The action against Suez in 1956 did not involve the Vulcan, however the bombing equipment fitted to the Valiant aircraft was the same as that carried in the Vulcan, which would probably have produced similar results.  There were grounds for improvement.

Comments by Sqn. Ldr. Spencer who took part in the bombing at Suez. Comments from Issue 8 of RAF magazine

If anyone from the Valiant or Canberra force involved in Musketeer should read this I would be very interested to hear their comments, and include them on the page. 

Three occasions spring to mind when the V Force has been used in anger, albeit with conventional not nuclear weapons; those occasions are Suez in ’56 with the Valiants, Indonesia in the mid-60’s with the Vulcans and the Falklands in 1982 with the Vulcan ‘Black Buck’ operations, and the Victor in its tanker role.

In the Falklands we saw very resource intensive operations to put a single Vulcan over Stanley Field on each of a couple of missions. On each sortie a stick of 1,000lb bombs was dropped on the airfield, at least one bomb cratering the runway on at least one sortie.  This was a very expensive way of making a point to the Argentines, but it showed them we could hit their mainland airfields if we had to. As regards Indonesia, I am not familiar with the action, and need to look at a few files from the National Archives.  However, I have had a look at some of the files related to Suez; I hope to review more of them in a few months.

At the time of Suez, late 1956, the Valiant was the main V-bomber and the force was operating in its high level role, low level had not been adopted as a delivery mode at this time.  3 Valiant Squadrons were appointed to take part in Musketeer, and they were based at Luqa on Malta, the Valiants together with the Canberras from Cyprus would constitute the bomber force for the operations against Egypt.  The Egyptian radar defences were in a bad state, as was their fighter defence network but it was decided that the Valiants would only operate over the Egyptian landmass during the hours of darkness, and at high level. It was planned that the 24 Valiants would fly a total of 192 sorties¹ in the first 2 weeks of the ‘war’.

In a series of reports after the Suez operations there was an analysis of the accuracy of the bombing, and what were believed to be contributory causes to those results; “The operation of the Bomber Force deployed ….. has been restricted by (a) the limited bombing equipment fitted in the bomber aircraft”.  In the Valiant this was NBS, GEE-H and a T2 sighting head. The navigation kit was NBS, Green Satin, GPI-4, VHF, ILS and the sextant.  Unfortunately NBS serviceability was deemed to have been a particular issue and GEE could not be used as there were no beacons. (One can’t help feeling that they must have known this before-hand.)  Because of this bombing was restricted to “… visual bombing of target indicators in good weather only.”² The bombing was at night and involved timed runs from a specific overhead on a specific track.  This was the bombing technology of the Second World War.

On the accuracy of the bombing the report said that it “indicates that bombing accuracy varied from target to target and in general was more scattered than expected.”

While the accuracy attained might not have produced too many problems in the Valiant’s primary role as nuclear strike bomber it must still have been worrying to the Air Staff to see the worrying serviceability of the NBS and the need to resort to visually bombing on markers laid down by a second marker aircraft. This facility would not be available in their nuclear role. The effectiveness of the bombing was limited; “It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the Bomber contribution.  As forcast, when Musketeer planning first started, the number of bombs upon airfields was inadequate and only in a few instances were runways put out of action.”

My comments on the bombing at Suez prompted a response from a ‘participant’, the following is the text of an email I received from Gordon Spencer.

To introduce myself, I am Sqn Ldr Gordon Spencer, nav plotter and one of the founder members of the most efficient force the RAF has ever had, bar none!!!!!!!!! I went to Gaydon in Aug 54 and subsequently 138 Sqn and 49 Sqn (Valiant) and XV Sqn (Victor B1 - B1a)

I was idling through the net and came across your comment on Suez. At that time we were in Australia dropping a little bucket of sunshine on that fair land whilst Suez was in preparation and arrived back in UK only a few days before the start of ops.

My comment concerns visual bombing. Our drop in Maralings was carried out visually (there was no room in the aircraft for NBS!) using the T4 bombsight - T2 with Green Satin feed as you well know. Our bomb error was less than 100 yds from 30000ft. I think the trouble in Suez arose from the fact that the T2 was not used properly. It could be a good bombsight if all went well - wind and the correct sighting angle which would vary from aircraft to aircraft. The fault lay, if my memory serves me right, at No 3 Group who insisted that all aircraft used a fixed angle sighting head and 3 Gp chose the angle! Guaranteed to scatter bombs all over the Sahara. At this distance in time my memory is a little dim but perhaps some other Valiant stalwart can confirm or deny.

Hope this helps

Yours aye

Gordon Spencer

Maryborough, Queensland

My thanks to Gordon; does anyone else have any comments?

The following comment is from Roy Brocklebank; “My boss at Waddo in 68 had been a nav rad at Suez. He confirms the T2 fiasco. He suspected that they had not allowed for stick length. His sqn, and I am not sure which one, used the NBS even though it was not authorised and allegedly got more accurate results.”

 The following couple of paragraphs sum up some of the views on the bombing;

“At first sight the bombing results appear to be disappointing.  Detailed analysis may confiorm this.  However, it should not be overlooked that the bombing accuracy was seriously impaired by the inadequate navigation and bombing facilities available. Further contributory factors are believed to be:-

• Lack of practice by crews in bombing with a full load. The handling characteristics of a heavily laden aircraft on a bombing run are markedly worse than with only a light load of practice bombs.
• Lack of practice in visual bombing.  For many years the primary bombing method of the Canberra force has been GEE-H. In recent months, however, the emphasis was placed on visual bombing in preparation for ‘Musketeer’ and a directive to this effect was issued by Headquarters Bomber Command.  Nevertheless, in spite of this directive, discussions with the Bomber Wings have revealed that a number of crews had not had any practice in visual bombing. This is a grave reflection on the preparation of squadrons for this operation.”

The comment in paragraph 40 (b) was a criticism of the whole process of preparation for Musketeer and caused a signal to be sent to the HQ of the Bomber Wings in Malta and Cyprus.  I would like to find followup signals to the one below.  This signal was also in AIR 20/9557 in the PRO and refers to the report in the paragraph above.  I suspect HQ 1 Group will have someone in hot water for not ensuring that the visual bombing requirement was met prior to joining ‘Musketeer’.

A conclusion was drawn in November ‘56 that; “The proficiency of crews must be improved by constant realistic training appropriate to the theatre of operations.”  This was the reasoning behind many V crews training at low level over Canada.

The following extracts are from an article by David Oliver in Issue 8 of the “RAF” [available from WHS], the article was on Operation Musketeer.

“That night [1 November]Canberras and Valiants attacked the reported Il-28 bases at Cairo-West, Fayid Kasfareet, and Luxor.  However, subsequent BDA reconnaissance showed that the airfields had suffered relatively minor damage and more raids would be required to end the risk of any counter attack by the Ilyushins.”

The comment above is in line with the previous comments on bombing accuracy, but it is interesting to contrast it with another quote David uses in the article which shows the eternal optimism of the politician.  David writes; “The Valiant raids had not proved to be as decisive as had been hoped, but Nigel Birch, the then-Secretary of State for Air, said in Parliament in December 1956, ‘The Valiant operations showed that these aircraft could not only carry ‘A’ bombs, but large loads of high explosive and, with their new radar bomb sights, could bomb accurately from great heights.” Birch’s comments seem at variance with everything mentioned above.

Sources:

• (1) AIR 20/10219, Operation MUSKETEER: overall air plan; Sept 1956.  National Archives
• (2) AIR 20/9557, Operation MUSKETEER Air Task Force HQ Files: Bomber operations.  National Archives.