As the Vulcan is a bomber it goes without saying that the bomb run and the placing of the weapon as close as possible to the target was something the crew wanted to get right.

The run in starts at the Initial Point Run in from the IP Attack profile info from Roy Brocklebank

This section details bombing runs as they were done in the 1970’s, the early days before low level was the norm were very much trial and error as the aircraft was not originally designed for this role.

2F Bomb Run Profile

At the end of the day the Vulcan was intended as a means of delivering a nuclear or conventional bomb on a target with a degree of accuracy as a part of an attack under a NATO or National War Plan.  That weapon could be delivered from high or low level but in its role as a strategic nuclear bomber of the '70's the delivery would be from low level after a high level transit.  The crew would operate on their own, not as part of a 'force package', they would rely on the pre-flight route planning document to contain accurate information regarding the location of defenses, radars and anti-aircraft units and that the route had been planned to avoid them all with sufficient margin to remain undetected, well that was the plan.  Luckily we did not have to test this for real.

The main low level delivery profile for the Vulcan was designated as a 2F. The 2F profile involved a run in on the target at low level, between 300 and 500 feet, running straight and level over the target releasing the weapon either on radar or if the target was visible to the pilots, a visual release could be done if the pilots were experienced and confident that they had acquired the target correctly. Because an aircraft releasing a weapon at these heights was vulnerable to damage from it's own weapon blast, the bomb would be delivered in 'retarded' mode, usually a brake parachute on the bomb, that would allow greater separation from the bomb.  In the case of a low-level laydown delivery of a nuclear weapon the bomb would also have a time delay set before take-off, ensuring a safe separation of some miles before weapon detonation after it hit the ground.

The photo on the right is one from Hunting Engineering who I believe manufactured the parachute units in the tail of the 1000lb bombs. The shot shows a Vulcan releasing the weapons at low level, the brake chute deploys and so increases the separation between bomb and aircraft to prevent damage to the aircraft from its own weapons. The nuclear weapon carried in the 1970’s for low level lay-down attacks had a similar brake device.

The I.P., or Initial Point, was a position some miles short of the target, around 15 - 20 miles at low level about 40 miles at high level. The idea of the IP was to ensure that crews approached their target from a known position and on a known track, having got ‘on top’ the IP they would then fly a designated track to the target, that way they could make themselves familiar with the final run-in to the target.

Offsets have been described elsewhere, so here I will only refer to them in terms of how they were used.  The bombing system was initially designed with one set of offsets, but this was later changed to two.  Using two sets would allow the Radar to select a large aiming point some good number of miles before the target to get an initial accurate steer towards the target, as well as a check on miles to run and time to go.  At this stage a large or very easily identifiable return would be used to ensure that an accurate last fix was fed into the nav system, as well as getting a good steer to target.  Having got this accurate fix, a switch to the second offset should see the radar markers drop right over the second offset radar return.  This should allow the Radar to choose a smaller, more accurate return, possibly from something that would not show on radar until close to it. You would not want a small difficult-to-see return as your only offset as you would not have the advantage of the earlier accurate fix and target heading that came from the large offset.  Depending on the size of radar return from the actual target, bombing could either continue using the second offset, and so having the system bomb on a point measured from the offset, or the offset could be switched out, allowing the radar markers to now fall over the target, if it produced a radar return.  Choice of offsets was part of the skill of radar bombing; choose too large an object (Drax power station) and it would not be accurate, the return would be so large that the issue would be where to put the radar markers, choose too small an object and it may not show up at all depending on approach angle, height, and the skill of the operator with the aerial, power and brilliance settings.  Maybe choose one of the cooling towers at Drax, and then tune the set when approaching it so that the individual towers would show as discrete returns.  The same accuracy considerations applied to the target itself. If the target produced a small, discrete return, then it could be used for final aiming and return, if it produced a large return or non at all, then the bombing would need to be done on the offsets.

The photo below (from a PRO file) shows the PPI display at 500ft over Canada; the aircraft is tracking north-west and the operator has his markers (just to the left of the red ‘X’) over a fix point or offset.

