The 30th was a day of ‘face off’ between the opposing forces. Bragg, feeling that Rosecrans was intending to attack his left wing, strengthened it with Cleburne’s division.  The battle opens on the 31st December, but will go through to the 2nd January.

Federal right wing starts to collapse Federals reform after attack Rosecrans pulls back on left wing Rosecrans near to retreat Photos in the Round Forest

On the night of December 30/31 Sheridan believed that Bragg would make his move on the Federal right wing.  During the night, in response to enemy movement in front of Sill’s brigade, on the right of his division’s sector, he had moved two regiments of reserves to reinforce Sill.  At 4 am his division “was assembled under arms and the cannoneers at their pieces.” On his right the divisions of Davis and Johnson had taken no similar precautions, they were still at rest. When the attack did come Sheridan was ready, the others were not. The attack by Confederate Lt. Gen. Hardee struck Johnson and Davis in flank and rear while they were unready.

The battle opened on the morning of the 31st December, 1862, at around 7:15 a.m. Rosecrans had directed that his forces should start after breakfast whereas Bragg called for a dawn assault, and so got his attack in first.  at a little before 06.30 McCown’s division (Rains brigade on the left, Ector in the centre and McNair on the right) with Cleburne following, moved on Johnson’s Federals.  Hardee threw almost half of the Confederate force against the Federal right, Johnson’s division. Johnson himself was at his HQ, a mile and a half in the rear, so there was no-one directing the troops at the front. Johnson’s force was routed by Cleburne’s attack, and the Federal line started to collapse and reform.  The right was starting to collapse, as it would later at Chickamauga.  When McCook requested support from Rosecrans his message did not mention a collapse or the rout of two of his brigades “the right wing is heavily pressed and needs assistance.” Accordingly Rosecrans responded at the speed necessary for someone ‘hard pressed’ rather than ‘broken and driven back.’

The following is from Henry Castle, a sergeant in the 73rd Illinois.

“An hour after daylight the expected attack came on Johnson’s division a half mile to our right and found it unprepared. Many of the officers were asleep or at breakfast..... the division commander was at his tent, half a mile to the rear.....”

Whle the Confederates had made a shock advance and thrown back the Federal right wing, it was itself losing its coherence.  Some of Cleburne’s division losing their direction in the scrub, fields and split rail fences, were going too far north-west.  While the Confederate attack on the Federal right wing had had initial success, it was soon starting to show a lack of co-ordination.  Cheatham had not advanced and supported Cleburne’s right flank which was now exposed. Bragg ordered Cheatham forward but instead of this being done in force it took place piece-meal against the brigades of Woodruff and Sill.  These brigades were in a good position on a ridge and behind fences.  The butternuts came on; Loomis first, then Vaughan and behind him Manigault, but they did this individualy not as one force en-masse. The attack suffered for that, but Sill was killed in the spirited defence.

Split rail fencing on the battlefield at Antietam. While it was useful for defensive purposes, it was also good as a fuel on a cold winters night.  Photo J Dillon.

Bragg, in his after the battle report wrote; “The enemy was taken completely by surprise. General and staff officers were not mounted, artillery horses not hitched, and infantry not formed.  A hot and inviting breakfast of coffee and other luxuries, to which our gallant and hardy men had long been strangers, was found upon the fire unserved, and was left while we pushed on to the enjoyment of a more inviting feast, that of captured artillery, fleeing battalions, and hosts of craven prisoners begging for the lives they had forfeited by their acts of brutality and atrocity.”

The routing of Johnson’s force had exposed Davis’s right flank, so he reformed against Sheridan’s right, but after further Confederate attacks, Davis was also forced back, exposing Sheridan. Rosecrans depended on Sheridan holding his position to allow the Union line to be ‘refused’, or bent back to cover the flank. Rousseau’s division, held in reserve, was brought down onto Sheridans right. Eventually Sheridan was low on ammunition as well as under pressure from the Confederates and had to withdraw towards the Round Forest, Federals, by around 11:00 a.m. were on a line between the Wilkinson and Nashville Pikes. The area at the junction of the east and south facing units became known as the “Bloody Angle”.  With Sheridan pulling back Hardee turned his attention to the Nashville Pike and Rousseau’s division in the Union rear. He assigned McCown to deal with Rousseau.  Rousseau in turn realised that he needed to change position to meet the Confederates, unfortunately Beatty’s brigade had not got word of the move to the new position along the Nashville Pike.  The brigade of Lucius Polk came up against Beatty and were sent back, but now Beatty realised he was out on his own and must withdraw. As he did so Polk struck again and Beatty’s force was routed. By now the Federal right wing had pretty well folded back from its position south of the Wilkinson pike until it was lying along the Nashville pike.  The Confederates continued attacking the re-formed Federal positions, but as they had earlier that day, they did much of it piece-meal.

The photo on the left shows cannon of Lt. Parson’s battery, shown by the ‘X’ on the map below.  They were fighting hard to hold off the Confederates of Rains’ brigade near the Round Forest.

Photo J. Dillon

The map above is from the “Battle of Stones River” from the Civil War Series.

