On the 19th September we see the opposing forces engaged in larger scale actions as the battle moves towards its climax on the 20th.  I have split the day into three time periods; Dawn to midday, Early afternoon and then Late afternoon.

On the 18th the Confederates had crossed the Chickamauga at Reed’s Bridge and Alexander’s Bridge.  In crossing the former they had forced Minty to the west side of the bridge, and he might have thought that he had destroyed it as planned when he crossed. However, he had not, it was only damaged, so allowing the Confederates to cross. Knowing Minty’s situation, Granger, commanding the Reserve Corps at Rossville, sent Colonel Dan McCook up the Cjickamauga to assist Minty.

McCook arrived at dusk after Minty had been driven back, and in the gathering darkness made a false assessment of the situation.  Around about the vicinity of Jay’s Mill he came into contact with some of McNair’s brigade, and took some prisoners. McCook believed it was just a small force his side of the bridge, and believed it to be cut off in its rear because he believed the Reed’s Bridge to have been destroyed by Minty. We now move to the morning of the 19th.

By this time in the campaign people were beginning to notice the strain on Rosecrans, he had taken much of the earlier detailed planning upon himself, he had felt it necessary to take issue with Washington when they had wanted him to pus on, and he had felt the need to wait for his supply lines to be secured. General Stanley; “Rosecrans habitually used himself badly in time of excitement.  He never slept, he overworked himself, he smoked incessantly.  At Iuka and Stone River, the stress of excitement did not exceed a week.  His strong constitution could stand that, but at Chickamauga this strain lasted a month, and Rosecrans’ health was badly broken.”  On the morning of the 19th the correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial saw him and commented; “I knew, for I had seen Rosecrans often under widely differing circumstances, that he was filled with apprehensions for the issue of that day’s fight. I recognized a change instantly, although I could hardly say in what it consisted. Rosecrans is usually brisk, nervous, powerful of presence, and to see him silent or absorbed in what looked like gloomy contemplation, filled me with indefinable dread.  Remember this was just for an instant, and when the leader thought he was entirely unobserved. Rosecrans is too good a soldier to let his face reflect to his men, either his hopes or his forbodings.” Maybe it was this tiredness that allowed his brittle nature to show itself again during the battle and to make decisions that he might later regret.

All through the 19th Bragg would stick to his original battleplan, even though it was becoming obvious that the battle was not following his plan. The intention had been to move forces downstream (north) along the Chickamauga, to overlap and turn the Federal left.  The morning attack by Thomas towards Reed’s Bridge should have told him the size of Thomas’ force, and that Rosecrans had moved a number of his units to that area. It also should have shown him that he did not have the intended overlap.  He was not going to be in a position to attack southwards, he would have to attack to the west with the Chickamauga at his back.

As the Confederate units crossed the Chickamauga by various fords and bridges they were then marched north before being brought into action; Cheatham would march for three miles, while D.H. Hill whose force had started on the left of Bragg’s army was marched six miles to the extreme northern end before joining the engagement. Both armies would find themselves feeding in units from south to north, pretty much piecemeal, as situations required them.

During all this time Rosecrans had a weak point between Lee & Gordon’s Mill and the Kelly Field as his forces were marched north to support Thomas.  These units could have been attacked in flank if Bragg’s focus had not been so intent on his original plan.