The final run-in on a low-level attack could be a fairly active period for the Radar, the thing was to stay in control and not let events get away from you, and sometimes on unfamiliar low-level routes abroad it could feel as though it was all going wrong.  Having done all the necessary pre-planning, offsets selected and measured, overlays drawn up and maps marked, it was all down to the 20 miles from IP, about 4 minutes at 300 knots. The nav Plotter would get the aircraft to the IP at the specified time, and pass heading to target to the pilots, from this point on, the target run should be down to the Radar, he may if he feels it appropriate allow the pilots to do a visual release, but lets assume it's all to be on Radar.

Having turned at the IP the Radar should then be able to pick up his first selected offset on the radar, using the 626 control stick and the wind switch he would then position the radar markers over the radar return.  Using the wind switch at the same time would allow a wind correction to be fed to the nav system and stabilize the radar display so that it does not 'drift' from the radar markers because of a wind error in the system.  Once sure that he now has the markers over the offset the radar can select 'bomb', this allows the NBS to feed a 'go right' or 'go left' signal to the pilot in control, the pilot will then fly the aircraft to centralize the steer indicator, so tracking the aircraft towards the target.

Another consequence of selecting the system to 'bomb' is that the film which has been inserted into the bombing 'computer' Calc 3 to allow release point computation for the particular weapon, will have started to run through the system tocalculate the forward throw.  Speed and height should be varied as little as possible as these could cause the film to start another run during which time data is not reliable.  The worst scenario would be to have a height change sufficient to start a film run, just close to release time as this will cause an incorrect release.  Accurate flying by the pilots on the final run-in was important. As the radar uses his set, he will continually adjust the radar settings to try to get a 'fine' return from his offset before either switching to the next offset or to the target.  As he adjusts the set and the position of the markers he will tell the pilot to 'ignore the steer' on the meter at the front, then when he is happy with his positioning of the markers he will tell the pilot to 'take out the steer', which asks the pilot to make the necessary heading correction.

At high level the steer is sent direct to the autopilot so that the corrections to the radar are a direct steer to the aircraft;  the autopilot will have height lock set to keep this steady and each time that the operator needs to feed a correction to the system, the bomb steer will be deselected until the Radar has corrected his aiming marker, ‘Bomb’ can then be re-selected and the autopilot will ‘take out’ the correction. If ‘bomb’ is not de-selected then as soon as the Radar starts to move the 626 it will feed direct to the autopilot, this will cause a turn and this will cause a tilt in the aerial, this will feed in radar errors, so the radar re-positions his markers with the autopilot de-selected from the bombing steer.

As the Radar continues to feed heading corrections to the pilots, the range is obviously decreasing, at around 6 miles to go to release the bomb doors will open automatically. This takes a good few seconds and is very noticeable to the crew in terms of noise and increased turbulence. Obviously there is a need for bomb doors to open before a weapon can be released, and so there are associated safety locks in the release system.  There is a positive check by the crew that the doors are opened, confirmed by the AEO taking a look through his periscope.  If the doors do not open automatically then they need to be opened by the pilot operating a separate open switch, if they don't then it would be an aborted run.

On the bomb run the camera mounted above the radar screen runs continually so that the radar can analyze his handling of the radar, the way he picked up the offsets and target etc when he gets back to base.  The camera also records the release point. For simulated low-level bombing over land there is also an F95 downward facing camera in the 'prone' bomb-aimer position in the nose, as the aircraft is on the target run the Radar switches on the F95 to record the final run in to the target and to allow scoring of the simulated release.  The tone which is turned on in the latter stages of the run will cause an 'event marker' on the film when it is turned off, so showing the release point. The frame on the film can then be compared with a large scale ordnance survey map so showing where the aircraft was at simulated weapon release.

At the time of release the Radar calls 'bomb gone' which allows the crew to collect release data needed for later confirmation of the accuracy of the release. Data would be height, speed, heading, wind speed and direction, all of which is collected on a form carried by the Radar.  Having completed the run the bomb doors would be closed and the NBS settings returned to those for normal navigation.

Roy Brocklebank sent me some information on bombing profiles following a question of mine; here is Roy’s info.

I was on 12 from 64-67, Waddo 67-69, Akrotiri 70-73. 73-74 I was in the WST so we would definitely have met.