The drawing above shows the change in the fronts after swing through by the Confederate left wing.

The three photos were taken by myself on a trip to Murfreesboro with my brother-in-law David and his friend Jim during April 2005. These three show the area of the Round Forest defended by Sheridan’s men when their right flank had been wound back by the Confederates.

The developments on his right wing now caused Rosecrans to reassess his intentions on the left.  I include an extract from ‘Stones River’ (The Civil War Series); “Confirmation of the disaster on the right threw Rosecrans into one of his famed fits of nervous hyperactivity. he would remain this way until dusk, and from his agitation came a flood of orders; far too many, thought Sheridan, for troops struggling to survive to obey.  Rosecrans directed brigades, regiments, companies - any body of men he could admonish into his ragtag line.  Sometimes his orders countermanded the efforts of subordinates trying to piece together their units.  Rosecrans frenzy overcame his better judgement.”  This tendency would also show itself at Chickamauga when he would pass orders direct to units without necessarily informing their corps or divisional commanders.

The divisions of Palmer and Wood that had not yet crossed the river were sent to reinforce the right wing, while the orders for Crittenden to cross were changed, and all his forces except one rearguard brigade were ordered back to support the defense of the right wing. Although it had not been his plan, Rosecrans now had a strong line along the Nashville Pike which was able to beat off the Confederate attacks. 

As well as the assault on the Federal right wing, the Round Forest behind the Cowan farm had become a focus for Bragg during the battle on the 31st December. In this scrub forest was Hazen’s brigade, to his left Wagner’s and to Hazen’s right, Croft’s brigade. The first attack was by Chalmer’s 2,000 Mississippians at 9am but the charred remains of the Cowan farm lay in their path and split the attacking forces in two.  Following Chalmer’s attack Donelson went in with his brigade on Chalmer’s left at 10am, but Chalmer’s routed attack left many of his men in Donelson’s attack path, so his force also split up.  Some ended up being destroyed in front of the Round Forest, the rest headed towards Croft, but Stewart’s Confederate force was now on the flank of Croft and threatening his rear.  Croft withdrew. Rosecrans and Thomas threw in men to stop Stewart and Donelson, which they did, but by 12.00 the Confederates were dangerously close to cutting the Nashvill Pike, which would be a disaster for Rosecrans.  While Rosecrans rode off to supervise the defense of the collapsing right wing under the attacks from Cleburne, Brig. Gen. Hascall was left as the senior commander in the Round Forest.  Hascall knew he had to hold the position to prevent the collapse of the left wing as well as the right.

Breckinridge had been told by Bragg that a hill on the east side of the river which enabled them to put down artillery fire on the Federals was “the key to the position”, and to hold it, this was Wayne’s Hill. This he had done, and Van Cleeve’s advance over the river in the morning had been repulsed. Unfortunately Breckinridge was unaware that Van Cleeve had then been withdrawn to support the Federals in the centre. As a result, when he received an order from Bragg at 1 p.m. to leave one brigade and march the rest to support Polk & Hardee, he said it was himself who needed reinforcing and did not move until given a direct order by Bragg at 2 p.m. He then sent two brigades following himself with the last two at about 3 p.m. This piecemeal attack by the brigades of Adams, then Jackson, then Palmer and Preston against the Federal centre, and four artillery batteries, had the result that all the courageous Confederate assaults were beaten back with great loss to Bragg’s force. The following from Bragg’s report;

“These unfortunate misapprehensions on that part of the field (which, with proper precaution, could not have existed) withheld from active operations three fine brigades until the enemy had succeeded in checking our progress, had reestablished his lines, and had collected many of his broken battalions.”

There were further Confederate attacks in the afternoon, but nothing conclusive.  On New Year’s Eve Rosecrans called his Corps and Divisional Commanders into a conference. Many were despondent and Rosecrans asked his cavalry commander, general Stanley “Is your command in shape to cover a retreat”.  Not a very positive view of the situation.  Thomas and Sheridan were resolved that there should be no retreat and convinced Rosecrans to make a stand; “If you are not attacked by six o’clock this morning” said Rosecrans to his commanders, “you will open the fight promptly, posted as you are, and move on to Murfreesboro.  Clear the field yet tonight of all wounded and see to it that your ammunition is well up; we will whip this fight tomorrow.” Outside the conference he saw firebrands away to the right where Overall Creek runs north at right angles to the Pike, he mistakenly took these to be Confederate fires (they were in fact Federals) and believed the enemy had now got in his rear. In this case there could be no way to retreat, and so he determined to stand firm.  Such is the ‘fog of war’, right decision, wrong reason. Meanwhile Bragg could be forgiven at this time if he believed he had done enough to win the day. He still held Murfreesboro, he had driven the Federals from their original positions, and caused them to suffer very heavy casualties.

On the 1st of January the two armies faced each other, but took no real action against the other, though the Federals did reposition their guns, concentrating many of them on the left wing. Rosecrans had ordered Crittenden to occupy the hight ground above McFadden’s Ford, which they did while Bragg waited, as he would after Chickamauga.  Bragg, frustrated that Rosecrans had not retreated from the field as he had expected him to, would try the next day.