Following the battle Rosecrans would come under later pressure to move on to the next action, but Rosecrans was concerned for his line of supply.

In his biography of Sheridan Richard O’Connor believed that there were four critical moments in the three-day battle.

1. The last stand in the Round Forest. This saved the bulk of the Union army from destruction before they could form a defensive line. 2. Thomas’ defence of the secondary line along the Nashville pike and the railroad. 3. The quick action of Captain Thruston in saving the corps ammunition train from capture. 4. The stand taken by Sheridan and Thomas at the council of war, persuading Rosecrans to stand and fight.

Grant had a poor opinion of Rosecrans, but thought well of Sheridan and after the battle expressed the view that “It was from all I can hear about it a wonderful bit of fighting.  It what a great general can do even in a subordinate command; for I believe Sheridan in that battle saved Rosecrans’ army.”

On moving into Murfreesboro Rosecrans had to take to his sick bed, diagnosed as suffering from ‘lung fever’ he had time to review his casualty figures.  The battle had been won at a high price; 1,630 killed out of a casualty figure of some 13,250 but he had driven the Confederates back. Although the battle might be thought of as a ‘draw’ in terms of casualties, it was a victory for the Federals in terms of offensive moves, they were another step closer to the vital communications town of Chattanooga and by forcing the Confederates back they had caused European nations to think again before backing the Confederacy. In Washington the battle was lauded as a great victory. Even Stanton had praise for Rosecrans; “The country is filled with admiration of the gallantry and heroic achievement of yourself and the officers and troops under your command.”

Williams in his book “Lincoln and his Generals” commented; “After Fredericksburg and during the first days of January, when Burnside was going to pieces, Lincoln needed some good military news. So did the country.  Stone’s River raised popular morale and strengthened the government at home and abroad. Lincoln was profoundly grateful to Rosecrans.  Months later, when he did not feel as kindly toward the General as he did in January, Lincoln would write to Rosecrans: “I can never forget whilst I remember anything that about the end of last year and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over.”

The big problem for Rosecrans after the battle was re-supply and his lines of communication, he had no intention of moving again against Bragg until he was sure that he had the supplies he deemed necessary for the next step. His rail supply line was continually cut by Confederate cavalry raids, and that supply line, by rail, extended over 212 miles to Louisville. This was one area where Bragg had a considerable advantage over him, he operated close to his supply bases and over much shorter supply lines, he also enjoyed a considerable advantage in the number and quality of his cavalry arm over Rosecrans.

In January Rosecrans received 14,000 additional troops, and on February 13th a new Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Garfield who would play a key role during the action at Chickamauga.

Although lauded for the result of the battle, Rosecrans was soon in trouble again with Washington, they were starting to tire of his requests for men and supplies before he would move again against Bragg, “Your complaints are without reason. You cannot expect to have all the best arms.”  Rosecrans resented the picture painted of him in Washington, that of the constant complainer, he believed his requests reasonable and necessary and in one of his responses he alluded to the time that Stanton had misjudged his motives when he was sent to ‘guide’ Blenker’s division in ‘61; “I have never asked, and never will ask, anything to increase my personal command.  Had this been understood when I went with Blenker’s division, this nation might have been spared millions of blood and treasure.”  Suggesting that Stanton’s action in ‘61 had prolonged the casualty roll and the cost of the war produced a terminal rift in their relationship.

In spite of the urgings from Washington Rosecrans stuck to his guns, and refused to move until he felt himself ready, and this situation continued for some months, even though in late May Grant was being repulsed in his attempts on Vicksburg and there was a fear that Bragg may be used to reinforce the town. In early June Rosecrans canvassed the views of his commanders to see if they felt a move should be made against Bragg; apart from Garfield there was an almost overwhelming view that he should not move. Rosecrans passed those views to Halleck who felt that ‘councils of war never fight’ and on June 11 he telegramed Rosecrans “If you say that you are not prepared to fight Bragg I shall not order you to do so, for the responsibility of fighting or refusing to fight at a particular time and place must rest upon the general in immediate command.” He finally moved on June 23rd after having been halted for 169 days.