left flank in the air, there was a half mile gap to King’s brigade on his left.  Hood saw and took the opportunity, Heg’s brigade was assaulted in front and flank, and Heg himself would die later that afternoon of a bullet wound to the stomach. Hood had hoped to turn the Federal right, but he would be thwarted by the arrival of Wood’s division of Crittenden’s corps from Lee & Gordon’s Mill. Wood arrived just in time for him to put Buell in to support Carlin’s and Heg’s brigades, as they were the most hard pressed. Wood also threw Harker’s brigade against Bushrod Johnson’s flank which was exposed as he attempted to push Carlin across the Lafayette. As a result Johnson had to retire. At the southern end of the battlefield the forces were again separated by the Lafayette road, but there was some bad news for the Federals. Harker, interrogating some of the prisoners from Hood’s force, discovered that they were in fact men from Longstreet’s units.

The photo above is taken at the southern end of the battlefield, looking west, in the area of the Viniard Farm, my back is to the Lafayette Road. This is close to where Heg fell. Photo J Dillon, Sept. 2002.