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Sunday, 20th September, would decide the battle. In a sense that Suday started on the evening of the 19th when Bragg gave his orders to his commanders.
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Map showing positions during the morning of Sunday, 20th September.
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The map above shows the reason why Thomas, during Rosecrans’ council of war on the evening of the 19th, had felt some concern for the strength of the right wing below the Brotherton Cabin.
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Rosecrans started the day with a review of his position. From his post battle report.
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I found General McCook's right too far up on the crest, and General Davis in reserve on a wooded hill-side west of and parallel to the Dry Valley road. I mentioned these defects to the general, desiring Davis division to be brought down at once, moved more to the left and placed in close column by division, doubled on the center, in a sheltered position.
I found General Crittenden's two divisions massed at the foot of the same hill in the valley and called his attention to it, desiring them to be moved farther to the left.
General Thomas' troops were in the position indicated, except Palmer's line was to be closed more compactly.
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Bragg had decided to split his army into two wings, making Polk (in whom he had considerable reservations regarding his competence) the commander of the right wing, and Longstreet, when he arrived, commander on the left. The composition of the two wings were;
Polk:- Hill’s corps, Walker’s corps and Cheatham’s division. Hill, a Lt.Gen. was made subordinate to Polk, although they both held the same rank.
Longstreet:- Hood’s corps, Buckner’s corps and Hindman’s division of Polk’s corps.
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Longstreet’s post-battle report; As soon as our horses came up (about 4 o’clock), I started with Colonels Sorrel and Manning, of my staff, to find the headquarters of the commanding general. We missed our way and did not report till near 11 o’clock at night. Upon my arrival, I was informed that the troops had been engaged during the day in severe skirmishing while endeavoring to get in line for battle. The commanding general gave me a map showing the roads and streems between Lookout Mountain and the Chickamauga River, and a general description of our position, and informed me that the battle was ordered at daylight the next morning, the action to be brought on upon our right and to be taken up successively to the left, the general movement to be a wheel upon my extreme left as a pivot. I was assigned to the command of the Left Wing, composed of Hood’s and Hindman’s divisions, an improvised division under brig. Gen. B.R. Johnson, and Buckner’s corps, consisting of Stewart’s and Preston’s divisions. The artillery consisted of the battalions of Majors Williams, Robertson, and Leyden, together with some other batteries attached to brigades.
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Bragg’s plan was that Polk’s force would initiate the attack on the Federal left at day-break, the attack would then roll southward and drive the Federals away from Chattanooga.
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Polk
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The following is from Bragg’s post battle report.
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Upon the close of the engagement on the evening of the 19th, the proper commanders were summoned to my camp fire, and there received specific information and instructions touching the dispositions of the troops and for the operations of the next morning. The whole force was divided for the next morning into two commands and assigned to the two senior lieutenant-generals, Longstreet and Polk-the former to the left, where all his own troops were stationed, the latter continuing his command of the right. Lieutenant-General Longstreet reached my headquarters about 11 p.m., and immediately received his instructions. After a few hours' rest at my camp fire he moved at daylight to his line, just in front of my position. Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to assail the enemy on our extreme right at day-dawn on the 20th, and to take up the attack in succession rapidly to the left. The left wing was to await the attack by the right, take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent.
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When Polk had received his orders from Bragg it was then his responsibility to get those orders written up and distributed out to his subordinate commanders. These would be written out by his staff and sent by courier to Hill, Walker and Cheatham. At this point the system broke down. Although the written orders were received by Walker and Cheatham, the courier with Hill’s instructions could not find him to deliver them. When he returned to Head Quarters he was not allowed to wake anyone, so HQ did not know that Hill was unaware of his orders, and the need for a dawn attack, or that one of his divisions was to initiate it.
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When Polk woke around 5am. he soon discovered that Hill had not received his orders, so he had them sent out again. Hill and his divisional commanders received their orders at around 6am. However, Hill now complained to Polk and so to Bragg, that he would need time to issue rations and reform his line, and that this would cause some delay in the planned dawn attack.
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The day was not starting well, and the old tensions between Bragg and his commanders were resurfacing.
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