The attack types were as follows:

2 – S&L Hi Level

2A – SAM evasive bomb run. At 43 miles execute a 45 deg turn with 47 deg AOB pulling 1.5 g. After 15 seconds reverse through 90 deg. Wings level for 30 seconds and reverse again. Repeat. About 17 miles from the target execute 45 deg turn and steady on target heading. About one minute S&L to bomb release. In war we would have been on assigned track at about FL520 and M 0.88 or so. By the time I joined the sqn, Jun 64, we had abandoned the 2A for the 2E but persisted in practising the 2A for the rest of that tour. It gave us something to do at high level and was good for pilot handling and crew cooperation. To get good scores in training we would fly at 410-430 (or lower), 0.84 M and into wind J.

2B – S&L Hi Level against Ouston Bombplot on a specified target and track. The target changed each week. As we ran in, perhaps 90 miles out, the RBSU would switch on an X-band jammer, a piece of kit from the Washington. We would then use anti-jam techniques – wide offsets and sector scan – to evade the jammer strobe. I recall one occasion when I F’d up and chose a small discrete offset close to the target. I cannot recall whether I bombed on the long range offset, achieved burn through or managed to reset the offsets. Before 1964 Methwold Bombplot had 3 jammers and could offer a more comprehensive experience.

2C – I am not sure what this one was except that it might just have been associated with Violet Club and was not even mentioned in 1964.

2D – this was a low level entry and pop up to FL 270 to drop either Blue Danube or Red Beard. We had Red Beard but the checklist was never cleared for use and we never practised the manoeuvre.

2E – pre-cursor to the 2H for release of Yellow Sun 2. LL entry at about 15 miles, popup and push over (+1.5g, +0.5g) to level at 11000 feet about one minute from the target. Initially we were tasked for this attack but not cleared for training as the 350kt pop was a bit violent for people on the ground. As with the 2A we cheated and the popup point used to creep back to give us more time straight and level. Resbat – Research Branch Analysis Team – calculated that the force average exposure time to bomb release was 120 seconds. The average time for an alert SA2 crew to detect, track, launch and kill, was 112 seconds. They developed the 2H. We were cleared to attack Newcastle on the 2E.

2F – initially developed for the Valiant with the Big E weapon. Later adopted by the Vulcan force with the WE177.

2G – Popup attack for a conventional attack with 21x1000lb to 8000 feet. In theory this was for use in a non-SAM environment and would get us above the AAA. Coincidentally it was above the 7200 feet min ht for the Calc 3.

2H – This was a low level approach to a pre-calculated pullup point, corrected for wind, the aircraft would then rotate with a smooth pull to a specified pitch angle and fly the calculated heading. As the aircraft passed 10500 feet in the climb the weapon would be released. In other words it was not aimed. Each aircraft type had a specific set of parameter. Initially the Mk 2/301 unrestricted power, was 14 deg climb begun at 18000 yards (IIRC). This was later amended to 15 deg and 18350 yards. This was the latest popup point of all the Vs. The Mk 2 BS, if non-powered, would execute a 2H as would the Victor Mk 2. Their parameters were different. The Vulcan Mk 1 with less powerful engines was something IRO 12 deg and 21500 yards. The Mk 1 crews, with the Calc 3 (7200ft) found they could do a proper NBS computed attack and gain much better results. We practised at West Freugh, attacking through Luce Bay, and got scores IRO 3000 yards at 1 o’clock. The Mk 1 crews were getting score IRO 450 yds. This was one reason why the Mk 2 was retro fitted with the Calc 3 vice 3A. We also got a new attitude instrument for the MFS with a 15 deg pitch mark.

2J – Like the 2G this was for a conventional attack but in a SAM environment. It topped at 2500 feet. Coincidentally the Range Orders stated that we could expect 1 % self-frag damage up to 2250 feet (IIRC) and 1% blast damage up to 3500 feet.

We then had a further profile that was IIRC never given a letter. With great foresight this could have been perfect for the Falklands 12 years later.

The aircraft approached to target at about FL 450 and at 45 miles executed a rapid descent to 18000 feet. Curiously this was above the Calc3A min height of 17200 feet. It was quite exciting but we got good scores.

The only profiles I actually dropped bombs from were the 2 – for 100lb PB, 2F with 28lb PB and the 2J with both 28lb and 1000lb HE.